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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction and Summary of Findings 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The change in the distribution of the population across different age groups is an 
important explanatory factor for economic and productivity growth (Bloom and 
Williamson, 1998; Mason, 2005). As a consequence of demographic transition, the 
number of working-age adults grows larger over time relative to the dependent 
population. This increase of the working age population share leads to a potential 
opportunity of rapid economic growth, known as the Demographic Dividend (Bloom 
et al., 2002). In this thesis demographic transition is defined as the process of change 
from a situation of both high birth and death rates (at or near equilibrium) to a 
situation in which both birth and death rates are low (at or near equilibrium). The 
demographic dividend may lead to faster economic growth as different population age 
groups have specific economic characteristics. Young people (0-14 years) require 
investment in education and health, prime-age adults (15-64 years) provide labor and 
savings, while the aged (65+) need health care and retirement income. If the number 
of working-age adults grows larger relative to the dependent population, less 
expenditure are needed to meet the needs of the youngest and the oldest age groups, 
as a result of which resources become available for investment in human development 
and general economic welfare. However, an optimal utilization of the demographic 
dividend requires a careful assessment of the changing population age structure and 
the accompanying policy framework. The demographic dividend is not an automatic 
phenomenon, but requires an integrated policy framework (health, education, labor Introduction and Summary of Findings 
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markets policies) to transform the potential opportunity of high economic growth in 
reality. In absence of such required changes in the policy framework and proper 
planning, the potential demographic dividend can turn into a demographic burden in 
the form of an army of unskilled, uneducated and unemployed youth.  
The potential opportunity to utilize the demographic dividend well is currently 
quite strong for emerging market economies. The process of demographic transition 
for developed countries took far longer than it will take for emerging economies. 
Bloom et al. (2003) show that the demographic transition process in Western Europe 
started in the middle of the eighteenth century and took nearly 150 years, whereas it 
will take only 50-75 years in East Asia. Consequently, the share of the population in 
productive age groups is also expected to be higher. The World Population Prospects 
Report of the United Nations (2008) reveals that the share of prime-age adults in 
developed countries peaked in 2005 and started to decline afterwards, but it will 
continue to rise in less developed economies up to 2040.  
Although differences in the pace of demographic transition are important, we 
need to point out that other country-specific determinants may affect economic 
growth too. In his Nobel Prize memorial lecture in 1971, Simon Kuznets already 
discussed the wide disparity of growth patterns between pre-industrialized developed 
and current developing countries. Referring specifically to China, India and Pakistan, 
he mentioned that …no country that entered modern economic growth (except Russia) 
approached the size of India or China, or even of Pakistan and Indonesia; and no 
currently developed country had to adjust to the very high rates of natural increase of 
population that have characterized many less developed countries over the last two or 
three decades. In the same lecture Kuznets also pointed out that, while the stock of 
material and social technology that can be tapped by less developed countries today is 
much larger than that in the nineteenth and even early twentieth century, the 
technological backwardness is also much greater now. In spite of these observations 
back in 1971, the emerging economies of China and India managed to achieve extra-
ordinary growth rates of which a significant part can be attributed to the demographic 
dividend, as we will show in this thesis. 
 Chapter 1 
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Figure 1.1 : Demographic transition and economic growth 
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1.1 Research questions and analytical framework 
The main research question of this thesis is: What are the mechanisms behind the 
relationship between demographic transition and economic growth? To answer this 
question, this thesis focuses on the distribution of the population across different age 
groups and its implication for economic growth and productivity. There are various 
channels through which demographic transition can affect these key economic targets, 
of which an increase in labor supply, labor productivity, investment in human and Introduction and Summary of Findings 
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physical capital, and saving are the most important.  
Figure 1 provides a graphical description of the mechanisms behind the 
relationship between demographic transition and economic growth that will be 
investigated in this thesis. Mason (2005) divides demographic dividend as a result of 
demographic transition into two parts: one that occurs as a result of a changing age 
structure and one that occurs due to a higher saving rate and more investment in 
human capital as a result of lower mortality and longer life spans. This thesis focuses 
primarily on the impact of a changing age structure, although we will not ignore the 
investment component of the growth story.
1 Figure 1.1 shows that the age structure 
effect consists of two elements. First, a higher concentration of population in 
productive ages may lead to an increase in labor supply, provided that labor market 
can absorb the large number of workers in a productive way. Second, due to a decline 
in family size and saving of childcare time, relatively more women are likely to enter 
the labor market, both in terms of higher participation and in a larger number of 
working hours. Consequently, our four sub-questions are: 
(i)  What is the impact of demographic transition, i.e., a change of the 
distribution of the population across different age groups, on economic 
growth? (chapter 2) 
(ii)  How does female labor force participation behavior change with fertility 
decline and economic development? (chapter 3) 
(iii)  What is the impact of an increase in labor force participation of different 
age groups and by gender on labor productivity growth? (chapter 4) 
(iv)  How does the effect of different determinants of labor productivity vary at 
different levels of age dependency? (chapter 5) 
By answering these questions we should be better able to find out whether the 
expected demographic changes can accelerate economic growth, or pose a threat that 
can hinder economic growth.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The impact of a changing age structure on savings and investment is beyond the scope of the current 
thesis but will be the topic of future research in the near future (Choudhry, 2010). Chapter 1 
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1.2 Thesis outline and value addition 
The thesis consists of five chapters addressing the impact of demographic transition 
on economic growth through labor market dynamics in developing and emerging 
economies. 
 Chapter 2 determines the contribution of demographic variables to economic 
growth. For this purpose, we use an augmented Solow-Swan neoclassical growth 
model extended to include demographic variables. The demographic variables that 
will be included are the growth differential between the working-age population and 
the total population, child dependency and old-age dependency ratios. These variables 
are motivated by a transition of the augmented Solow-Swan neoclassical growth 
model formulated in output per worker growth into a comparable model formulated in 
output per capita growth. To estimate this model we use data for seventy countries 
over the period 1961-2003. Modern panel data techniques are employed in the 
empirical estimation. A comparison with the traditional cross-section approach shows 
that the panel data approach performs better due to the dynamic nature of the 
population age distribution.  
The added value of the second chapter is twofold. First, we extend the 
theoretical framework for economic growth by incorporating the demographic 
variables in the model. Our results show that change in age composition of population 
and age dependency matters for economic growth. Second, we calculate the role of 
demographic variables in explaining the economic growth in China, India and 
Pakistan. Although the main objective of this chapter is to analyze the overall effect 
of demographic transition on economic growth, we focus on the impact of 
demographic variables on economic growth in China, India and Pakistan over the last 
four decades. In addition, we forecast their role in coming decades and provide policy 
suggestions to properly utilize their potential. From a policy viewpoint, our results 
underline the strong need to better understand the pace and timing of the demographic 
transition process and the transformation process of “demographic dividend” into 
economic growth. Most of the developing and emerging market economies are 
passing through or are about to enter a stage where they can actually get the benefits 
from the demographic transition. But there is no guarantee that the true quantum of Introduction and Summary of Findings 
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these benefits will be realized. Reasons are unpreparedness and lack of an adequate 
policy framework to utilize the demographic dividend.  
 Chapter 3 focuses on the change in female labor force participation as a result 
of fertility decline and economic development. This chapter determines the impact of 
demographic transition on female labor supply behavior for different age groups and 
investigates the relationship between women's labor force participation and per capita 
income levels. Several behavioral changes may occur along the demographic 
transition process. Long life expectancy can lead to changes in investment in human 
capital, saving behavior, the retirement decision and the attitude towards women in 
society. If the fertility rate declines and child care responsibilities diminish, women 
also have more time to participate in the labor market (Bruno and Rodrigo, 2007). 
Goldin (1995) and Mammen and Paxson (2000) show that the relationship between 
female labor force participation rates and per capita income around the world is U-
shaped. To analyze the role of demographic dynamics on women's labor force 
participation and to investigate the existence of a U-shaped female labor supply 
behavior, we use a panel of 40 countries over the period 1960-2005. As the fertility 
rate may not be exogenous, since several studies found that those who participate in 
the labor force tend to have fewer children (Lesthaeghe, 1995; Sundström, 2000), we 
overcome the problem of reverse causation by treating the fertility rate as an 
endogenous variable and use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the 
parameters of our model. 
The added value of the analysis in chapter 3 is threefold. First, it evaluates the 
impact of fertility decline on female labor supply behavior of ten different age groups 
over the period 1960-2000. It is found that fertility decline has a positive effect on 
female labor force participation but that the impact varies across different age groups. 
As was to be expected, we find that the positive effect of fertility decline is higher in 
the child-bearing age group of women aged 15-44. Nevertheless, the impact on other 
age groups also appears to be significant, which implies that studies that restrict the 
analysis to certain (prime) age groups will underestimate the overall impact of fertility 
decline on female labor supply. Second, the impact of fertility decline depends on the 
level of economic development of a particular country. In low income countries the 
impact of fertility decline is different than in high-income countries. A model with Chapter 1 
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interaction effects is used to capture the impact of various determinants of female 
participation at different levels of the capital stock per worker (as a proxy for 
economic development). Previous studies of Pampel and Tanaka (1986), Tansel 
(2002) and Fatima and Sultana (2009) already considered the square of the level of 
income per worker. In these three studies the coefficient of the level of income per 
worker is found to be negative and significant and that of its square to be positive and 
significant. However, since we find that the coefficients of other interaction effects 
are significant too, we conclude that only one interaction effect is not sufficient to 
uncover the supposed U-shaped relationship. Third, this chapter not only finds that the 
impact of fertility transition differs between age groups, but it also calculates the 
turning points of the explanatory variables for different age groups, the income level 
at which the impact of the explanatory variables changes sign.  
The theory of demographic transition predicts that as a result of fertility 
decline there will be a change in the age composition of the population. The increase 
of the relative size of the working-age population may lead to more labor supply. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of increasing labor force participation rates on labor 
productivity. One would assume that one of the factors affecting labor productivity is 
the availability of productive and decent employment. However, in developing 
countries, where there is already a substantial level of unemployment and 
underemployment, a rise in labor supply often results in further underemployment and 
unemployment, since these economies do not have the capacity to produce 
employment opportunities for the new entrants on the labor market. To evaluate the 
impact of increased labor supply, the relationship between labor force participation 
and productivity growth needs to be investigated (McGuckin and van Ark, 2005; 
Broersma, 2008). This chapter contains an empirical analysis of this relationship for 
45 countries in different regions of the world over the period 1980-2005, with a 
particular focus on transition and developing economies.  
The added value of the fourth chapter is threefold. First, our results show that 
there exists a tradeoff between productivity and labor force participation in the short 
term. Second, this tradeoff tends to fade away after several years, revealing that the 
increase in labor force participation has a positive effect on economic growth in the 
medium to long term. However, due to this short-term tradeoff effect, largely related Introduction and Summary of Findings 
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to the pro-cyclicality of productivity, previous findings that an increase in working-
age population share opens a window of opportunity should be taken with care 
(Bloom  et al., 2002; Kelley and Schmidt, 2005; Mason, 2005). Third, although a 
number of studies already identified a tradeoff between productivity and labor force 
participation (Beaudry and Collard 2002; McGuckin and van Ark, 2005; Becker and 
Gordon, 2008; Broersma, 2008), most of these studies are restricted to high income 
countries. This chapter investigates the nature of this relationship for developing and 
emerging economies and finds that the intensity of this tradeoff varies across 
countries and is related to the income level. The tradeoff is weakest in developed high 
income economies, where it fades away in less than five years. By contrast, in 
developing and transition countries the tradeoff is stronger and weakens more slowly 
after multiple years. 
Chapter 5 provides further insights on the divergence of labor productivity 
across different regions and income groups around the world. The purpose of this 
chapter is to test whether the age composition of population affects the impact of 
different determinants on labor productivity across countries. The empirical analysis 
is based on a panel of up to 110 countries over the period 1980-2005. Using a model 
with interaction effects, among which the age dependency ratio and social, economic 
and infrastructural determinants of labor productivity, we find that at higher levels of 
age dependency, the impact of certain productivity determinants becomes 
insignificant. 
The added value of this final chapter is twofold. First, we find that the main 
determinants of labor productivity not only have a direct impact on labor productivity 
but that their impact is also conditional on the age composition of total population. 
Previous studies have investigated the effect of various determinants on labor 
productivity, among which gross capital formation, ICT investment, inflation and 
financial development (Islam, 2008; Belorgey et al., 2006), as well as the effect of 
labor force participation rates (Feyrer, 2007; Choudhry and Van Ark, Chapter 4 of 
this thesis). However, to the best of our knowledge, no study before has considered 
interaction effects. Second, in this chapter, we investigate the effect of different Chapter 1 
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determinants of productivity in OECD and non-OECD countries separately
2. Our 
results indicate that higher age dependency has a negative effect on labor 
productivity, not only directly but also via other social, economic and infrastructural 
determinants of labor productivity. This finding implies that if the working-age 
population grows larger during the process of demographic transition, productivity 
growth will boost, not only because of the direct effect of age dependency but also 
because of its interaction effects on other socio-economic determinants of labor 
productivity. Up to now, these interactive impacts have not been taken into account in 
the literature. Moreover, our findings also help to explain labor productivity 
differentials across high-income OECD countries, which are affected by an aging 
population, and low-income non-OECD countries. 
1.3 Main findings of the thesis  
This thesis finds strong empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that changes in 
the distribution of the population across different age groups affects economic growth 
along the process of demographic transition. However, it is also clear that an increase 
of the relative size of the working-age population does not necessarily transform itself 
into a demographic dividend unless an adequate policy framework is adopted to 
realize this potential opportunity.  
  In relation to the research questions formulated in section 1.2, we draw five 
main conclusions from this thesis: (i) The distribution of the population across 
different age groups may boost economic growth temporarily (when working age 
population share dominates in total population share), (ii) Fertility decline has a 
positive effect on female labor force supply behavior, (iii) The relationship between 
women's labor force participation and per capita income around the world is U-shaped 
because women's labor force participation rates first fall during the process of 
economic development and then start to increase again, (iv) There exists a tradeoff 
between productivity and labor force participation in the short term, which fades away 
in the medium term providing opportunities for catch-up growth for emerging and 
developing economies , and (v) Age dependency has a negative effect on labor 
                                                 
2 In contrast to all those studies explaining GDP per capita, most studies analyzing productivity 
determinants focused on OECD countries only. One exception is Islam (2008). Introduction and Summary of Findings 
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productivity growth, as well as a negative effect on the impact of other social and 
economic variables on labor productivity growth. 
Age structure and economic growth 
The impact of the distribution of the population across different age groups on 
economic growth is discussed in chapters 2 and 5 of this study. In chapter 2, we find 
that GDP per capita growth is positively related to the growth differential between the 
working-age population and the total population, and negatively related to child and 
old-age dependency ratios. Based on this model, we find that together these effects 
explain 46 per cent of growth in per capita GDP in China over the period 1961-2003, 
39 per cent in India, and 25 per cent in Pakistan. All three economies show up a 
positive demographic dividend effect and they will continue to do so in the next 
decade. 
  In chapter 5, we also investigate the impact of age dependency on labor 
productivity. To better understand growth differentials across countries, more and 
more studies focus on productivity rather than just aggregate GDP effects (Hall and 
Jones, 1999; Kogel, 2005; Islam, 2008). We find that age dependency has a direct 
negative effect on labor productivity growth, as well as an indirect negative effect via 
other determinants of labor productivity. In addition, we find that child dependency is 
more harmful for economic and labor productivity growth in developing and 
emerging economies than old age dependency. It implies that declining child 
dependency in developing and emerging economies will boost labor productivity 
growth in these economies. 
Fertility decline and female labor supply behavior 
In chapter 3, we investigate the relationship between fertility and female labor force 
participation. Fertility appears to have a large negative and significant effect on the 
participation rate of females in different age groups (15-19, 20-24, …, 60-64), whereas 
the interaction effect between fertility and the capital-labor ratio (a proxy for 
economic development) appears to have a positive effect. This positive effect, 
however, is only significant for females aged between 15-19 and 20-24. The fact that 
the coefficient of the fertility variable is negative and that of the product term with the 
capital-labor ratio is positive indicates that fertility has a negative effect on the female Chapter 1 
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labor force participation rate in lower income economies and a positive effect in 
higher income economies. The turning point for the total female working-age 
population amounts to US $69,410 available capital stock per worker. In other words, 
in countries located in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and South 
America, fertility affects participation negatively, while in countries located in 
Europe, North America and Oceania, fertility affects participation positively. The 
explanation is that the latter countries not only provide more child care facilities but 
also provide more financial support to families with young children, among which 
paid parental leave and childcare subsidies (Jaumotte, 2003). First, paid parental 
leaves help mothers of young children reconcile work and family life, and may 
strengthen labor market attainment through a job guarantee. Second, childcare 
subsidies reduce the relative price of childcare, thereby increasing the return of 
market work relative to home production (in addition to increasing effective income). 
The turning points in terms of capital stock per worker for females in the prime-age 
groups are higher than those for the younger and older age groups. It implies that 
teenagers and elderly women are the first who will enter the labor market as a result 
of fertility decline when income levels rise, then women in the younger age groups 
20-24 and 25-29 and, finally, women in the age groups 30-34, 35-39 and 40-44. 
  Our results also point out that when fertility declines by four births per 
woman, which represents the difference between fertility rates in low-income and 
high-income economies, the total female labor force participation rate will rise by 
about 19 percentage points. 
Economic development and female economic participation 
Chapter 3 of this thesis finds strong empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that 
the relationship between women's labor force participation and per capita income 
around the world is U-shaped. A microeconomic framework of the labor force 
participation decision is aggregated across individuals to show that fertility, the share 
of employment in agriculture, education and the income level (measured by the 
capital-labor ratio) are the key variables explaining the female labor force 
participation rate in countries at different levels of economic development. A 
quadratic functional form in the capital-labor ratio is estimated for females in ten 
different age groups using data for 40 countries in different income classes over the Introduction and Summary of Findings 
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period 1960-2000. For every age group and for every explanatory variable in the 
model we find a particular point where the regime of falling participation rates change 
into a regime of rising participation rates. The policy implication is that every country 
can eventually narrow the gap in labor force participation rate between men and 
women. 
Tradeoff between participation and labor productivity 
In chapter 4, we study the relationship between productivity and participation in 
different regions of the world for the period 1980-2005. There generally is a strong 
tradeoff between productivity growth and participation, as the former tends to save 
jobs. However, the causes of this tradeoff as well as their intensity may differ between 
countries. By analyzing patterns of the participation-productivity tradeoff across 
regions and different income groups, we find that the intensity of the tradeoff varies 
across countries and is related to the income level of the country. The tradeoff is 
weakest in developed high income economies, where it fades away in less than five 
years. However, the tradeoff is stronger in developing and transition countries and 
weakens more slowly after multiple years. We also find that the tradeoff has become 
weaker after 1995 for all regions and income groups except for transition economies. 
The results show that Africa is a victim of low productivity trap because of 
unproductive employment growth, whereas the Southeast Asian region shows positive 
growth both in employment and productivity. Along with pro-cyclical nature of labor 
productivity, this diversity in the pattern of tradeoffs may be explained by differences 
in structural transformation phases and dissimilar labor market institutions between 
transition and developed countries. For example, developing and low income 
economies still mainly depend on agriculture for employment generation and this 
sector is less productive compared to other sectors because of high underemployment. 
The productivity-participation tradeoff is therefore the worst for most of the African 
and South Asian countries where the agricultural sector in many cases still accounts 
for half to more than two thirds of total employment. 
In chapter 4 we also investigate the extent of this tradeoff for female workers 
and young and aged workers, and find that the impact of female and young workers 
(15-24 years) participation on labor productivity growth is negative and significant. 
 Chapter 1 
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Age dependency and labor productivity 
In chapter 5, we find that higher age dependency impacts labor productivity 
negatively not only directly but also modifies the effect of other social, economic and 
institutional determinants of labor productivity. These findings imply that the 
performance of these determinants is conditional on different levels of age 
dependency. At higher levels of age dependency, the impact of certain productivity 
determinants becomes insignificant. Separate analyses for 27 high income OECD 
countries and 83 other countries provide very similar kind of marginal impacts of 
gross capital formation (GCF), information and communication technology (ICT) and 
labor market reforms (LMR). However, the marginal impact of financial development 
slightly differs among OECD and other countries, We find that in high income OECD 
countries, financial development marginal effect on labor productivity curve is more 
steeper as compared to developing economies which implies that financial 
development will promote labor productivity at high level of age dependency This 
may be due to the different nature of age dependency in high income developed and 
developing economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction and Summary of Findings 
14 
 
 
 
  Chapter 2 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in 
China, India and Pakistan
1 
 
                                         
2.1 Introduction 
The world population tripled over the past half-century and much of this increase was 
accounted for by developing and emerging economies. One question that has attracted 
a lot of attention in the literature concerns the economic consequences of rapid 
population growth. In most neoclassical modeling it is assumed that the labor force 
growth rate is equal to the population growth rate (Kelley and Schmidt, 2005). This 
assumption is relevant in the longer run when both population size and the distribution 
of the population across different age groups stabilize, but it is less relevant in periods 
of demographic transition when mortality and fertility rates change from high to low 
levels. Economic growth may boost temporarily when during the process of 
demographic transition the number of working-age adults grows large relative to the 
dependent population, and slow down when a population ages rapidly (Bloom and 
Williamson, 1998; Kelley and Schmidt, 2005).  
The objective of this chapter is to determine the effect of demographic 
transition on economic growth in China, India and Pakistan, not only in the past but 
also in the future. Although demographic transition will only boost economic growth 
                                                      
1 This Chapter is based on the paper “Demographic transition and economic growth in China, India 
and Pakistan” written with Paul Elhorst. The paper is accepted for publication in Economic Systems. 
We are grateful to Bart van Ark for constructive comments on previous versions of this chapter. We 
also thank participants of the conferences of the European Society of Population Economics in 2008 
and of the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies in 2009 for useful comments and 
critical remarks. 
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in countries that are passing through the middle phase of the demographic transition 
process, developed countries that have reached the last phase of the demographic 
transition process in which the population ages will be included too. This is because 
sufficient variation in the data is a prerequisite for obtaining significant effects and 
these countries offer additional information about the types of effects that occur not 
only if the number of working-age adults grows large, but also if the number of 
working-age adults starts decreasing again. In total, we use data from seventy 
countries located in different regions of the world and being in different phases of the 
demographic transition process. The data set covers the period 1961-2003. Only when 
computing the contribution of demographic changes to economic growth and when 
forecasting the growth potential of demographic changes, we will restrict the data set 
to China, India and Pakistan. 
To evaluate the impact of demographic transition on economic growth, we use 
an augmented Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model extended to include 
demographic variables (Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Asian 
Development Bank, 1997; Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Kelley and Schmidt, 2005). 
The type of demographic variables that will be included is motivated by a transition of 
this model formulated in output per worker growth into a comparable model 
formulated in output per capita growth. This transition extends the framework 
proposed by Bloom and Williamson (1998). 
One relevant question asks to what extent differences found in the contribution 
of demographic variables are attributable to the way in which applied econometricians 
analyze a given body of data. One part of the literature uses data in a cross-section, 
while another part combines time-series and cross-sectional data. Mankiw et al. 
(1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) are classic references of the first approach, 
while Islam (1995) is the most prominent example of the second. Within the literature 
that combines time-series and cross-sectional data, considerable discussion also arises 
about two concerns: the appropriate time length to use when a total sample period is 
divided into several shorter periods, and the inclusion of fixed effects. For example, 
whereas Bloom and Williamson (1998) adopt a cross-section model, Kelley and 
Schmidt (2005) adopt a panel data model including country and time-period fixed 
effects. In this chapter we apply the cross-section as well as the panel data approach 
and test for endogeneity for some of the explanatory variables to find out which Chapter 2 
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econometric model best describes the data. 
Our particular interest in Pakistan, India and China is mainly due to three 
reasons. First, all three countries are emerging economies with impressive economic 
growth rates in the recent past. Second, they are in the top ten worlds ranking of 
countries based on population size. In this respect, it should be noted that these three 
economies account for nearly forty percent of world population. Third, all three 
countries are passing through the process of demographic transition but at a different 
pace and over a different time period. Therefore, it is pertinent to explore the impact 
of demographic transition on their economic performance both in the past and in the 
future. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, we present a detailed 
comparative analysis of the process of demographic transition in China, India and 
Pakistan. In section 2.3, we describe the augmented Solow-Swan model extended to 
include demographic variables that is used for testing the empirical relationship 
between the demographic transition process and economic growth and, in section 2.4, 
we present and discuss the empirical findings. Based on this model, we calculate the 
relative contribution of demographic variables to economic growth in China, India 
and Pakistan over the period 1961-2003 in section 2.5. In section 2.6, we map the 
future prospects of the demographic transition process on economic growth in China, 
India and Pakistan over the period 2005-2050. In the concluding section we 
summarize our main findings. 
2.2 Demographic transition and demographic dividend in Pakistan, India and 
China 
Since we are particularly interested in the effect of demographic transition on the 
economies of Pakistan, India and China, we briefly describe the process of 
demographic transition and the main factors behind this process in these three 
countries.  
Figure 2.1 shows that the demographic transition process started with a decline 
of the Crude Death Rate (CDR) in the early 1950s. This decline proceeded most 
rapidly in China, followed by India and Pakistan. Over the period 1950-2000, the 
decline of the CDR was the lowest for Pakistan. The decline in mortality was 
accompanied by an increase in life expectancy. Over the period 1950-2000, life Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China, India and Pakistan 
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expectancy at birth rose by 28.9 years for China, 26.2 years for India, and 19.5 years 
for Pakistan. Although not shown, the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) also declined. This 
decline ran analogously to the decline of the crude death rate and the increase in life 
expectancy. 
The fall in infant mortality induced parents to reduce fertility, the second 
phase of the demographic transition process, although they did not adjust 
immediately. Except for Pakistan, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) started to decline in 
the late 1960s (Figure 2.2). One explanation for the sharp decline in China after 1970 
is the introduction of the so-called wan xi shao birth control campaign (later 
marriages, longer interval between births, and fewer children). This policy was 
followed by the family planning program of "one child policy" in 1979. One of the 
effects was that the Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR) ― the percentage of 
women between 15-49 years who are practicing, or whose sexual partners are 
practicing, any form of contraception ― increased. For example, it rose from 64.4 
percent in 1981 to 77.3 percent in 1987. It should be stressed that India was actually 
the first country to adopt a family planning program (1951) with full government 
support. Initially, it was a clinic-based program but in the 1960s this program was 
extended to include efforts by media and health workers to motivate couples to accept 
contraception.  
The CPR, however, was and still is lower than that in China. It rose from 4.4 
percent in 1967 to only 52 percent in 2004. A similar pattern occurred in Pakistan. In 
1952, the Family Planning Association of Pakistan initiated efforts to control rapid 
population growth. Three years later the government began to fund the association 
and emphasized the need to reduce population growth in its First Five-Year Plan 
(1955-60). However, population policy was suspended during the 1960s for political 
and religious reasons. In 1980 the Population Division was renamed the Population 
Welfare Division and transferred to the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Development. This agency was charged with the delivery of both family planning 
services and maternal and child health care. Pakistan's CPR rose from 3.3 percent in 
1979 to 27.6 percent in 2000. 
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Figure 2.1: Demographic transition in China, India and Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nation Population Division  
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Due to the sharp decline in fertility, China was and still is the first of these 
three countries that saw its fertility rate fall below replacement level, namely in 1995. 
According to projections of the United Nations (2008), India will not be able to 
achieve this level before 2025 and Pakistan not before 2050.  
The pace and timing of the demographic transition process in these three 
countries cause(d) divergent trends in population growth and the distribution of the 
population across different age groups. Figure 2.3 graphs the share of the working-age 
population (15-64), of children (0-14), and of people aged 65 and over (65+) to the 
total population. Since 1975 the share of the working-age population increased for all 
three economies, while the share of children decreased. Up until now, the share of 
elderly people is below or around 10 percent and therefore not a serious problem for 
these countries.  
Due to concentration of population in productive ages, opportunities for 
economic growth tend to rise. First, a higher concentration of population in productive 
ages may lead to an increase in labor supply, provided that labor market can absorb 
the large number of workers in a productive way. Second, since fertility decline can 
free up time from child care, relatively more women are likely to enter the labor 
market, both in terms of participation and in number of hours (Bloom et al., 2009; 
Choudhry and Elhorst, 2010). Third, because of lower mortality and longer life spans, 
the willingness to invest in human capital and to save increases, as a result of which 
the labor force becomes more productive (Cervellati and Sunde, 2009) and prospects 
for investment improve (Mason, 2001; Schultz, 2004; Fang and Wang, 2005). Taken 
together, these effects are known as the Demographic Dividend effect (Bloom et al., 
2002). The period in which these positive effects are expected to occur is called the 
potential window of opportunity (WOP). The WOP for China, India and Pakistan is 
presented in Figure 2.3 and depends on the (expected) distribution of population 
across different age groups over the period of 1950-2050.
2 This figure shows that the 
share of the working-age population in China will reach its peak in 2010 (72%). 
Although the share of children will still be declining, the share of older people will 
already increase at that time. The WOP will remain open till 2020. In India and 
Pakistan, the share of the working-age population will reach its peak in 2040 (69%) 
                                                      
2 Expected values are based on United Nations (2008).  Chapter 2 
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and 2045 (67%), respectively. The WOP, which opened in the 1990s in these two 
countries, is expected to remain open until the middle of this century. 
Figure 2.2: Comparative analysis of total fertility rate 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
9
5
0
-
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
5
-
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
5
-
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
0
-
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
5
-
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
0
-
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
5
-
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
-
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
5
-
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
-
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
5
-
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
-
2
0
2
5
2
0
2
5
-
2
0
3
0
2
0
3
0
-
2
0
3
5
2
0
3
5
-
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
0
-
2
0
4
5
2
0
4
5
-
2
0
5
0
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
p
e
r
 
w
o
m
a
n
China India Pakistan
 
Source: United Nation Population Division 
2.3 Demographic transition and economic growth: Theory 
To explain economic growth we adopt the augmented Solow-Swan model (Mankiw et 
al., 1992), which is characterized by the following expression for the steady-state 
output per worker yt at time t 
) ln(
1
) ln(
1
) ln(
1
) ln( ) ln( δ τ
β α
β α
β α
β
β α
α
+ +
− −
+
−
− −
+
− −
+ + = − − g h s gT A y t T t t T t t   (2.1) 
where T denotes the time span of the growth period considered, At-T is the state of 
technology at the beginning of the observation period, α is the cost share of physical 
capital and β of human capital in production under a Cobb-Douglas technology, s is 
the fraction of income invested in physical capital (the saving rate) and h invested in 
human capital, τ is the labor force growth rate, g is the rate of technological progress, 
and δ is the depreciation rate.  
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Figure 2.3:  Population dynamics by age groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Population Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database 
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The convenient growth-initial income-level regression equation is a linear 
approximation to the growth rate of output per worker, which is derived from a linear 
approximation to the dynamics around the steady state in (2.1) using a Taylor 
expansion (see Mankiw et al., 1992, pp. 422-423). This yield 
, ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
) ln(
4 3 2 1 0 t t T t t T t
T t t g h s y
T
y y
ε δ τ γ γ γ γ γ + + + + + + + = − −
−        (2.2) 
where  T / ] gT ) A )[ln( e 1 ( T t
T
0 + − = γ −
λ − ,  T / ) e 1 (
T
1
λ − − − = γ ,  T / ) e 1 (
1
T
2
λ − −
β − α −
α
= γ , 
T / ) e 1 (
1
T
3
λ − −
β − α −
β
= γ , and  T / ) e 1 (
1
T
4
λ − −
β − α −
β + α
− = γ  (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995; Islam, 1995). In its simplest version, ε represents a normally distributed and 
independent error term, as a result of which (2.2) can be estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). This model implies that economies tend toward the same equilibrium 
growth path for capital, and hence output per worker, except for differences in s, h, τ, 
g and δ. The annual speed of convergence implied by the parameter estimate of γ1 is 
T / ) T 1 ln( 1 γ + − = λ , although it is important to note here that absolute (or 
unconditional) convergence, i.e. the idea that a country grows faster the further it is 
from its own steady state, may change if we allow for explanatory variables that have 
different values across countries. This is because differences among the explanatory 
variables of economic growth correspond to different steady-state positions. A poor 
country may still grow faster than a rich country, but only conditional upon the 
variables determining its steady-state position. This is true for all explanatory 
variables that are considered in addition to the initial income level. 
According to Bloom et al. (2001), the neoclassical Solow-Swan model ignores 
a critical dimension of population dynamics: populations' evolving age structure. 
Since each age group in a population behaves differently, and the distribution across 
age groups changes, economic growth may be boosted or slow down temporarily. 
Whereas prime-age adults supply labor and savings, the young require education and 
the aged health care and retirement income. Consequently, economic growth may 
boost when the number of working-age adults grows large relative to the dependent 
population, and slow down when a population rapidly ages. Estimates by Bloom and 
Williamson (1998) and Kelley and Schmidt (2005) indicate that successively one-Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China, India and Pakistan 
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third of East Asia's economic growth over the period 1965-1990 and 44 percent of 
Asia's economic growth over the period 1960-1995 can be attributed to population 
dynamics. At the same time, Bloom and Williamson (1998) warn that the 
demographic gift when the number of working-age adults grows large merely 
represents a growth potential. Whether this potential is used properly or not depends 
upon the policy environment as reflected by quality of institutions, labor policies, 
openness to trade, macroeconomic management, and education policies. 
In many studies on economic growth, output per capita rather than output per 
worker is the main focus of analysis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Bloom and 
Williamson (1998) show that output per capita is identical to 
N
L
L
Y
N
Y
y ≡ = , (2.3) 
where N is the total population and L is the labor force. When taking natural logs and 
converting this expression to growth rates, one obtains 
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This equation splits per capita output growth into two components: a component 
measuring productivity per worker and a component that transforms output growth 
per worker to output growth per capita. The first component is the dependent variable 
of the augmented Solow-Swan model when it is divided by the time span T (since 
yt=Yt/Lt), while the second component can be rewritten as 
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According to Kelley and Schmidt (2005), this component can take three different 
forms:  
•  The labor force growth rate is equal to the population growth rate, τ-n=0.  
•  τ-n  ≈ wa–n, where the variable "wa" represents the growth rate of the 
working-age population, i.e., the population aged 15 to 64.  
•  τ-n = [τ-lf] + [lf-wa] + [wa-n]. This decomposition is different from (4) in that 
it assumes that L represents the number of labor hours and τ the growth rate in Chapter 2 
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the number of labor hours, and "lf" the labor force growth rate. This 
transformation takes full advantage of the components of labor change.  
The first assumption is employed in most neoclassical theoretical modeling and most 
relevant in the longer run when both population size and the age distribution stabilize. 
It is less relevant when studying the impact of demographic transition, because this 
process marks a period within which the age distribution changes tremendously. 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) adopt the second transformation, because the growth 
rate of the working-age population is seen as a simple but useful proxy for the labor 
market effects that occur over the period of demographic transition, and because this 
proxy can be treated as an exogenous variable to the model. The third transformation 
also requires data on the number of labor hours and the labor force participation rate 
of the working-age population, which in addition may not be treated exogenous to the 
model.  
Kelley and Schmidt (2005) argue that the modeling framework proposed by 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) to address imbalanced age-structure changes over the 
demographic transition process is not sufficient to capture the multi-faceted role of 
demography in economic growth. In addition to the population growth and the 
working-age population growth variables, they also propose demographic variables 
such as the population shares of younger and of older people, as well as population 
size and density. However, a theoretical framework to justify these variables is 
lacking. 
  Some studies have debating the question whether more factors should be 
included to explain economic growth. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), Cuaresma and 
Doppelhofer (2006), and Islam (2008) argue that mono-causal theories of economic 
performance (productivity measured as economic growth per worker), although valid, 
are less useful as it appears, because they find, using advanced econometric 
techniques, that a good number of variables have robust partial correlation with 
economic growth. In an overview paper, Durlauf and Quah (1999, p. 276) count 36 
different categories and 87 specific examples of variables that have been included in 
previous studies. At the same time, Durlauf and Quah argue that the lessons that can 
be drawn from these models are unpersuasive. First, many studies fail to clarify 
whether the additional variables they consider can be interpreted in the light of some 
economic theory. Second, even if they can and appear to be statistically significant, it Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China, India and Pakistan 
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is not always clear what exercise a researcher conducts by adding particular control 
variables. Since growth explanations are so broad, it is often difficult to identify a 
particular economic theory. Brock and Durlauff (2001) refer to this problem as the 
"open-endedness" of theories of economic growth. To justify additional variables, 
such as the demographic variables in Kelley and Schmidt (2005), we therefore extend 
the transition model of Bloom and Williamson (1998), while control variables that 
cannot be justified theoretically will be left aside in this study. 
  The population growth rate, n, can be rewritten as a weighted average of the 
population growth rates of different age groups 
+ + − − − − + + = 65 65 64 15 64 15 14 0 14 0 n s n s n s n , (2.6) 
where s denotes the population share of a particular age group and n the growth rate 
of that age group. Note that the three age groups, 0-14, 15-64 and 65+, may be 
considered as the main age groups representing the demographic transition process 
and that  64 15 n −  represents the population of working-age.  
  Collecting terms from (2.2), (2.5) and (2.6), the annual GDP per capita growth 
rate can be written as a function f of the following demographic variables 
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Table 2.1 gives an overview of demographic variables used in a selection of previous 
studies, which are representative for the kind of variables that have been considered 
over the last fifteen years.
3 Brander and Dowrick (1994) consider the birth rate and 
the population growth rate. They find that high birth rates reduce economic growth 
because both investment and labor supply will fall. Since the birth rate and the 
population share of people aged 0-14 are closely related to each other, this variable 
fits within (2.7). Barro (1996, 2008) and De Gregorio and Lee (2003) use the total 
fertility rate to capture the impact of population change on economic growth. On the 
short-term, a higher fertility rate means that increased resources must be devoted to 
childrearing, rather than production of goods. Just as the birth rate, this variable fits 
within (2.7). On the long-term, a portion of the economy's investment must be used to 
provide capital for new workers (after children have grown up), rather than to raise 
                                                       
3 Dependent on the key words and the software being used, up to 300 journal articles could be found 
dealing with demographic transition and economic growth. Chapter 2 
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capital per worker. This effect is reflected by the variable ln(τ+g+δ) since its 
coefficient γ4 is expected to be negative. 
Table 2.1: Demographic variables included in previous studies 
Study Demographic  Variables 
Brander and Dowrick (1994)  Birth rate and population growth rate 
Barro (1996, 2008)  Total fertility rate 
Kelley and Schmidt (1995)  Population growth rate, population density, crude birth rate, lagged crude birth rate and crude death rate  
Bloom and Williamson (1998)  Population growth rate, working-age population growth rate 
Kelley and Schmidt (2005)  Child dependency, old-age dependency, population density,  population size 
Crenshaw et al. (1997)  Population growth rate, population (15+), population (0-14) 
De Gregorio and Lee (2003)  Total fertility rate 
Fang and Wang (2005)  Total dependency ratio 
Hongbin and Zhang (2007)  Birth rate, youth dependency ratio, growth of labor force share, migration rate 
Azomahou and Mishra (2008)  Population growth rate, population (15-64), population (0-14), population (65+) 
 
Bloom et al. (2008) 
 
Youth-age and old-age population shares 
 
Kelley and Schmidt (1995) augments the growth model with population 
growth, population density and components of population growth (crude death rate, 
crude birth rate and the crude birth rate lagged fifteen years in time). The inclusion of 
the current and the lagged birth rate is meant to distinguish between the supposed 
negative resource-using effects of births from the positive labor supply effects of past 
births. Population density is included to cover land stock per capita to signify positive 
inducements to technical change caused by pressure on resources created by 
population growth. The last variable, however, does not follow from (2.7). 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) consider the growth rate of both the working-
age population and the total population to translate a traditional neoclassical model 
formulated in output per worker growth into a comparable model formulated in output 
per capita growth. This means that they replace τ by n15-64 and do not decompose n 
into different age group. In a follow-up study (Bloom et al., 2008), they also consider 
the youth-age and old-age population shares.  Kelley and Schmidt (2005) consider the 
child and old-age dependency ratios. Since these variables are defined as s0-14 and s65+ 
and as  s0-14/s15-64 and s65+/s15-64, respectively, they perfectly fit within (2.7). 
Other studies reported in Table 2.1 use variables describing the size of 
different age groups or dependency ratios and confirm the observation that the focus 
has been shifted from population growth rates towards its distribution across different Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China, India and Pakistan 
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age groups. The inclusion of these variables is often justified by the distinct economic 
behavior of different age groups.  
Although the decision which variables to use is partly a matter of taste, 
statistical considerations may be important too. Following Bloom and Williamson 
(1998), we approach τ-n by wa–n=n15-64-n, the growth differential between the 
working-age population and the total population. The advantage of n15-64 over τ is that 
the first variable may be treated exogenous to the model. If τ were to be measured by 
either the number of labor hours or the number of people participating in the labor 
market, it will partly depend on the rate of economic growth, and thus be endogenous 
to the system. At the same time, it should be realized that τ will also depend on child 
dependency (or the birth/fertility rate) and old-age dependency. A reduction of child 
dependency can free up time from child care and can increase female labor supply, 
both in terms of participation and in number of hours (Choudhry and Elhorst, 2010). 
A reduction of old-age dependency may reduce tax and social security contributions 
paid by employed people needed to finance retirement income and health care of the 
elderly and therefore also increase labor supply (Elhorst and Zeilstra, 2007). For this 
reason, we follow Kelley and Schmidt (2005) and also consider child and old-age 
dependency ratios.
4 Except that they determine the population growth rate, as pointed 
out in (2.7), they also affect labor supply, which is important since the replacement of 
labor force growth rate τ by the working-age population growth rate n15-65 has the side 
effect that τ is no longer part of the model. The variables s0-14/s15-64 and s65+/s15-64 not 
only compensate for this but also perfectly fit within (2.7). The coefficients of these 
two dependency ratios are expected to be negative. 
  Bloom and Williamson (1998), among others, split the variable τ-n into τ and 
n to test whether their coefficients are different. However, since the correlation 
coefficient between the growth rates of the working-age population and of the total 
population is rather high (in our sample 0.92), their evaluation might be undermined 
by multicollinearity issues. Including variables in a regression that are highly correlated 
may cause the coefficients to have the wrong sign or implausible magnitudes and to have 
high standard errors and low significance levels even if they are jointly significant and 
                                                       
4 Kelley and Schmidt (2005) include the child and old-age dependency ratios because they might affect 
the saving rate, a variable they do not include. However, we believe that the impact of these 
dependency ratios on labor supply is more important, because changes in labor supply affect the 
transition of the Solow-Swan model formulated in output per worker growth into a comparable model 
formulated in output per capita growth. Moreover, we control for the saving rate. Chapter 2 
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the R
2 for the regression is high (Greene, 2008, p. 59). The coefficient of the variable τ-n 
is expected to be positive. If the growth rate of the working-age population exceeds the 
growth rate of the population, economic growth may be boosted temporarily, and vice 
versa. Most likely, its coefficient is also smaller than 1.
5  
2.4 Demographic transition and economic growth: Empirics 
For our empirical analysis we use data from 70 countries over the period 1961-2003. 
The data set consists of developing as well as developed countries at different phases 
of the demographic transition process. Table 2.1A in the appendix gives an overview 
of the countries included arranged by continent.  
Data on GDP per capita are taken from the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net) and expressed in constant price 
purchasing power parities (PPP). Demographic variables are taken from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007). The working-age population is defined 
as the population 15-64 years of age, while the child and old-age dependency ratios 
are obtained by dividing the population aged 0 to 14 and aged 65 and over by the 
working-age population, respectively. The saving rate is measured as gross domestic 
saving in percentage of GDP and taken from World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2007), while human capital is measured as the tertiary gross enrolment rate and 
taken from World Bank (2000).  
  The first column of Table 2.2 reports the estimation results when using the 
data in one single cross-section, i.e., if T=42 and the number of observations equals 
the number of countries in the sample (70). The average annual growth rate over the 
entire period 1961-2003 (multiplied by 100) is explained by both the initial level of 
per capita GDP and the tertiary gross enrolment rate in 1963 and the averages of the 
growth differential between the population of working-age and the total population, 
the child and old-age dependency ratios, and the saving rate for the period 1961-2003. 
Employing the single cross-section approach has three potential drawbacks. First, it 
only utilizes data at the beginning and the end of the sample period. Second, it 
erroneously assumes that variables like the growth differential between the population 
of working-age and the total population, and the child and old-age dependency ratios 
                                                       
5 Usually, (g+δ) is assumed to be the same for all economies and to be equal to 0.05 (Mankiw et al. 
1992; Islam 1995). Replacing γ4ln(τ+0.05)+τ by γ*ln(τ) will have the effect that γ*<1 since γ4<0, 
unless the approximation of τ by n15-64 is not adequate and the restriction that the coefficients of τ and 
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are constant over the sample period. Third, it overlooks the possibility that different 
growth paths may lead to similar results in terms of convergence. 
Table 2.2: Effect of demographic transition on economic growth 
Dependent variable is growth rate of GDP per capita in constant PPP terms (1961-2003) multiplied by 100 
  1 2  3  4 
Independent Variables  Cross 
Section 
 
TSCS  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
Instrumental 
Variable Approach 
 
Log initial GDP per capita 
 
-0.83 
 
-0.55 
 
-1.69 
 
-2.72 
  (-4.32) (-2.79)  (-3.91)  (4.60) 
Growth differential between working-age    3.56 1.32  0.55  0.60 
population and total population  (5.99) (5.51)  (2.06)  (1.59) 
        
Log of child dependency ratio  -2.71 -3.54  -1.76  -3.32 
  (-3.46) (6.15)  (1.98)  (-1.96) 
Log of old-age dependency ratio  0.45 -0.77  -0.47  -3.68 
  (0.80) (1.74)  (-0.50)  (1.18) 
Log of  tertiary gross enrolment rate  -0.003 -0.013  -0.005  0.014 
  (-0.15) (-1.44)  (-0.40)  (0.82) 
Log of saving rate  0.54 0.92  1.20  1.06 
  (1.63) (4.77)  (5.12)  (4.08) 
Constant  5.51 1.39  10.87  10.77 
  (2.38) (2.07)  (2.68)  (1.14) 
 
Number of cross sectional units 
 
70 
 
70 
 
70 
 
70 
Observations(unbalanced panel)  -  540  540  463 
R
 2  0.65 0.28  0.48  0.42 
LR-test, significance country FE      232.70   
p-value (Chi-square statistic)      0.00   
Hausman test (FE vs. RE) 
Chi-square (14)    34.24   
p-value     0.00   
Significance of time FE 
F statistic/ chi-2 statistic in IV model   12.11 6.33  43.16 
p-value   0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sargan-Hansen test over identifying restrictions
Chi-square (1)       1.24 
p-value       0.31 
Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity 
F(2,378)       1.22 
p-value       0.29 
t values in parentheses. 
The coefficient of tertiary gross enrolment rate is multiplied with 100 to make results presentable. 
In column 4, the child and old-age dependency ratios are instrumented by lagged values of the population growth rate, the 
working-age population growth rate and life expectancy. 
Results in the second column of Table 2.2 are obtained by moving to cross-
sections for shorter periods. In such a pooled regression, the average annual growth 
rate over each period is explained by the initial level of per capita GDP and the 
tertiary gross enrolment rate for that particular period, as well as the averages of the 
growth differential between the population of working-age and the total population, 
the child and old-age dependency ratios, and the saving rate for that particular period. 
The question that arises what the appropriate length of such periods is. A time span of Chapter 2 
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just one year is possible since the underlying data set provides annual information. 
However, often yearly time spans are said to be too short for studying growth 
convergence because short-term disturbances may loom large in such brief time spans 
(Islam, 1995). Therefore, we consider five-year time spans, T=5, just as in Islam 
(1995). Since our data set is not balanced, the number of observations in this 
regression is smaller than 630, namely 540 (growth periods considered are 1961-65, 
1966-70, 1971-75, 1975-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000, 2001-2003). 
A possible objection to pooling time-series cross-section data is that this 
approach does not control for fixed effects. Islam (1995) argues that fixed effects 
should be included, since the strategy of replacing the term  ] gT ) A )[ln( e 1 ( T t
T + − −
λ −  in 
the growth-initial income-level regression with just a constant and a normally 
distributed error term, γ0 + ε, is flawed. Since At-T not only reflects technology but 
also such factors as resource endowments, climate and institutions, At-T is anything 
but constant among different countries, and could probably be correlated with one or 
more of the explanatory variables in the regression model. Replacing this variable 
with a normally distributed error term and then estimating the model by OLS thus 
violates the condition that the explanatory variables are independent of the error term. 
A better solution is to replace At-T by a conventional error term as well as a dummy 
variable for each country in the sample, since the latter does not need to be 
uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables in the model. Since the rate of 
technological process, gT, may also change over time, this variable is replaced by 
time-period fixed effects. The results of this model are reported in the third column of 
Table 2.2. For reasons of space, the country and time-period fixed effects are not 
reported. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for convergence is that the coefficient of 
the initial GDP per capita level is negative. For all regression results summarized in 
Table 2.2, this condition is satisfied. The coefficient of the variable measuring the 
growth differential between the working-age population and the total population is 
positive and significant for all of regressions whose results are reported in Table 2.2. 
The coefficient appears to be greater than one for the first two regression 
specifications (single cross-section model and TSCS model) and smaller than one for 
the third regression specification (fixed effects model). Overall, these results imply 
that the hypothesis that economic growth may be boosted temporarily in case the Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China, India and Pakistan 
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growth rate of the working-age population exceeds the growth rate of the population, 
and vice versa, is supported by the data.  
As expected, the child dependency ratio has a negative and significant effect 
for all regression results summarized in Table 2.2. The coefficient of the old-age 
dependency ratio appears to be positive for the first regression specification (single 
cross-section model) and negative for the second and the third regression 
specifications (TSCS model and fixed effects model). However, in neither of these 
cases it is significant. Recently, Bloom et al. (2008) also found that the old-age 
population share does not have a significant effect on economic growth. One 
explanation is that we do not have countries in our sample that have completed the 
demographic transition process. Most developed countries just reached the last phase 
of this process, that is, the period in which the population ages, as a result of which 
negative effects, if present, have not yet been able to manifest themselves. Another 
explanation is that some studies have debated the proposition that population aging 
causes negative effects (Mason and Lee, 2004). 
The saving rate has a positive effect for all regression results summarized in 
Table 2.2, although it is only significant in the TSCS model and the fixed effects 
model. The tertiary gross enrolment rate appears to be insignificant for all regression 
results summarized in Table 2.2.  
The R
2 of the TSCS approach over a five-year time span amounts to 0.28, 
which is considerably less than the R
2 of the single cross-section approach of 0.65. 
The explanation is that the increase in the number of observations also amplifies the 
variation in the dependent variable. The R
2 of the fixed effects model increases to 
0.48, which can be explained by its only focusing on the time-series variation between 
observations. To investigate the hypothesis that the country fixed effects are not 
jointly significant, we performed a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test. The results indicate 
that we must reject this hypothesis. To test whether random effects can replace these 
fixed effects, we performed Hausman's specification test (Baltagi, 2005). The results 
again are in favor of the fixed effects model. For this reason we will use this model to 
isolate the impact of demographic variables on economic growth. The reason to 
abandon the single cross-section model is that this model, just as the TSCS model, 
does not control for fixed effects. Another reason is that the coefficient of the 
demographic variable measuring the growth differential between the working-age Chapter 2 
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population and the total population and the coefficient of the old-age dependency ratio 
take less plausible values than in the fixed effects model (greater than 1 and greater 
than 0, respectively). Besides, we already discussed three potential drawbacks of the 
single cross-section approach. 
  One potential objection is that the child and old-age dependency ratios are not 
exogenous.
6 Problems of reverse causation may bias the estimated impact on 
economic growth. To test for reverse causality, we re-estimated the fixed effects 
model by 2SLS. Child dependency and old-age dependency were instrumented with 
five-year lagged values of the population growth rate, the working-age population 
growth rate and life expectancy. The coefficient estimates are reported in the fourth 
column of Table 2.2, as well as the results of two specification tests.  
To test the joint hypothesis that the instruments are valid and the model is 
correctly specified, we applied the Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying restrictions. 
The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, that is, 
uncorrelated with the error terms, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as 
chi-squared in the number of (I-K) over identifying restrictions, where I is the total 
number of instruments. A rejection casts doubt about the validity of instruments. 
However, we find that the joint hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
  To test the hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be 
treated as exogenous, we ran the Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test of exogeneity 
for a regression equation with fixed effects. The null hypothesis states that an ordinary 
least squares estimator of the same equation will yield consistent estimates: that is, 
any endogeneity among the regressors would not have deleterious effects on OLS 
estimates. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed F(M,Nobs-K), where M is the 
number of regressors specified as endogenous in the original instrumental variables 
regression, Nobs is the total number of observations and K is the number of regressors. 
A rejection indicates that the instrumental variables fixed effects estimator should be 
employed. Since the five-percent critical value of this density function is 3.04, the null 
cannot be rejected, which implies that the child and old-age dependency ratios may be 
                                                      
6 Another objection might be that the impact of child and old-age dependency cannot be evaluated 
using this model because it controls for the saving rate too. However, the coefficient estimates 
appeared to be robust against excluding the saving rate. 
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treated as exogenous explanatory variables. A similar result was found by Bloom and 
Williamson (1998) and Kelley and Schmidt (2005).   
Table 2.3: Effect of demographic transition on economic growth: sensitivity 
analysis fixed effects model 
Dependent variable is growth rate of GDP per capita in constant PPP terms (1961-2003) multiplied by 100 
   1  2  3  4 
        
 Independent variables 
Deleting 
one 
percentile 
from each 
variable 
Outlier 
treatment 
Ten year   
time spans 
Jackknifing  
country  
by  
country 
 
Log initial GDP per capita  -2.23 -1.74  -2.23  -1.70 
  (-5.13) (-3.99)  (-6.83)  se=0.43 
Growth differential between 
working-age population and total 
population 0.51  0.59  0.37  0.55 
 (1.96)  (2.20)  (1.87)  se=0.27 
Log of child dependency ratio  -2.78 -1.80  -1.74  -1.76 
  (-2.90) (-1.92)  (-2.28)  se=0.95 
Log of old-age dependency ratio 
-0.31 -0.38  -0.32  -0.47 
  (-0.34) (-0.40)  (-0.41)  se=0.93 
Log of tertiary gross enrolment rate 
-0.002 -0.006  -0.009  -.0007 
  (-0.012) (-0.402)  (-0.767)  se=0.04 
Log of saving rate  1.33 1.25  0.82  1.20 
  (5.52) (5.19)  (3.96)  se=0.24 
Constant  14.66 11.28  16.76   
  (3.64) (2.78)  (5.08)   
t values in parentheses, se= standard error 
 
To investigate whether the results are robust, Table 2.3 finally reports the 
results of different robustness checks of the fixed effects model. The first column 
gives the result when deleting one percentile on both ends of the distribution of each 
variable. This leads to a reduction of twelve observations. The second column gives 
the results when a fraction of the lowest and the highest values of each explanatory 
variable are set equal to a lower and an upper bound, respectively. The third column 
gives the results when the data are measured over time spans of ten years, which, just 
as time spans of five years, is common practice in the growth literature. Since the 
countries included in the sample are different in size and economic development, we also 
investigated whether the results are driven by one particular country. For that purpose, 
one country has been taken out of the sample at a time (jacknifing). Since the sample 
consists of 70 countries, we so obtained 70 observations for each coefficient estimate Chapter 2 
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and its corresponding standard error (se). The last column of Table 2.3 reports the mean 
coefficient estimate and the mean standard error. In neither of these cases, we need to 
reject the null hypothesis that the estimates of one particular coefficient in the fixed 
effects model reported in Table 2.2 and its counterpart in one of the columns of Table 
2.3 have the same expected value. This indicates that the results of the fixed effects 
model are robust.  
Cuaresma and Doppelhofer (2006) have found that nonlinearities and threshold 
effects among development of economic growth may be important too. For this reason, a 
quadratic functional form has been estimated too, which may be considered a second-
order Taylor expansion to the dynamics of the steady state [see equations (1) and (2)]. 
However, even though a fraction of the second-order terms was found to be significant, 
this approach is problematic from a forecasting point of view. In the next section, we 
map the future prospects of the demographic transition process on economic growth in 
China, India and Pakistan over the period 2005-2050, based on demographic changes 
over that period projected by the United Nations (2008). If the economic growth 
model is extended to include second-order terms between the demographic and 
economic variables, such as the saving rate and the tertiary gross enrolment rate, these 
economic variables need to be projected as well. Since these data are not available and 
predicted values of these explanatory variables would create new uncertainties, the 
analysis in the next section has been limited to results obtained for the linear fixed 
effects model. 
2.5 The impact of demographic transition 
To determine the contribution of the demographic transition process to past economic 
growth in China, India and Pakistan, the coefficient estimates of the demographic 
variables in the fixed effects model are multiplied with the country-specific growth 
rates of the demographic variables, averaged over the period 1963-2003. The 
contribution of the old-age dependency ratio is also determined, even though its 
coefficient in Table 2.2 turned out to be insignificant. We will come back to the 
implications of this in the concluding section.  
  The results, which are reported in Table 2.4, show that the decline in child 
dependency was the major contributor to GDP per capita growth in these three 
countries. The growth differential between the working-age population and the total Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China, India and Pakistan 
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population also had a positive effect on economic growth, but its contribution was 
much smaller. The old-age dependency ratio had a negative effect. To determine the 
overall contribution of the demographic variables, the individual contributions have 
been summed. The overall contribution appears to be positive for all three economies 
and the highest for China. Over the period 1963-2003, China's annual GDP per 
growth rate was 7.24 percent and 3.35 percentage points of this growth rate, i.e., 46 
percent can be attributed to demographic variables. India grew by 2.62 percent per 
year of which 39 percent can be attributed to demographic variables, and Pakistan 
grew with 2.57 percent per year of which 25 percent can be attributed to demographic 
variables. The results for India and Pakistan are different from those of China because 
the demographic transition process in these two countries started much later (see 
Figure 2.1).  
  Bloom and Williamson (1998) found that one-third of East Asia's economic 
growth over the period 1965-1990 can be attributed to population dynamics. 
However, they did not consider demographic variables other than the growth rates of 
the working-age population and of the total population. Kelley and Schmidt (2005) 
found that 44 percent of Asia's economic growth over the period 1960-1995 can be 
attributed to population dynamics, of which 16 percentage points as a result of the 
growth differential between the working-age population and the total population and 
28 percentage points as a result of other demographic variables. Our results 
corroborate Kelley and Schmidt's finding that other demographic variables, among 
which the child dependency ratio in particular, are relatively more important than the 
growth differential.    
Table 2.2A in the appendix decomposes the results reported in Table 2.4 into 
four periods: 1963-70, 1971-80, 1981-90, 1991-2000. This table reconfirms that the 
child dependency ratio was the major contributor to GDP per capita growth in most 
periods, although there are notable exceptions. In addition, it shows the temporary 
nature of population dynamics on economic growth. For example, whereas the old-
age dependency ratio was not a serious threat for China in the first three decades, the 
size of the negative effect obtained for the 1990s indicates that this may change soon. 
Furthermore, whereas the contribution of the child dependency ratio on China's GDP 
per capita growth rate was 6.20 percentage points and relatively important in the 
1980s, it was negative and relatively unimportant in the 1960s. These figures are Chapter 2 
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explained by the introduction of the wan xi shao birth control campaign after 1970 
and the one child policy in 1979. Just as in China, the decline in child dependency in 
India had a positive effect on economic growth in the last three decades. However, 
whereas the contribution of this variable in China already started to decline in the 
1990s, it still increases in India. Since the demographic transition process in Pakistan 
started much later than in China and India, the first positive contribution of the decline 
in child dependency in Pakistan is obtained for the 1990s. 
Table 2.3A in the appendix shows that the child dependency ratio will 
continue to decline in China, India and Pakistan, but there are significant differences 
among these countries. In China, the child dependency ratio will stabilize after 2035, 
whereas it will continue to decline in India and Pakistan up to 2050. Consequently, 
this decline is expected to have a greater positive impact on economic growth in these 
two countries than in China. The old-age dependency ratio will continue to increase in 
all three countries, which will have a negative impact on economic growth. Finally, 
whereas the growth differential between the working-age population and the total 
population is expected to have a positive effect on economic growth in India and 
Pakistan over the period 2005-2050, it will have a negative effect in China. Table 2.5 
shows that as an overall result of these three projections, population dynamics are 
expected to have a positive effect on economic growth in India and Pakistan and a 
negative effect in China. The overall effect amounts to 1.49, 1.97 and -0.79 percent, 
respectively. It is the expected old-age dependency ratio of 0.38 in China in 2050 that 
may be held largely responsible for this negative effect. Since the old-age dependency 
ratio in India and Pakistan in 2050 will still be rather low (0.20 and 0.15, 
respectively), these results reconfirm the conjecture that the window of opportunity of 
China will close in 2020, whereas it will remain open in India and Pakistan until the 
middle of this century.  Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China, India and Pakistan 
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Table 2.4: Contribution of demographic transition process to past economic growth, 1961-2003  
Estimated Contribution 
Countries 
Average 
annual growth 
rate of real 
GDP per capita 
Average growth 
differential between 
working-age population 
and total population 
(Diff) 
Average growth rate child 
dependency ratio (CD) 
Average growth rate old-age 
dependency ratio (OD)  Diff CD  OD    Total 
China   7.24  0.56  -1.87  0.54  0.31  3.29  -0.25  3.35 
India   2.62  0.23  -0.70  0.72  0.13  1.24  -0.34  1.03 
Pakistan   2.57  0.11  -0.23  -0.37  0.06  0.40  0.17  0.64 
*The average growth rates are calculated using data from the World Bank. Chapter 2 
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Table 2.5: Expected contribution of demographic transition process to economic 
growth, 2005-2050 
 
Estimated 
Contribution  Total contribution 
Country 
Average 
growth 
differential 
between 
working-age 
population 
and total 
population 
(Diff) 
Average growth 
rate child 
dependency ratio 
(CD) 
Average growth 
rate old-age 
dependency ratio 
(OD)  Diff CD  OD  Total 
China   -0.307  -0.46  3.04  -0.18  0.84  -1.92  -0.79 
India   0.290  -1.43  2.51  0.17  2.67  -1.58  1.49 
Pakistan   0.718  -1.38  1.81  0.42  2.58  -1.14  1.97 
 
Our results show that China has been able to take advantage of the growth 
potential offered by the demographic transition process. Whether India and Pakistan 
will also be able to realize the growth potential is still to be seen. There are three 
serious obstacles. First, whereas the literacy rate in China is 91 percent by now, more 
than one-third of the adult population in India is still illiterate and approximately one-
half of the adult population in Pakistan. Second, India and Pakistan seem to have leap 
into the post-industrial phase without industrializing their economies. Whereas the 
manufacturing sector is the dominant sector in China (with a GDP share of almost 50 
percent in 2006), the services sector is the dominant sector in India and Pakistan 
(approximately 55). Third, China's reform process, which began in the late 1970s, 
started in the agricultural sector rather than in the manufacturing and financial sectors. 
Pakistan, and to a lesser extent India, introduced reforms as a result of deteriorating 
external sector conditions and under the support of international financial institutions’ 
(IFIs) adjustment and stabilization programs. The focus of these reforms was on 
financial, fiscal, trade and manufacturing sectors rather than on the agricultural sector, 
the initial source of rapid economic growth in China. In this respect, a comparison of 
the impact of these reforms on economic growth in China and India is revealing. In 
1978, at the inception of its reforms, China's per capita GDP
7 was $165 (in constant 
2000 US dollars), whereas it was $231 in India. China caught up with India in per 
capita GDP terms in 1984 ($259 vs. $250), and surpassed it in 1986 ($311 vs. $267). 
In the first post-reform decade, the Chinese economy grew at 9.6 percent, while the 
Indian economy grew at 5.7 percent in the corresponding post-reform decade (1990s). 
                                                      
7 Data source: World Development Indicators Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China, India and Pakistan 
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To realize the growth potential caused by the demographic transition process, 
Pakistan and India should create a more productive and better skilled workforce, 
stimulate investments and create a much bigger market for goods and services. They 
also need to stimulate industrialization, since it has greater multiplier effects on other 
sectors of the economy. The expected increase of the working-age population may 
also be absorbed by greater investments in infrastructure that can employ relatively 
large numbers of unskilled labor and that do not require much capital. To meet the 
challenges of an aging population, China should establish a sustainable pension 
system and should consider an increase of the retirement age in order to reduce the 
number of people dependent on this system. 
2.6 Conclusions 
By extending the framework proposed by Bloom and Williamson (1998) meant to 
address imbalanced age-structure changes when mortality and fertility rates change 
from high to low levels, we have demonstrated that three demographic variables may 
temporarily boost or slow down economic growth during a process of demographic 
transition: the growth differential between the population of working-age and the total 
population, the child dependency ratio and the old-age dependency ratio. 
  An empirically relevant question asks to what extent differences found in the 
contribution of demographic variables are attributable to the way in which applied 
econometricians analyze a given body of data. To be able to answer this question, we 
have estimated an augmented Solow-Swan model extended to include these three 
demographic variables using the data in cross-section over the entire sample period, 
by moving to time-series cross-sectional data pooled over periods of five years, and to 
panel data including country and time-period fixed effects. We found that the 
coefficient of the growth differential between the population of working-age and the 
total population is positive and significant and of the child dependency ratio is 
negative and significant for these three regression specifications. By contrast, the 
coefficient of the old-age dependency ratio appeared to be positive for the first 
regression specification and negative for the last two regression specifications. 
However, in neither of these cases it was significant. Although these results may 
therefore said to be robust to the kind of econometric specification being adopted, we 
also found that the fixed effects model best described the data when these 
specifications were tested against one another.  Chapter 2 
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  Based on this model, we found that population dynamics explain 46 percent of 
economic growth in per capita GDP in China over the period 1961-2003, 39 percent 
in India, and 25 percent in Pakistan. We also found that the decline in child 
dependency was the major contributor to GDP per capita growth. These results 
corroborate Kelley and Schmidt's argument that the growth differential between the 
population of working-age and the total population, as in Bloom and Williamson 
(1998), is not sufficient to address the multi-faceted role of demography in economic 
growth. Furthermore, population dynamics are expected to have a positive effect on 
economic growth in India and Pakistan over the period 2005-2050, and a negative 
effect in China. Even though the coefficient of the old-age dependency ratio was 
found to be insignificant and thus ambiguous, it is the expected increase of this ratio 
that may be held responsible for this negative effect in China. One explanation for its 
insignificance is that most developed countries just reached the last phase of the 
demographic process that is the period in which the population ages, as a result of 
which negative effects, if present, have not yet been able to manifest themselves. In 
other words, even though the impact of the old-age dependency ratio is ambiguous, 
policymakers in China better remain alert. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female 
Labor Force Participation
 1 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents theoretical and empirical work on women’s labor force 
participation across the process of economic development. Many studies have 
investigated the relationship between economic development and fertility and the 
relationship between fertility and female labor force participation, but the relationship 
between economic development and female labor force participation has received 
considerably less attention in the literature. Although one might expect that women want 
more children if income levels rise (Becker, 1960; Hotz et al., 1997, pp. 292-293), the 
first relationship has generally been found to be negative. The quality-quantity model of 
fertility is one of the first models that acknowledged that economic progress 
simultaneously increases the return to human capital, which in turn can lead to a 
reduction in fertility as families choose smaller family size with increased investments in 
each child (Hotz et al., 1997, pp. 294-308). Another reason is that the need to have 
children as a form of old-age security diminishes. In addition, lower mortality reduces the 
return to large families, representing another additional force toward lower fertility 
(Falcao and Soares, 2007). Finally, children who are useful from an early age on the farm 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Paul Elhorst. The authors are thankful to the participants of the 
European Economic Association conference 2009, Scottish Economic Society Conference 2009 and 4
th 
European workshop on labor economics. The usual disclaimer applies. Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
44 
 
in low-income economies become increasingly less useful and more expensive to raise if 
income levels increase, all the more so as they spend an increasing number of years in 
school (Jacobsen, 1999).  
  The second relationship between fertility and female labor force participation has 
been found to be negative too. The reason is that with fewer children to take care of, 
women are able to spend an increasingly larger share of their life working for pay, both in 
terms of participation and in number of hours. Figures 3.1(a)-(d) illustrate that high-
income and (lower and upper) middle-income countries show a negative relationship 
between the fertility rate and female labor force participation over the period 1960-2000. 
Only in low-income countries does this negative relationship seem not to exist. There 
may be two reasons for this. First, studies of the behavioral response to changes in 
fertility are complicated by issues of endogeneity, since the increase in female labor force 
participation may have a negative feedback effect on the fertility rate. Endogeneity 
requires instrumental variable methods, such as two-stage least squares (2SLS) to obtain 
consistent parameter estimates. Second, the income level should be controlled for, an 
important aspect that often is not adequately modeled as we will show in this paper.  
  Goldin (1995) and Mammen and Paxson (2000) were among the first to point out 
that the third relationship between female labor force participation rates and per capita 
income around the world is U-shaped. In poor, mainly agricultural economies, the 
number of women who are in the labor force is relatively high. In most cases they are 
unpaid workers on family farms who combine agricultural work with child care. When 
income levels rise, often because of an expansion of the manufacturing sector and the 
introduction of new technologies, women’s labor force participation rates fall. Men move 
into new blue-collar jobs that increase family income, exerting so-called unearned 
income effects that reduce women’s participation. Furthermore, as men move out of 
agriculture and into paid employment, there are fewer family farms on which women can 
work. In other words, opportunities for women decline in absolute terms due to the 
separation of market work from household work. At the same time, women may be 
barred from manufacturing employment by social custom or by employer preference. 
Those women who are in manufacturing are mostly self-employed or, again, unpaid 
family workers, for example, in home-based craft production (Schultz, 1990). Chapter 3 
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Figure 3.1: Fertility rate and female labor force participation by income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Source: Key Indicators of Labor Markets & World Development Indicators 
Panel 1: Fertility rate and Female Labor Force Participation: High Income Economies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
F
L
F
P
R
 
(
%
)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
F
e
r
t
i
l
i
y
 
R
a
t
e
(
b
i
r
t
h
s
 
p
e
r
 
w
o
m
a
n
)
LFPR TFR
Panel 4 : Fertlty Rate and Female Labor Force Participation: Low Income Economies
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
F
L
F
P
R
 
(
%
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
F
e
r
t
i
l
i
y
 
R
a
t
e
(
b
i
r
t
h
s
 
p
e
r
 
w
o
m
a
n
)
LFPR TFR
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
F
L
F
P
R
 
(
%
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
F
e
r
t
i
l
i
y
 
R
a
t
e
(
b
i
r
t
h
s
 
p
e
r
 
w
o
m
a
n
)
LFPR TFR
Panel 2 : Fertility Rate and Female Labor Force Participation: Upper Middle Income Economies
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
F
L
F
P
R
 
(
%
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
F
e
r
t
i
l
i
y
 
R
a
t
e
(
b
i
r
t
h
s
 
p
e
r
 
w
o
m
a
n
)
LFPR TFR
Panel 3 : Fertility Rate and Female Labor Force Participation: Lower Middle Income EconomiesEconomic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
46 
 
When economic development continues, women move back into the labor force. 
There are several reasons for this. First, since the educational attainment of women tends 
to improve in more developed countries, the value of women’s time in the market 
increases, which strengthens the incentives of women to work outside the home. Second, 
since employment in the agricultural and in the manufacturing sector tends to fall and 
employment in the services sector tends to increase in more developed countries, more 
women tend to enter the labor market because these jobs are experienced as more 
acceptable forms of employment as far as women are concerned. Bowen and Finegan 
(1969) were among the first to point out that the sectoral composition of employment 
might explain structural differences between metropolitan areas in the relative abundance 
of those jobs commonly held by females. This study however mainly focused on 
developed countries. In a study on women’s labor force participation from a world 
perspective, Shultz (1990) found that the shift in the composition of production out of 
agriculture and into manufacturing and services was associated with an expansion of 
opportunities for women’s employment relative to men’s, particularly as wage earners. 
The possibility of doing this kind of work part-time, especially in the services sector, is 
also of importance since part-time work permits women to combine work outside the 
household with their domestic activities within the household (Jaumotte, 2003). Third, 
more women are able to enter the labor market since fertility tends to decline when the 
economy develops. This is also known as one of the main effects of demographic 
transition ― a change from high to low rates of mortality and fertility.
2 Bloom et al. 
(2009) found that total labor supply would rise by about 11% due to increased female 
labor market participation when fertility declines by four births per woman. 
Taken as a whole, this story tells us that across the process of economic development 
women’s labor force participation rates first fall and then start to increase again.
3 Figure 
3.2 shows the female labor force participation rate in 2005 for a cross-section of 40 
                                                 
2 Other effects are changes in per capita income growth, investment in human capital, savings, and age of 
retirement, etc.  
3 The U-shaped behavior of female economic participation with economic development resembles with the 
inverted-U hypothesis of inequality and growth. Kuznets (1955) suggested that economic progress 
(measured by income per capita) is initially accompanied by rising inequality but then these disparities 
disappear as benefits of development spread widely. Similarly, female participation initially decline with 
economic development but then this decline changes into an increase. Chapter 3 
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countries, while Table 3.1A in appendix gives an overview of the countries included and the 
income classes to which they belong. Figure 3.2 illustrates that the female participation 
rate is indeed relatively high in low-income countries (e.g., Tanzania, Madagascar and 
Zambia), relatively low in lower middle-income countries (e.g., Egypt and Tunisia), and 
again relatively high in both upper middle-income countries (e.g., China and Brazil) and 
high-income countries (e.g., Canada, Italy and the US). However, although Goldin (1995) 
and Mammen and Paxson (2000) recognized the U-shaped relationship between 
economic development and female labor force participation from a theoretical viewpoint, 
it is another issue as to how to model this relationship empirically.  
Figure 3.2: GDP per capita and female labor force participation (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A textbook overview of the theory behind the U-shaped relationship can be found 
in Hoffman and Averett (2010), but illustrative of this literature is that empirical 
approaches to this relationship are sparse. To cover the U-shaped relationship Bloom et 
al. (2009) adopted a linear regression model and controlled for the level of urbanization, 
that is, the percentage of the total population living in an urban area. The idea was that 
the time cost of working in an urban setting increases (commuting time is one reason), as 
a result of which labor supply falls. Although they indeed found a negative and 
significant effect, it is questionable whether this variable is really able to cover the 
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supposed U-shaped relationship, since such a nonlinear relationship cannot be covered by 
adding another explanatory variable to a linear regression model. This is because the 
same change in economic development is likely to be less influential in high-income 
countries than in low-income countries. 
Another possibility is that economic development affects female labor force 
participation interactively with other explanatory variables, that is, it modifies the effects 
that these variables have on female labor force participation (Pampel and Tanaka, 1986). 
For example, a shift to manufacturing employment in industrializing countries may 
eliminate work opportunities for women to such a degree that variation in fertility and 
education may make little difference for female labor force participation. For these two 
reasons we propose a regression model with interaction effects between the level of 
income per worker and the three key variables that explain female labor force 
participation across the process of economic development, namely, fertility, the share of 
employment in agriculture and the level of education. The square of the level of income 
per worker will also be considered. This approach offers the opportunity to model the 
regime shift between female participation rates, which first decline and then increase if 
the economy develops, as well as the opportunity to compute the turning points of this 
regime shift for the different explanatory variables in the model, as we will show in this 
chapter. 
The previous studies by Pampel and Tanaka (1986), Tansel (2002) and Fatima 
and Sultana (2009) already considered the square of the level of income per worker.
4 In 
all three of these studies the coefficient of the level of income per worker was found to be 
negative and significant, and that of its square to be positive and significant. However, 
since we find that the coefficients of other interaction terms are significant too, we must 
conclude that just one interaction term is not sufficient to cover the supposed U-shaped 
relationship. In addition, to investigate the existence of a U-shaped curve, the latter two 
studies only used data from a single country, whereas we will be using time-series cross-
section data from different countries around the world. The time-series component of the 
data is utilized to investigate whether countries move along this curve if the economy 
                                                 
4 Pampel and Tanaka (1986) considered the square of energy use per capita, a variable they used as a proxy 
for economic development. Chapter 3 
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develops, while the cross-sectional component is utilized to cover every part of the U-
shaped relationship. If the analysis would be limited to one country or to a set of 
developing or developed countries only, then the sample might not be representative for 
the relationship we would like to examine. In this respect, Pampel and Tanaka (1986) 
pointed out that if the effects of development are linear, examination of a sample 
dominated by nations at one level of development would not greatly bias the results ― 
the linear effect would be the same at different levels of development. However, if the 
effects are not linear, a restricted sample might misspecify the true relationship. 
  This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we postulate a 
microeconomic framework for the labor force decision and its causal factors. This 
framework will then be aggregated across individuals to make it suitable for analyzing 
the labor force participation rate at the country level. In addition, we will show that 
aggregation across individuals or across groups of people is not allowed if their marginal 
reactions are significantly different from each other. In addition, we will present a 
framework to test this hypothesis. Section 3.3 describes the data and the empirical 
implementation of the data into the model. In Section 3.4, we present and discuss the 
results of our empirical analysis. This will also include the turning points of the 
explanatory variables for different female age groups, that is, the income level at which 
the impact of the explanatory variables changes sign. These turning points throw more 
light on the question of whether the relationship between women’s labor force 
participation and economic development is really U-shaped. The last section of the paper 
summarizes the empirical results and discusses their policy implications. 
3.2 The theoretical framework 
Simple textbooks models of labor supply specify that the labor force participation rate 
may be derived from a model of choice between consumption and working time. At 
micro level, the decision to participate in the labor market can be considered as a 
dichotomous random variable that takes the value of 1 if the decision is positive and 0 if 
it is negative. If we start from data observed at country level instead of individual data, 
the observed variable consists of a proportion Lj of a group of women belonging to the 
female working age population in country c (c=1,...,C) who decide to participate. In Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
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Section 2.1 we will present a theoretical framework to identify the key determinants of 
the individual labor force decision. In Section 2.2 we will explain the transition from the 
micro level to the country level. 
The decision at the micro level 
A woman is assumed to participate in the labor market if the utility level U associated 
with participation exceeds the utility level associated with being inactive.
5,6 These utility 
levels depend on whether this woman is already employed or not.  
  First, suppose a woman is already employed. If she is able to keep her job, she 
receives an hourly wage (wf) for the number of hours being supplied (hf). Women who 
work on a family farm do not receive an hourly wage rate, but their wage rate may be 
approached by the shadow wage rate from the production part of a household production 
model (Elhorst, 1994). The probability (Pd) that a woman will lose her job depends on 
labor market conditions (l), with a high value of l assumed to refer to favorable 
conditions. If labor market conditions are unfavorable (e.g., loss of employment in 
agriculture), this implies a decrease in l and an increase in Pd(l). When a woman loses her 
job involuntarily in higher-income countries, she may receive unemployment benefits, 
but in lower-income countries this is generally not the case. In addition to this, the 
woman’s utility level depends on the number of children she gives birth to (fertility) and 
the quality per child (q). Although having more children may increase the woman’s 
utility level in principle, the counteracting effect is that the time available for work will 
be reduced due to childcare responsibilities. This implies that working time is a function 
of fertility, hf=hf(τ), where the first derivative of hf with respect to τ is negative, 
0 / hf < τ ∂ ∂ . A decline in fertility may be offset by increasing the expense per child 
associated with desiring a higher quality of life. The possibilities of doing so depend on 
the wage levels of both man and wife within the household, q=q(wm,wf). Finally, the 
woman’s utility depends on the income earned by her husband. Improvements in men’s 
                                                 
5 Although unemployed people may also be said to participate in the labor market, being unemployed in 
developing countries is often comparable to being inactive. 
6 Hill (1983) treats the decision to enter the labor force as an employee as being distinct from the choice to 
enter the labor market as a family worker. Although this is another way to model different regimes, it is 
only applicable when having individual data and when it is observed which women do paid work and 
which women do family work. At the aggregated level, this information is not available. Chapter 3 
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wages due to an expansion of the manufacturing sector without corresponding 
improvements in women’s wages reduce the labor force participation of women, since a 
rise in unearned income (i.e., the income of a woman independent of hours worked) leads 
unambiguously to a reduction in hours worked. In lower-income countries this may have 
the effect that a woman will quit working altogether. In sum, a woman already employed 
will remain active as long as 
U{ [1-Pd(l)]×wf×hf(τ) , τ, q(wm,wf), wm} > U{ 0, τ, q(wm,0), wm }.   (3.1) 
Second, suppose a woman is not yet participating in the labor market. If she is able to 
find a job, she will obtain the benefits of being active (wfhf), as well as face the 
disadvantage of having less time available for childcare. In addition, a woman seeking a 
job incurs search costs (s), or relatively more so than a woman who already has a job and 
might be looking for another one. The probability of finding a job depends again on labor 
market conditions (l). If labor market conditions are unfavorable (e.g., relatively few jobs 
in the services sector), this probability (Pf(l)) decreases. In sum, a woman will become 
active if  
U{ Pf(l)×wf×hf(τ) , τ, q(wm,wf), wm} > U{ 0, τ, q(wm,0), wm }.  (3.2) 
From this theoretical framework it follows that the participation decision is positively 
related to the female wage rate (wf) and favorable labor market conditions (l), and 
negatively related to the male wage rate (wm), fertility and search costs.  
  There are more variables that have been found or have been argued to affect the 
labor force participation rate of women. Overviews have been provided by Elhorst 
(1996), Jacobsen (1999), Lim (2001), Jaumotte (2003), and Hoffman and Averett (2010). 
In this paper, however, we will focus on the key variables across the process of economic 
development.  
 
 
 
 Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
52 
 
The participation rate at the country level 
The transition from the micro level to the macro level for homogeneous groups is 
discussed in Pencavel (1986), while Elhorst and Zeilstra (2007) extended this study by 
addressing the problem of heterogeneous population groups. Pencavel used the concept 
of reservation wage, the individual’s implicit value of time when on the margin between 
participating in the labor market and not participating. This reservation wage, w*, 
depends on observable explanatory variables (X) and unobservable explanatory variables 
(ε). Suppose women of a particular age group (g) have identical observable explanatory 
variables Xg, but different unobserved explanatory variables ε. Wages (w) may vary 
between age groups and between countries, but (like Xg) they do not vary within age 
groups within countries, that is, w=wg. Consequently, differences in reservation wages 
are caused by different values of the unobserved explanatory variables ε only. Let fg(wg*) 
be the density function describing the distribution of reservation wages across women of 
group g and Fg(wg*) the cumulative distribution function corresponding to the density 
function. This cumulative distribution function Fg(w) is interpreted as giving for any 
value of wg the probability of the event wg*≤wg, that is, the proportion of women who 
offer positive hours of work to the labor market since the market wage rate exceeds their 
reservation wage. Then the labor force participation rate Lg of age group g is the 
cumulative distribution of wg* evaluated at wg*=wg, given Xg and a set of fixed but 
unknown parameters βg, 
), , X | w ( F ) , X , w ( L g g g g g g g g β = β  (3.3) 
where the dependence of the labor participation rate of age group g has been made 
explicit on wg and Xg.  
  Since different age groups within each country may have different observable 
explanatory variables wg and Xg, the total labor force participation rate is determined by 
the sum of the group-specific cumulative density functions Fg(wg|Xg,βg) (g=1,…,G), 
weighted by the share of each age group in the total female population of working age 
(ag). In mathematical terms 
) , X | w ( F a L
G
1 g g g g g g total ∑ β = = .   (3.4) Chapter 3 
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From this equation it follows that there are two ways to deal with the problem of 
heterogeneous groups. One way is to consider a limited number of regression equations 
for broad population groups and to correct for the composition effect of groups having 
different observable explanatory variables X. This approach was followed by Pampel and 
Tanaka (1986), Tansel (2002), Jaumotte (2003), Elhorst and Zeilstra (2007) and Fatima 
and Sultana (2009). The other, more prevalent, way is to consider as many population 
groups as necessary to obtain within-group homogeneity and then to estimate a separate 
regression equation for each age group. This approach was followed by Bloom et al. 
(2009), but only for women whose age was below 45. Women aged 45 and over were 
excluded with the argument that fertility beyond age 45 is very low. However, it would 
have been interesting to test whether fertility indeed has no effect on the participation rate 
of older women. Older women may still have to care for children who have not yet left 
home or they may not be able to re-enter the labor market even if they want to. 
  Generally, the extent to which the participation rate may be aggregated or must be 
disaggregated can be considered as offering two competing models to choose from. 
Supposing that the participation rate of two female age groups can be explained, say A and 
B, or their joint participation rate can be explained, then the first model consists of two 
participation rate equations  
, ε + β   X =  
N
n   =   L A A A
A
A
A     , ε + β   X =  
N
n   =   L B B B
B
B
B  (3.5) 
where n is the female labor force, N is the female working age population, and w is assumed 
to be part of X. The second model consists of one participation rate equation 
, ε + β X   =  
N + N
n + n   =   L B + A B A B + A
B A
B A
B + A +  (3.6) 
where LA+B=WALA+WBLB with WA=NA/(NA+NB) and WB=NB/(NA+NB). εA and εB in (5), 
and εA+B in (6), are independently and identically normally distributed error terms for all 
women with zero mean and variance 
2
A σ , 
2
B σ  and 
2
B A+ σ , respectively. 
  Starting from two participation rate equations of two different age groups and from 
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the same by testing the hypothesis  B A 0 : H β = β  against the alternative hypothesis 
B A 1: H β ≠ β . Note that the participation rate of every age group is taken to depend on the 
same set of explanatory variables. If one equation is to contain an explanatory variable that 
is lacking in the other and its coefficient estimate is statistically different from zero, H0 
would have to be rejected in advance. 
The so-called Chow test can be used to test the equality of sets of coefficients in two 
regressions, but this test is only valid under the assumption that the error variances of both 
equations equalize, 
2
B
2
A σ = σ . The empirical analysis to be discussed later in this paper 
reveals that this assumption is rather implausible; if the parameter vector β differs between 
two age groups, the error variance is different as well. Therefore, the Wald test is adopted 
here. Let βA and βB denote two vectors of k parameters, one for group A and one for group 
B, with covariance matrices VA and VB, then the Wald statistic 
   ), β ˆ - β ˆ ( ) V (V )' β ˆ - β ˆ ( B A
-1
B A B A +  (3.7) 
has a chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis that the 
estimates of βA and βB have the same expected value. 
3.3 Empirical analysis: Implementation 
The data we use for the empirical analysis comprises 40 countries over the period 1960-
2000. We selected observations over five-year intervals (1960, 1965, …, 2000). Since the 
data set is not complete, the total number of observations is 326. The countries included 
belong to different income classes, so as to cover every part of the supposed U-shaped 
relationship between the female labor force participation rate and economic development.  
  The variable to be explained is the female labor force participation rate of ten five-year 
age groups (15-19, 20-24, …, 60-64). According to the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), the organization from which the data were extracted, a woman is economically active 
if she is employed or actively seeking work.
7 The female labor force participation rate is 
defined as the number of economically active women belonging to a particular age group 
divided by the total female population in that age group.  
                                                 
7 The data from 1960-1980 and 1980-2005 were taken from different data sets (ILO 1997, 2007). Chapter 3 
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  The theoretical framework set out in Section 2 invites the use of regression analysis 
to evaluate the empirical reliability of the female wage rate (wf), the male wage rate (wm), 
labor market conditions (l), fertility (τ) and search costs (s). However, further explanation 
of how these variables have been implemented and the functional form of the relationship 
to be estimated would seem appropriate. 
One difficulty that immediately emerges empirically is that we do not have comparable 
international data on male and female wage levels. To address this problem, Bloom et al. 
(2009) assumed a simple Cobb-Douglas function where output Y depends on capital K and 
aggregate labor L and men and women are paid according to their marginal products. In 
mathematical terms 
α − α + =
1
f f m m ] h L h L [ K Y ,     (3.8) 
where effective labor L is the sum of the male and female forces, Lm and Lf, weighted by 
their education levels, hm and hf, respectively, and 0<α<1. Consequently, 
f f h )
L
K
)( 1 ( w
α α − =    and    m m h )
L
K
)( 1 ( w
α α − = . (3.9) 
Put into words, female wages rise with female education, male wages with male education, 
and both female and male wages rise with the capital-labor ratio. As an alternative to male 
and female wages, one may therefore also use the capital-labor ratio and the educational 
levels of males and females. This alternative approach, however, raises two complications. 
Formally, the capital-labor ratio cannot be treated as an exogenous explanatory variable. 
This is because the size of the labor force, the denominator of this ratio, depends on the 
number of women who decide to participate. Following Bloom et al. (2009), we therefore 
proxy the capital-labor ratio by K/W, where W represents the total male and female 
population of working age (15-64). Second, the correlation coefficient between the 
educational levels of men and of women is high (0.94). Including highly correlated variables 
in a regression may cause the coefficients to have the wrong sign or implausible magnitudes 
and to have high standard errors and low significance levels even if they are jointly 
significant and the R
2 for the regression is high (Greene, 2008, p. 59). To avoid that the 
regression results are undermined by multicollinearity issues, we will only consider the Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
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educational level of women.
8 This variable is proxied by the average years of schooling of 
the female population aged 15 and over, and taken from Barro and Lee  (2000). To 
measure the numerator of the capital-labor ratio, we took data from Penn World Tables 
6.2 with respect to the physical capital stock (Heston et al., 2006). 
  In addition to the wage level, the better educated women, compared with the less 
educated, (1) possess skills that are in demand more often by an economy that pursues 
continued technological progress, (2) are likely to conduct more efficient searches, and 
(3) are less prone to layoffs and exhibit more stable patterns of employment. In this 
respect, the educational level of women can also be said to cover search costs.  
  The labor market conditions of a country are measured by employment in 
agriculture, that is, the percentage share of employed people in agriculture. This is 
because we have seen that the number of women who are in the labor force is relatively 
high in poor, mainly agricultural economies, and that this number diminishes if 
employment in agriculture falls. 
  Fertility is defined as the total number of children a woman will have by the end of 
her fertile period based on prevailing age-specific fertility rates. Data on the total fertility 
rate were taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2007). The fertility 
rate is treated as an endogenous explanatory variable. As instrumental variables we use 
the birth rate, the number of childbirths per 1,000 of the population (but then lagged five 
years in time), the infant mortality rate (up to one year of age) and the mortality rate 
under five years of age. Data on the birth rate were extracted from World Population 
Prospects (United Nations 2005) and data on infant mortality rates from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2007). Other instrumental variables were 
considered too, but rejected because they did not pass the (mis)specification tests to be 
discussed in the next section. 
   
                                                 
8 Since our data set is comparable to the data set used in Bloom et al. (2009), we suspect that these problems 
may have affected the empirical results reported in that study as well. Chapter 3 
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Summary statistics of all the variables by different income groups
9 are presented in Table 
3.2A in the appendix. This table demonstrates that the female participation rate of every 
age group shows a U-shaped relationship if we move from low-income economies to 
high-income economies. The participation rates of females aged between 15 and 19 on up 
to between 50 and 54 are the lowest for lower middle-income economies, while the 
participation rates of females aged between 55 and 59 and 60 and 64 are the lowest for 
the upper middle-income economies. In addition, an inverse U-shaped relationship is 
apparent between the number of women in the labor force and their ages. The female 
participation rate is low in the 15-19 age category; it increases sharply in the 20-24 age 
category and then remains constant or gradually increases up to the 40-44 age category. In 
the 45-54 age category the female participation rate starts to decline and in the 60-64 age 
category it falls off dramatically.  
    All other variables increase or decrease if we move from low-income economies 
to high-income economies. The average years of schooling and the capital-labor ratio 
increase if incomes rise, while the total fertility rate, employment in agriculture, the birth 
rate, infant mortality rate and mortality rate under 5 years of age fall if incomes rise. 
We pose the following empirical model for every age group 
it t i it f it
it
it it ) h , A ,
W
K
, ( f L ε + λ + μ + τ = , (3.10) 
where Lit denotes the female participation rate of a particular age group of country i at 
time t. τ is the fertility rate, K/W is the capital-labor ratio (the denominator measured by 
the total population of working age), A is the share of employment in agriculture and hf is 
the educational level of females. All these variables refer to country i at time t. εit are 
independently and identically normally distributed error terms for all i and t with zero 
mean and variance σ
2, μi denotes a country fixed effect, and λt indicates a time-period 
fixed effect. Country fixed effects control for all country-specific, time-invariant 
                                                 
9 Economies are divided according to 2006 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. 
The groups are: low income, $935 or less; lower middle income $936 - $3,705;  upper middle income 
$3,706 - $11,455; and high income $11,456 or more. Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
58 
 
variables whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical cross-sectional study
10; the 
justification for adding time-period fixed effects notes that they control for all time-
specific, country-invariant variables whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical 
time-series study (Baltagi, 2005). 
  It is clear from both the introductory section of this paper and the data description 
in Table 2 that a linear functional form in equation (3.10) will not be able to capture the 
posited U-shaped relationship between economic development and female labor force 
participation. To model the regime shift between falling and rising female participation 
rates across the process of economic development, there should be a nonlinear 
relationship in one of the explanatory variables reflecting the income position of an 
economy. In (3.11) we propose a quadratic functional form in the capital-labor ratio, 
since this variable is used as a proxy for the wage level and therefore best reflects the 
transition of economies from low income levels to middle and high income levels 
it t i
it
it f 8 it f 7
it
it 6 it 5
2
it 4
it
3
it
it 2 it 1 it
W
K
h h        
W
K
A A )
W
K
(
W
K
W
K
L
ε + λ + μ + β + β +
β + β + β + β + τ β + τ β =
 (3.11) 
This quadratic functional form is a generalization of the linear functional form in that it 
also contains product terms between the different explanatory variables and the capital-
labor ratio. To test whether this functional form better describes the data than the linear 
function form, we will test the null hypothesis H0: β2=β4=β6=β8=0.  
Starting with (3.11) we can also calculate the turning points of the explanatory 
variables, that is, the point at which the positive impact of a certain variable changes into 
a negative impact or vice versa. For example, in a low-income economy the share of 
employment in agriculture is expected to have a positive effect on female labor force 
participation and in higher-income economies to have a negative effect (see section 3.1). 
                                                 
10 There are many other social, cultural and institutional factors that may affect the female labor force 
participation rate. Social traditions are very important in determining the roles played by men and women 
in society. Women are generally considered as homemaker and care provider and men as bread earner. 
Antecol (2000) finds that women are more likely to participate in the labor market if their male partners 
exhibit greater cultural acceptance of such behavior. Since we control for country specific fixed effects, 
such cultural and social differences across countries are accounted for. 
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Its turning point depends on the income level, in the quadratic equation approached by 
the capital-labor ratio. The turning point of an explanatory variable can be obtained by 
differentiating the quadratic functional form by that particular variable, which for all 
explanatory variables in the model gives 
W
K L
2 1 β + β =
τ ∂
∂ ,   
W
K
A
L
6 5 β + β =
∂
∂ ,   
W
K
h
L
8 7
f
β + β =
∂
∂    and  
f 8 6 4 2 3
W
K h A
W
K
2
L
β + β + β + τ β + β =
∂
∂ , (3.12) 
where the subscripts i and t have been left aside, because the turning points will be 
determined at the sample mean. The first derivative with respect to the variable A shows 
that the marginal effect of the share of employment in agriculture will be negative if the 
capital-labor ratio is smaller than -β5/β6 and positive if it is greater than -β5/β6 (note: if 
both  βs are positive or negative, then the marginal effect can only be positive). The 
marginal effect of the capital-labor ratio itself not only depends on the capital-labor ratio, 
but also on the fertility rate, the share of employment in agriculture and the educational 
level of females. However, by substituting the first derivatives of these variables into the 
first derivative of the capital-labor ratio and by rearranging terms, we obtain following 
equation which only depends on the capital-labor ratio. 
W
K
) 2 (
L 2
8
2
6
2
2 4 8 7 6 5 2 1 3
W
K β + β + β + β + β β + β β + β β + β =
∂
∂ , (3.13) 
This equation shows that the marginal effect of the capital-labor ratio can also be 
negative or positive, depending on the turning point that in this particular case can be 
calculated by 
2
8
2
6
2
2 4
8 7 6 5 2 1 3
2 β + β + β + β
β β + β β + β β + β
− .   (3.14) 
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3.4 Empirical analysis: Results 
The first panel of Table 3.1 reports the estimation results of the nonlinear regression 
model (3.11) for the ten age groups that have been considered. Although country fixed 
and time-period fixed effects have been included too, their coefficient estimates are not 
reported for reasons of space. Since the share of employment in agriculture is measured 
in percentages, its coefficient presents the shift in the participation rate measured on the 
interval 0-100% when this variable rises by one percentage point. The coefficient of the 
fertility rate shows the shift in the participation rate when this variable increases by one 
child, of education when this variable changes by one year of schooling, and of the 
capital-labor ratio when this ratio increases by US$1,000 (in the remainder of this paper 
we use $).  
The fertility rate and the product term between the fertility rate and the capital-
labor ratio have been treated as two separate endogenous explanatory variables. The 
results are reported in the second panel of Table 3.1. Note that the alternative approach of 
using fitted values for the fertility rate only and calculating the product term between the 
fertility rate and the capital-labor ratio based on the fitted values of the fertility rate is 
inconsistent (Kelejian, 1971; Greene, 2008, p.380). We also estimated the model, 
ignoring the endogeneity of the fertility rate, but we have not reported the results of this 
exercise. Instead, we will explain the main differences.    
The results from the first-stage regressions show that the capital-labor ratio, 
employment in agriculture, and education have a negative effect on the fertility rate, and 
that the birth rate and the two mortality rates have a positive effect. Many of these results 
are in line with previous papers (see Anna and Marco 2005). Both for the fertility rate and 
the product term between the fertility rate and the capital-labor ratio, the R-squared is 
relatively high, indicating that the instruments together with the exogenous regressors do 
have predictive power with respect to the fertility rate. This is also illustrated by the F-
tests of the first-stage regressions. 
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Diagnostics 
The third panel of Table 3.1 reports the results of several diagnostics to test whether the 
model is correctly specified. To test the hypothesis that instrumental variables techniques 
are required, we ran the Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test of exogeneity for a 
regression equation with fixed effects. The null hypothesis states that an ordinary least 
squares estimator of the same equation will yield consistent estimates: that is, any 
endogeneity among the regressors should not have deleterious effects on OLS estimates. 
Under the null, the test statistic is distributed F(M,N-K), where M is the number of 
regressors specified as endogenous in the original instrumental variables regression, N is 
the total number of observations and K is the number of regressors. A rejection indicates 
that the instrumental variables fixed effects estimator should be employed. Since the five-
percent critical value of this density function is 3.04, the null must be rejected for every 
age group. Table 3.1 reports the results for the instrumental variables we use, the birth 
rate, the number of childbirths per 1,000 of the population (but then lagged five years in 
time), the infant mortality rate (up to one year of age) and the mortality rate under five 
years of age. Similar test results have also been computed for alternative sets of 
instrumental variables (see Table 3.3A in the appendix). However, these alternative sets 
did not pass all the (mis)specification tests. 
  To test the joint hypothesis that instruments are valid and that the model is 
correctly specified, we applied the Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying restrictions. 
The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, that is, 
uncorrelated with the error terms, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as 
chi-squared in the number of (L-K) over identifying restrictions, where L is the total 
number of instruments. A rejection casts doubt about the validity of instruments. For all 
population groups except females aged between 60 and 64, we find that the joint 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
  Finally, we have tested whether the instruments are redundant, irrelevant or weak. 
First, excluded instruments are redundant if the asymptotic efficiency of the estimation is 
not improved by using them. The test statistic computes the rank of the matrix cross-Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
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product between the endogenous regressors and the possibly redundant instruments after 
both have all other instruments partialled out. Under the null that the specified 
instruments are redundant, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of endogenous regressors (M) times the number of 
instruments being tested (L). Second, excluded instruments are relevant if they are 
correlated with the endogenous regressors. The test statistic computes the rank of the 
matrix of reduced form coefficients on the excluded instruments. Under the null that the 
instruments are irrelevant, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of 
freedom equal to L1-M+1, where L1 is the number of excluded instruments. Third, 
excluded instruments are weak if their correlation with the endogenous regressors is 
weak. The critical value of the F version of the corresponding Cragg-Donald Wald 
statistic within our empirical setting is approximately 8.18. The results of these three tests 
reported in the last panel of Table 3 indicate that our instruments are neither redundant, 
nor irrelevant, nor weak. It should be stressed, however, that this positive result was 
achieved after a severe selection procedure in which several possible instrumental 
variables had to be dropped, among which women’s life expectancy, male education, the 
child dependency ratio, the level of urbanization and the capital-labor ratio lagged in 
time. Furthermore, just as Falcao and Soaras (2007), we found that child mortality does 
not appear to be a particularly important determinant of female labor force participation, 
but that its effect on fertility is important.  
We have tested whether it is necessary to adopt a quadratic functional form in the 
capital-labor ratio. If the coefficients of the interaction effects are not jointly significant, 
then a linear functional form would suffice. The test results are reported in the last line of 
the first panel in Table 3.1. They indicate that the linear functional form should be 
strongly rejected in favor of the proposed quadratic functional form for all age groups. 
The R-squared ranges from 0.07 percent for females aged 60-64 to 0.57 for females aged 
25-29. 
To investigate the hypothesis that the country fixed effects are not jointly 
significant, we performed an F-test. The results indicate that we should reject this 
hypothesis for all age groups. To test whether random effects can replace these fixed Chapter 3 
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effects, we performed Hasuman’s specification test (Baltagi, 2005). The results reject the 
random effects model in favor of the fixed effects model for all age groups. 
Finally, we have tested the equality of the coefficients of the eight explanatory 
variables reported in Table 3.1 for all crosswise combinations of population groups 
(including the total female working age population), a total of 55 pairs. Since the square 
root of the error variance ranges from 2.31 for females aged 60-64 to 2.74 for females 
aged 35-39 (see σ in Table 3.1), we used the Wald statistic specified in (3.7). The results 
indicate that the null hypothesis has to be rejected in 46 cases. Only female labor force 
behavior in the successive age groups of 24-29 on up to 40-44 shows any resemblance to 
each other. In other words, the marginal reaction of the different population groups being 
identical is the exception rather than the rule. It follows from this finding that age-
targeted policies to enhance the female labor force participation rate may be more 
successful than one uniform policy.  
Interpretation of coefficient estimates 
Fertility appears to have a large negative and significant effect on the participation 
rate of females in every age group, whereas the interaction effect between fertility and the 
capital-labor ratio appears to have a positive effect. This positive effect
11, however, is 
only significant for females aged between 15 and 19, and 20 through 24. The fact that the 
coefficient of the fertility variable is negative and that the coefficient of the product term 
with the capital-labor ratio is positive indicates that fertility has a negative effect on the 
female labor force participation rate in lower-income economies and a positive effect in 
higher-income economies. The turning point for the total female working age population, 
which is illustrated in Panel 1 of Figure 3.3, amounts to $69,410. In other words, in 
countries located in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and South 
America, fertility affects participation negatively, while in countries located in Europe, 
North America and Oceania, fertility affects participation positively. 
                                                 
11 The finding of a positive effect of fertility on labor supply for women below 25 in developed countries 
may be an education effect - early childbearing may take women out of education and into the labor 
market. Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
64 
 
Table 3.1: Female labor force participation, fixed effects estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: Female Economic Participation by Age Group 
Variables  15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64  overall 
                  
Fertility -13.39***  -15.065*** -13.394*** -12.040*** -12.160***  -11.356**    -9.278** -7.466* -9.802** -7.595*  -9.717*** 
  (3.529) (4.374) (4.459) (4.429) (4.662) (4.519)  (4.28)  (3.995) (3.946) (4.312) (3.255) 
Fertility × capital-labor ratio 0.307***  0.211*  0.191  0.140 0.130 0.125 0.139 0.134 0.193* 0.153  0.140 
  (0.101) (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.129) (0.124) (0.115) (0.107) (0.111) (0.115) (0.091) 
Capital-labor  ratio  -1.056***  -0.050 0.035 0.102 0.010 0.019 0.152 -0.244  -0.394*  -0.274  -0.222 
  (0.28)  (0.298) (0.291) (0.289) (0.294) (0.276) (0.248) (0.219) (0.222) (0.215) (0.191) 
Capital-labor  ratio  ×  capital-labor  ratio  -0.005  -3.28***  -2.548*** -2.601*** -2.331*** -2.462*** -2.186*** -1.836*** -2.022*** -2.173*** -1.742*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.00) 
Agriculture  0.324*  0.314  0.399* 0.432** 0.355*  0.403*     0.296  0.204  0.227  0.141  0.221 
  (0.171) (0.208) (0.206) (0.196) (0.207) (0.206) (0.199) (0.189)  (0.20)  (0.216) (0.151) 
Agriculture  ×  capital-labor  ratio  -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.029***  -0.025**  -0.026***  -0.018* -0.024*** 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.01)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.008) 
Education  -3.115** -3.266** -3.647** -3.880** -4.376** -4.427**    -4.551***  -4.463***  -4.849*** -2.849* -3.459*** 
  (1.294) (1.576) (1.594) (1.704) (1.809) (1.751) (1.697) (1.577) (1.464) (1.487) (1.217) 
Education  ×  capital-labor  ratio  0.079*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.086*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) 
             
R
2  0.27 0.18 0.57 0.56 0.52 0..56 0.52 0.46 0.15 0.07 0.34 
σ   2.47 2.70 2.64 2.69 2.74 2.67 2.59 2.40 2.42 2.31 2.24 
Significance of country fixed effects             
F(39,  270)  40.81 22.23 24.16 23.05 23.67 25.46 30.34 43.50 44.12 42.16 36.29 
p-value  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Hausman test (FE vs. RE)              
Chi-sq(8)  31.21 44.31 50.64 40.69 34.35 31.07 40.74 74.25 50.48 79.23 58.83 
p-value  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Nonlinearity Test             
F(4,270)  6.12  9.74  16.13 20.01 20.72 21.32  18.80  17.74 15.12  8.61  19.11 
p-value  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
   Dependent variable: Fertility  Dependent variable: Fertility × capital-labor ratio    
Lagged  birth  rate  0.076***       2.569***          
  (0.010)       (0.369)          Chapter 3 
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Capital-labor  ratio  -0.012       1.836***          
  (0.008)       (0.398)          
Capital-labor  ratio  ×  capital-labor  ratio  0.001       -0.0002          
  (0.008)       (0.001)          
Agriculture  -0.003       -1.028***          
  0.005       (0.021)          
Agriculture  ×  capital-labor  ratio  (0.0001)       0.062***          
  (0.0001)       (0.006)          
Education  -0.38***       -2.23          
  (0.058)       (2.01)          
Education  ×  capital-labor  ratio  0.002***       -0.067***          
  (0.0005)       (0.033)          
Infant  mortality  rate  0.003       1.557***          
  (0.007)       (0.253)          
Mortality rate below 5 years of age  0.005          -0.883***            
  (0.005)       (0.161)          
                      
R
2  0.91       0.79         
First stage F-test  28.26          27.36                
Davidson-MacKinnon Test of Exogeneity            
F  (2,268)  11.32  17.79  13.75  9.09 9.98 8.13 4.90 3.91 9.82 7.88 11.5 
p-value  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01  0.02  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Over identification test              
Sargan-Hansen  test,  chi-sq(1)  0.55 0.59 0.66 0.38 0.13 1.19 2.29 2.92  1.9  6.53 0.73 
p-value  0.45 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.71 0.27 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.39 
IV Redundancy Test  chi-sq(1)  p-value          
Lagged  birth  rate  55.08  0.00           
Infant  mortality  rate  28.47  0.00           
Mortality  rate  below  5  years  of  age  31.18  0.00           
Under identification test             
Chi-sq(2)  2 7 . 8 1             
p-value  0.00            
Weak identification test             
Cragg-Donald  Wald  Statistic  10.1            
Notes: 
All regressions are based on the sample of 326 observations and include country and time-period fixed effects. 
Coefficient of squared capital labor ratio is multiplied by 1000 to make results presentable. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1 %. Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
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  The explanation is that these countries not only provide more childcare facilities 
but also provide more financial support to families with young children, among which are 
paid parental leave and childcare subsidies (Jaumotte, 2003). First, paid parental leaves 
help mothers of young children reconcile work and family life, and may strengthen labor 
market attainment through a job guarantee. Second, childcare subsidies reduce the 
relative price of childcare, thereby increasing the return of market work relative to home 
production (in addition to increasing effective income). Figure 3.4 shows the turning 
points for different age groups based on the estimation results reported in Table 3.1. An 
inverse U-shaped relationship is apparent between these turning points and the age of 
women. The turning points for females in the prime age groups are greater than those for the 
younger and older age groups. This implies that teenagers and elderly women are the first 
who will enter the labor market as a result of fertility decline when income levels rise, 
even though the impact of fertility decline is weaker for these age groups (see below). 
The second group will be women in the younger age groups 20-24 and 25-29 and, finally, 
women in the age groups 30-34, 35-39 and 40-44. 
If the endogeneity of the fertility is not accounted for, the coefficients of the 
fertility variable remain negative and significant, but they decrease substantially in 
magnitude. Furthermore, for five age groups (20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40-44) the 
sign of the interaction variable changes sign. Consequently, fertility would always have a 
positive effect on the female participation rate in these apparently younger age groups, 
which is rather implausible and clearly not in line with previous studies. These findings 
corroborate the hypothesis that fertility should be treated as an endogenous explanatory 
variable. 
On the basis of our regression results we can also compute the demographic 
transition effect, that is, the increase in female labor force participation due to the change 
from high to low rates of fertility when an economy develops. Table 3.2A in appendix 
shows that the fertility rate declines from 6.03 births per woman in low-income 
economies to 2.14 in high-income economies. Taking into account that the positive effect 
of fertility decline diminishes the higher the capital-labor ratio, we find that the total 
female labor force participation rate will rise by about 19% as a result of such a decline in Chapter 3 
 
67 
 
fertility when using the estimation results for the total female labor force (last column of 
Table 3.1). Figure 3.5 graphs the results that are obtained when using the estimation 
results for the different age groups. This figure shows that the impact of fertility decline 
for the prime age groups is stronger than for teenagers and elderly women. If these 
impacts are weighted with the share of each age group in the total female population of 
working age, the total effect becomes 22%. Bloom et al. (2009) found 11%, but they 
pointed out that this percentage may underestimate the total effect since they only 
considered female labor supply of those females aged below 45 (according to our 
estimation result these age groups explain approximately five percentage points of the 
total increase). Furthermore, they estimate a linear instead of a quadratic functional form 
as in this study
12 and therefore cannot account for regime switch effects. For emerging 
economies like India and Pakistan our model predicts an increase in the female labor 
force participation rate by about 10 and 20 percentage points over the period 2010-2050, 
respectively, based on the decline in fertility over that period projected by the United 
Nations (2006).
13 
The share of employment in agriculture has a positive effect on the female 
participation rate of every group, while the interaction effect between the share of 
employment in agriculture and the capital-labor ratio has a negative effect. The former 
effect is significant for five age groups and the latter effect for all age groups. The 
positive sign of the agricultural variable itself can be explained by the fact that women 
can combine farm work with family responsibilities in low-income and developing 
economies. The explanation for the negative sign of the interaction term is twofold. First, 
a rising capital-labor ratio represents a structural shift from employment in agriculture to 
industry and services.  
 
                                                 
12 Although they do take into account the fact that capital increases in line with the rise in labor supply. 
13 According to the medium variant, total fertility will decline from 2.76 in 2010 to 1.85 in India and from 
4.00 to 2.16 in Pakistan. Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
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 Figure 3.3: Marginal effects, confidence intervals and turning points 
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Figure 3.4: Marginal effects and turning points for different age groups 
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Panel 2: Turning points of agricultre employment by age groups
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Panel 4:  Turning points with capital stock per worker by age groups
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Panel 3:  Turning points of education by age groups
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Consequently, the agricultural sector can employ fewer females. Furthermore, 
they cannot immediately move to other sectors due to lack of skills and knowledge. 
Second, when an economy develops, mechanization of farm activities increases labor 
productivity, as a result of which fewer people are needed in the agricultural sector. In 
this respect, Boserup (1970, 1990) argued that industrialization marginalized women in 
the sense of hindering their participation in wage work. In sum, our results corroborate 
the hypothesis that agricultural employment has a positive effect in lower-income 
countries and a negative effect in higher-income countries. The turning point for the total 
female working age population, as illustrated in Panel 2 of Figure 3.3, amounts to $9,210. 
In addition to this, Panel 2 of Figure 3.4 shows that there are hardly any differences with 
respect to different age groups. The turning point ranges from $11,170 for females aged 
15-19 to $7,830 for females aged 60-64 years. These results reflect the actual situation 
prevailing in the world. In countries located in Africa and South Asia, the capital-labor 
ratio is lower than the level at which the marginal effect of the share of employment in 
agriculture changes sign; these are two regions of the world that also happen to have the 
highest rate of females employed in the agricultural sector, namely 69 percent and 61 
percent in 2007, respectively. Schultz (1990) found that changes in the sectoral 
composition of the labor force traced out the U-shaped relationship between female labor 
force participation rate and economic development. Our results confirm this finding. 
Education has a negative and significant effect on the female participation rate of 
every age group, while the interaction effect between education and the capital-labor ratio 
has a positive and significant effect. These coefficient estimates indicate that education 
does not have a positive effect on women’s labor force participation in lower-income 
countries, but only in higher-income countries. The turning point for the total female 
working age population, as illustrated in Panel 3 of Figure 3.3, amounts to $53,215. In 
other words, education only has a positive effect for countries located in Europe, North 
America and Oceania. A similar result was found by Smith and Ward (1985) for the US 
in 1900 and by Kottis (1990) for Greece over the period 1971-1981 in that the impact of 
education depended on a country’s stage of development. The explanation is that most 
women in low-income countries are unpaid workers on family farms and that more 
schooling does not help to improve their position on the labor market under these Chapter 3 
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circumstances. Furthermore, women may be barred from manufacturing employment by 
social custom or employer preference as soon as the economy starts to develop. The 
results are also in line with the OECD (1994, p.127), which has pointed out that there is 
little evidence to support an across-the-board increase in educational attainment in 
developed countries, because there seems to be a dividing line at upper secondary 
education below which labor market opportunities are worse than above it. Empirical 
evidence in favor of this proposition was also found by Elhorst and Zeilstra (2007). On 
the other hand, Panel 3 of Figure 3.4 shows that females in the lowest age groups (15-19 
and 20-24) are the first who will benefit from more education when the economy 
develops. For these age groups we find turning points of $39,430 and $45,361, 
respectively, which is below the value of $53,215 found for the total female working age 
population. 
Figure 3.5: The impact of fertility decline on female labor force participation for different 
age groups 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1
5
-
1
9
2
0
-
2
4
2
5
-
2
9
3
0
-
3
4
3
5
-
3
9
4
0
-
4
4
4
5
-
4
9
5
0
-
5
4
5
5
-
5
9
6
0
-
6
4
 
 
Since every regression equation of a particular age groups contains five 
explanatory variables that depend on the capital-labor ratio (note that in most equations 
three of these variables appear to be significant), it is difficult to draw any conclusion as 
to whether the capital-labor ratio affects the female participation rate positively or 
negatively. Therefore, we have calculated the marginal effect of the capital-labor ratio Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
72 
 
using (13). Panel 4 of Figure 3.3 graphs this relationship for the total female working age 
population. It shows that the capital-labor ratio has a negative effect on the female labor 
force participation rate in countries with capital-labor ratio’s below $86,445 and a 
positive effect above it. The explanation for this is that improvements in men’s wages due 
to an expansion of the manufacturing sector in developing countries without 
corresponding improvements in women’s wages exert (unearned) income effects that 
reduce women’s participation. Only when the value of women’s time considerably 
increases, do women move back into the labor force. 
3.5 Conclusions 
A few studies have argued that women’s participation in the labor force first declines and 
then rises with economic development, but they were unable to model this relationship 
empirically. Since such a U-shaped relationship cannot be covered by a linear regression 
model, we adopted a quadratic functional form with interaction effects between the 
capital-labor ratio (as indicator of the income level in a particular country) and three 
variables that are seen as the key explanatory variables of the female labor force 
participation rate across the process of economic development, namely, fertility, the share 
of employment in agriculture and the level of education. In addition, the square of the 
capital-labor ratio was considered. Previous studies by Pampel and Tanaka (1986), Tansel 
(2002) and Fatima and Sultana (2009) already considered the square of the level of 
income per worker. However, since the coefficients of the other interaction terms have 
been found in this paper to be significant too, we must conclude that only one interaction 
term is not sufficient to model the posited U-shaped relationship. Since female labor 
force participation may have a negative feedback effect on the fertility rate, we also tested 
for exogeneity of the fertility rate. Since this hypothesis had to be rejected, instrumental 
variables were then used to obtain consistent parameter estimates. After a severe selection 
procedure, three valid instrumental variables were found, namely, the birth rate five years 
lagged in time, the infant mortality rate (up to one year of age) and the mortality rate 
under five years of age. 
  We also investigated the extent to which the labor force behavior of females in 
different age groups may be lumped together for the purpose of a common treatment. Chapter 3 
 
73 
 
Previous studies by by Pampel and Tanaka (1996), Tansel (2002), Jaumotte (2003), 
Elhorst and Zeilstra (2007) and Fatima and Sultana (2009) have ignored population 
distribution effects, relying instead on the representative-agent paradigm. In order for 
representative-agent models to accurately describe aggregate behavior, all marginal 
reactions of individuals to changes in aggregate variables must be identical. We have 
found strong empirical evidence against this condition being applied to females across 
different age groups. 
  For every age group and for every explanatory variable in the model we found a 
particular point where the regime of falling participation rates changes into a regime of 
rising participation rates. Fertility has a negative effect in countries if the capital-labor 
ratio is below $69,410 and a positive effect above it. The same applies to the level of 
women’s education and the capital-labor itself, although the turning points are different, 
$53,215 and $86,445, respectively. Conversely, the share of employment in agriculture 
has a positive effect in countries if the capital-labor ratio is below $9,210 and a positive 
effect above it. Each of these findings corroborates the hypothesis that the relationship 
between female labor force participation rates and per capita income around the world is 
U-shaped. 
  Since women’s labor force status relative to that of men is an important 
benchmark of their status in society, their integration into the economy is a desirable goal 
for both equity and efficiency considerations. The existence of a U-shaped relationship 
between female labor force participation rates and per capita income around the world 
shows that it is possible to narrow the gap between men and women. The more an 
economy develops, (1) the lower will be the fertility rate which can free up time from 
childcare and the more childcare facilities will become available; (2) the more the 
industry mix will shift into the direction of employment in services which is experienced 
as a more acceptable form of employment for women, and which, since this kind of work 
can often be done part-time, permits women to combine work outside the household with 
their domestic activities; (3) the better women will be educated, as a result of which the 
value of women’s time in the market will increase, which strengthens the incentives of 
women to work away from home; and (4) the higher the female wage rate will be, as a 
result of which the probability will be less that the unearned income effect (the income of Economic Development, Fertility Decline and Female Labor Force Participation 
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a woman independent of hours worked, i.e., the income of her husband) will have the 
effect that a woman will quit working altogether. Concurrently, it should be pointed out 
that, just because the relationship between female labor force participation rates and per 
capita income is U-shaped, low-income countries will first have to go through a trough 
and even then they will have a long way to go before the gap eventually disappears. 
 Chapter 4 
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Chapter 4 
 
Tradeoff between Productivity and Employment: An 
International Comparison
1 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to attain long term sustainable economic growth of an economy, creation of 
employment opportunities along with promotion of higher productivity is a basic 
essential. Policy makers in developed, developing, emerging and transition economies are 
emphasizing the need to improve workers’ productivity. However, at the same time it 
needs to be considered that labor productivity will be increased by the substitution of 
capital intensive methods for labor intensive methods in production process, leading to a 
potential loss of jobs. 
Although productivity gain can lead to job losses, as technological progress leads 
to efficient utilization of resources, it can also lead to employment creation due to 
expansion of new product markets. The new jobs may be created in different areas, 
sectors and industries. Sectoral shifts of employment have been taking place in all regions 
of the world. On balance an increase in employment is more prominent in the services 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on the paper “Tradeoff between productivity and employment in transition 
economies: An international comparison” written with Bart van Ark. The paper is published as a book 
chapter in “Economic growth and structural features of transition” edited by E. Marelli and M. Signorelli, 
Palgrave Macmillan Publishers. 
 The authors are thankful to the participants of the AIEL XXIII Conference on Labor Economics, 2008, 
held in Brescia, Italy for their valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Tradeoff Between Productivity and Employment: An International Comparison 
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sector, but with considerable variation among different regions of the world. Similarly, 
the composition of the labor force, human capital development, investment in physical 
capital goods and adoption of ICT is changing over time. Since this transition process 
takes time, a tradeoff can be expected between employment growth and productivity 
growth during this transition process. 
This chapter focuses on the impact of increasing labor force participation rates on 
labor productivity. The theory of demographic transition predicts that there will be a 
change in the age composition of the population as a result of fertility decline. An 
increase of the relative size of the working-age population may lead to more labor supply. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether an increase in labor supply, caused by 
demographic transition, will affect labor productivity positively. One of the factors 
affecting labor productivity is the availability of productive and decent employment. In 
developing countries, where there is already a substantial level of unemployment and 
underemployment, a rise in labor supply often results in further underemployment and 
unemployment, since these economies do not have the capacity to produce employment 
opportunities for the new entrants on the labor market. To evaluate the impact of 
increased labor supply, the relationship between labor force participation and 
productivity growth needs to be investigated (Van Ark et al., 2004; McGuckin and Ark, 
2005; Broersma, 2008). This chapter focuses on the productivity and labor force 
participation tradeoff in dynamically changing economies with particular focus on 
transition and developing countries. The hypothesis is that there will be a tradeoff in 
productivity growth and employment due to structural changes in short and medium run. 
But in the long run, the economy will benefit from these structural changes as higher 
productivity is combined with employment growth. The chapter also investigates whether 
this development can be verified for all regions of the world or whether it is specific to 
some countries belonging to particular income groups. The chapter provides an 
international comparison of this tradeoff between different regions, as well as by different 
income groups of the world. Below we analyze (i) the relationship between productivity 
and employment for transition and developing economies belonging to different income 
groups; (ii) the impact of gender and different age groups of labor force on the 
productivity-participation tradeoff; and (iii) possible reasons that explain the differences Chapter 4 
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in the tradeoff across regions and income groups. This chapter also highlights the 
potential requirements for the transformation of short term tradeoffs into long run 
positive effects for sustainable growth in transition and developing economies. 
To investigate the intensity of the tradeoff between productivity and participation, 
we use a panel approach for 45 countries
2 across the world for the period of 1980-2005 
and the sub-period of 1995-2005. We find that there is tradeoff between labor 
productivity and labor participation for all regions and income groups of the world. The 
intensity of this tradeoff varies for economies belonging to different regions and income 
groups. The tradeoff increases as we move from high income developed economies to 
upper middle, lower middle and lower income developing and emerging economies. The 
analysis shows that during 1995-2005, the tradeoff has reduced for all regions, except for 
the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and it has become almost 
insignificant for high income group and upper middle income group economies.
3 We also 
find that the impact of female participation is negative and significant during 1980-2005. 
However, during the period of 1995-2005, female participation has a negative impact on 
productivity for a period lasting three years and becomes insignificant thereafter. 
Moreover, our results show that the impact of the participation of younger workers is 
negative and significant on productivity during 1980-2005 and becomes insignificant 
after 1995. 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 explores the employment-
productivity relationship. In section 4.3, the patterns of the employment-productivity 
tradeoff are analyzed across different regions and time periods at macro level. Empirical 
analysis of this tradeoff by applying panel analysis is presented in section 4.4. Impact of 
gender and age of workers on the tradeoff are analyzed in section 4.5. Finally, section 4.6 
summarizes the findings and suggests policy recommendations to handle this tradeoff. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 A list of countries is provided in Table 4.1A in the appendix. 
3 Transition economies are taken as five economies from Central and Eastern Europe which include 
Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, Hungary and Romania. Tradeoff Between Productivity and Employment: An International Comparison 
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4.2 The relationship between employment and productivity  
We start with a basic relation where output is considered as a multiplicative term of 
employment and productivity. A given level of output can be achieved either with high 
productivity and low employment (i.e. the employment intensity of economic growth is 
low) or, in contrast, with low productivity and high employment (a high-employment 
intensity). The important question is whether an increase in productivity necessarily 
implies a decline in employment. In fact, it is not always the case as there are other 
sources such as better capacity utilization, efficient use of inputs, and training and skill 
development of labor, which lead to an increase in productivity. In this case, the 
productivity can grow without reducing the employment. Similarly, there may be 
“displacement effects” that occur due to expansion of market share with increase in 
productivity level of particular firms. There can be a prompt employment decrease in 
other competing firms, so displacement effects should be kept in mind while focusing on 
the net impact on employment. Moreover, whenever productivity increases with 
mechanization, there may be less demand of labor (for example in the agricultural sector) 
but at the same time there will be more labor demand due to expansion of output and 
related activities of mechanical developments (as in the manufacturing sector of 
developing countries). Although the immediate impact may be a slight decline or 
displacement in labor demand, market forces will compensate through output expansion 
and demand for new products demand in the longer term.
4 For evaluating the 
productivity-employment tradeoff, both the time framework, the response of markets and 
institutions towards productivity increase are important. There are compensating 
mechanisms through which productivity growth in a particular sector can affect output 
and employment growth at the aggregate level. These compensating mechanisms work 
through decline in product prices, increased wages, increase in investment and overall 
employment and new products through innovation (World Employment Report, 2005). It 
is important to investigate whether these compensating factors play a positive role in the 
long run, especially in developing and emerging economies.  
                                                 
4 There is considerable variation in short, medium and long term. Here we use 3-5 years for the short run, 5-20 years 
for the medium and long term and 20+ years for the very long term.  Chapter 4 
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4.3 The tradeoff between productivity and employment 
Theoretically, when net participation is associated with employment growth then the 
productivity-participation tradeoff follows directly from the neoclassical production 
function (Broersma, 2008). Under decreasing returns to labor, any increase in 
employment rate will reduce capital per worker, which will in turn lower output per 
worker. Another theoretical argument to the productivity-participation tradeoff is based 
on skilled heterogeneity among workers. New entrants in the labor market are relatively 
less skilled than those already employed (Becker and Gordon, 2008). An increase in labor 
participation will imply a decline in labor productivity (McGuckin and Van Ark, 2005). 
Another related explanation for this possible tradeoff is that high growth rates of labor 
make it difficult to exploit the benefits from new technologies which help to boost labor 
productivity (Beaudry and Collard, 2003). 
To evaluate the productivity-participation tradeoff, we analyze a cross section of 
45 countries from all over the world for the period 1980-2005. In our sample, nearly 70 
percent of the countries are developing and emerging economies and they belong to 
different income groups.
5  
We start our analysis with an identity reconciling per capita income and labor 
productivity through labor intensity and participation 
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where Y is GDP, P is population, H is hours work, L is labor, P15-64 is working age 
population and E is the number of employed persons. In our detailed econometric 
analysis, we use the broader definition of the participation rate, the share of employed 
                                                 
5 Economies are divided according to GNI per capita into four groups. The groups are: low Income, $935 or less; lower 
middle income, $936 - $3,705; upper middle income, $3,706 - $11,455; and high income, $11,456 or more.  Tradeoff Between Productivity and Employment: An International Comparison 
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persons in total population, instead of the narrower definition of the population between 
15-64 years of age. This is done intentionally as the employment rate is widely available 
and less subject to measurement differences across countries. Moreover, the working age 
population (15-64 years) measure is somewhat arbitrary because people older than 64 
years may still be working. Data for (4.1) is drawn from The Conference Board and the 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC). 
Descriptive analysis 
Since we found that the annual percentage growth rates of the series are stationary
6, we 
continue our analysis based on them. Most economies represent developing countries and 
lack data on annual hours worked for these economies. So we will use GDP per 
employed person as a measure of labor productivity.  
Graphical description of data is presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in which we 
focus on the long term development of per capita income and labor productivity from 
1981-2005 taking account of each country’s starting position, which is the level of per 
capita income and productivity in 1980. This shows whether there has been convergence 
among these 45 countries in past 25 years in terms of welfare (GDP per capita), 
productivity (GDP per person employed). As the major part of sample countries consists 
of developing economies, there is no convergence in the sample. The negative annual 
growth of some countries shows that these economies are prey to a low level of income 
trap (see Figure 4.1). These economies are Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Nigeria. 
All these four economies are from Africa and belong to the lower income economies 
group. On contrary, countries like China, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand show good 
performance despite of their low initial level of income. All these economies belong to 
the East and Southeast Asian region and explain some part of East Asian miracle growth. 
A scatter plot of the initial level of labor productivity and the annual average 
growth during 1980-2005 is presented in Figure 4.2. This scatter plot pretty much 
coincides with the per capita income scatter plot, indicating that labor productivity 
growth is a major explanatory factor for income growth. There are many countries with 
low initial productivity level and high annual growth in productivity representing a 
                                                 
6 Levin, Lu and Chu (2003) panel unit root test result suggest that data series are stationary. Chapter 4 
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catching up phenomenon, i.e. Malaysia, South Korea, China, Thailand and Turkey. 
However, there are also economies in the sample that are prey to a low productivity trap, 
i.e. Zambia, Zimbabwe and Madagascar, Peru, Syria, Brazil, Ecuador, and Kenya. There 
is also variation in labor productivity growth performance among transition economies. 
For example, Albania with quite a low initial productivity level showed reasonable 
annual productivity growth while Bulgaria did not perform well during the period under 
analysis (see Figure 4.2). In the next section we will discuss the possible reasons for 
variation in productivity performance across different regions and income groups. 
An assessment of the long term interaction between employment growth and 
productivity growth for sample countries is presented in Figure 4.3. Although a negative 
relationship can be seen between employment and productivity growth, there is quite 
some variation across countries. Most countries are in the northeast quadrant of the 
diagram showing both productivity and employment growth. At one end there is China, 
South Korea and Malaysia which show evidence of both productivity and employment 
growth. At the other end, there are economies mostly from Africa, Latin America and 
Middle East in the southeast quadrant of Figure 4.3. These economies show high 
employment growth accompanied by poor performance in productivity which implies 
that there is a high rate of underemployment in these economies. There are also four 
countries in the northwest quadrant which show negative employment growth during 
1980-2005. All these economies are transition economies which experienced a rapid 
decline in employment during the 1990s with productivity gains related to a contracting 
economy because of the collapse of the former socialist regimes, leading to a huge shake-
out of employment from unproductive enterprises and the beginnings of market 
liberalization. 
Another way to explore the productivity-participation tradeoff is a decomposition 
of output growth by the change in employment and productivity (see Table 4.1). The 
regional growth rates are calculated by unweighted average growth rates in sample 
countries belonging to a particular region. In most cases we can observe a negative 
relationship between employment and productivity growth in different regions, i.e. in 
Europe, Africa and Middle East and North Africa.  Tradeoff Between Productivity and Employment: An International Comparison 
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      Source: The conference Board and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database (2008). 
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Figure 4.2: Scatter plot of labor productivity in 1980 and average labor productivity growth (1981-2005)
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Figure 4.1:Scatter plot of GDP per capita in 1980 and average  per  capita  income growth (1981-2005)
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One can also notice that in Africa output growth is mainly due to employment 
growth with very low productivity except for 1960-70. In Europe, productivity growth is 
mainly responsible for the output growth over the four decades up to 2000. However, the 
situation is reversed in the recent past (2000-2005). In Transition economies, output 
growth is mainly due to high productivity growth related to a rapid decline in 
employment in these economies. Only Bulgaria and Hungary showed slightly positive 
growth in employment during 2000-05, while the other economies in the sample showed 
negative employment growth during 1980-2005. The Southeast Asian region showed 
positive employment and productivity growth during the last decade, with productivity 
growth dominating employment growth. Similarly, in South Asia both employment and 
productivity growth moved together positively since 1980s. 
Table 4.1:  Output decomposition by employment and productivity (1960-2005) by regions 
   Africa  East Southeast Asia  Europe 
  
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
1960-70  5.00  2.46 2.53  6.21 2.52 3.69  5.29 0.64 4.65 
1970-80  3.11  2.71 0.39  6.35 2.68 3.66  3.27 0.35 2.92 
1980-90  2.11  3.36 -1.25  5.66 2.85  2.8  2.38 0.59 1.79 
1990-00  1.48  2.77 -1.29  4.78 1.53 3.25  2.32 0.85 1.47 
2000-05  2.95 2.1  0.85  5.04 1.44  3.6  1.76 1.23 0.53 
   Middle East & North Africa  North America  Transition Economies  
  
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
1960-70  4.89  1.65 3.24  5.22 2.49 2.72  5.11 1.30 3.82 
1970-80  6.87  2.76 4.11  5.38 3.59 1.79  3.54 0.96 2.58 
1980-90  3.92 3.1  0.81  2.3  2.52 -0.22  0.07 0.30 -0.22 
1990-00  3.89  2.88 1.01  3.03 1.58 1.45  0.80  -1.86 2.66 
2000-05  3.63  2.51 1.12  2.33 1.67 0.66  4.86  -0.94 5.80 
   South America  South Asia  Oceania 
  
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
Output 
growth 
Emp 
growth 
Produc 
growth 
1960-70  4.81  2.03 2.77  4.38 1.86 2.52  4.28 2.48 1.81 
1970-80  4.21  2.47 1.73  3.17 2.38 0.78  2.69 1.52 1.16 
1980-90  1.23  3.19 -1.96  4.88 2.21 2.67  2.51 1.09 1.41 
1990-00  3.81  1.52 2.27  4.86 2.02 2.84  3.16 1.43 1.72 
2000-05  3.75  2.72 1.03  5.24 2.76 2.47  3.31 2.4  0.91 
Source: The Conference Board and the Groningen and Growth Development Centre, Total Economy Database (2008). 
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Output growth in developed economies during 1960-2005 showed that the 
employment elasticity of output is low relative to developing economies. Similarly, 
output decomposition by different income groups reveals that in high income economies 
output growth was mainly due to productivity growth, whereas in low income economies 
low output was due to unproductive employment growth (see Tables 4.2A & 4.3A in the 
appendix). 
Gain in productivity means that more real income is generated which can be 
distributed among workers through higher wages. It will lead to an increase in per capita 
income which can further boost productivity through better standards of living and 
increased human capital investment. By looking at the impact of productivity and labor 
participation on per capita income, we provide a breakdown of this relationship as 
mentioned in (4.2). 
This breakdown of labor productivity growth into effects of labor force 
participation and GDP per capita by region and by different income groups has been 
provided in Table 4.2. It appears that the relationship between labor force participation 
and labor productivity tends to be negative in most cases. The share of active population 
to total population has turned strongly positive in most of developing economies during 
the 1990s. On the other hand, in some countries the demographic transition has not 
materialized into demographic benefits as can be seen from the poor performance with 
regard to productivity in Africa and South American economies, i.e. Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mexico, Syria, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A similar analysis by different income levels 
shows that the share of active population in total population decreased in high income 
economies, whereas it was high during 1995-2005 compared to 1980-95 for other income 
groups. In transition economies, there is a strong negative relationship between 
participation and productivity. Labor productivity growth during 1995-2005 was rapid as 
compared to the period of 1980-95, whereas the impact of the active population share on 
per capita income was only slightly positive.  
 
 Chapter 4 
 
85 
 
Table 4.2: Decomposition of labor productivity into effects of labor force participation and GDP 
per capita (1980-2005) annual average % growth 
Region/Area 
GDP per Person 
Employed (%) 
Effect of Employment as 
a percent of labor force 
(age 15-64) (in % points) 
Effect of labor force  
as percent of working 
age population (age 
15-64) (in % points
Effect of Active 
population(age 15-64) 
as a percent of total 
population
GDP per 
Capita (%) 
Africa                
1980-95 -1.775  -0.028  0.030  0.293  -1.480 
1995-05  0.384 -0.093  -0.157 0.388  0.523 
Southeast Asia                
1980-95  3.479 0.131  0.111 0.640  4.361 
1995-05 3.038  -0.337  0.200  0.308  3.208 
Europe                
1980-95 1.782  -0.375  0.153  0.244  1.804 
1995-05 0.904  0.540  0.560  -0.040  1.964 
Eastern Europe                
1980-95  0.628 -0.749  -0.704 0.255  -0.570 
1995-05 4.874  0.144  -1.064  0.389  4.343 
Middle East and North Africa                
1980-95  0.812 0.045  0.056 0.628  1.541 
1995-05 1.207  -0.142  0.159  0.930  2.154 
North America                
1980-95 0.260  -0.349  0.504  0.378  0.792 
1995-05  1.072 0.162  0.067 0.410  1.711 
Oceania                
1980-95 1.529  -0.460  0.214  0.177  1.460 
1995-05  1.174 0.583  0.304 0.139  2.199 
South  America                
1980-95 -0.042  -0.801  1.109  0.433  0.699 
1995-05 1.188  -0.584  0.695  0.441  1.740 
South Asia                
1980-95  2.875 -0.231  -0.263 0.266  2.647 
1995-05 2.616  0.323  -0.170  0.652  3.421 
By Development 
Developed                
1980-95 1.789  -0.322  0.155  0.259  1.882 
1995-2005  1.414 0.408  0.324 0.067  2.212 
Developing                
1980-95 0.650  -0.251  0.110  0.453  0.948 
1995-2005  2.033 -0.170  -0.056 0.554  2.344 
By Income Group 
High income                
1980-95 1.963  -0.291  0.106  0.239  2.017 
1995-05  1.474 0.440  0.351 0.029  2.295 
Upper middle                
1980-9522 0.598  -0.462  0.040  0.436  0.612 
1995-05 2.424  0.013  -0.372  0.469  2.533 
Lower Middle                
1980-95 1.365  -0.190  0.278  0.597  2.050 
1995-05 2.382  -0.261  0.199  0.647  2.966 
Low income                
1980-95 -0.675  -0.155  -0.009  0.200  -0.663 
1995-05  0.759 -0.221  -0.103 0.493  0.867 
Source: TCB/GGDC, Total Economy Database (2008) with GDP converted to US $ at 1990 GK PPP  Tradeoff Between Productivity and Employment: An International Comparison 
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An analysis with regard to time period shows that in all regions except East and 
South East Asian economies per capita income growth has increased during 1995-2005 as 
compared to 1980-95, with in most cases an increased role for productivity growth in 
driving the improvements in per capita income around the world. A similar analysis by 
income group shows that except in high income economies, growth in per capita income 
is high during 1995-2005. The labor productivity analysis shows that in developing 
economies labor productivity during 1995-2005 is high as compared to period 1980-95 
and its opposite is true for developed economies. This reflects the catching up of 
developing economies with low initial productivity level. 
The impact of participation, whether it is measured as employment rate or labor 
force participation rate, on productivity is negative or very low (see Table 4.2). It 
demonstrates the tradeoff between labor participation and employment, although one has 
to keep in mind that this relationship is not perfect as other factors can impact this 
relationship. 
Productivity growth and changes in labor intensity can also be viewed from a 
comparative perspective by focusing on relative levels. We present relative performance 
of different income groups economies in labor productivity and per capita income as a 
percentage of the US level in Figure 4.4 below for the years 1975 and 2005. For per 
capita income and labor productivity, there exists a significant gap between US and other 
income group economies. Comparison of the performance of these income groups for the 
years of 1975 and 2005, shows that in 2005, only high income economies managed to 
reduce the gap with the US productivity level while in all other income groups, this gap 
has further widened. In 1975, employment rate in high, upper middle and low income 
economies was higher than in the US, while in 2005 only low income economies have 
employment higher than the US. The lowest level of labor productivity in low income 
economies in comparison with the US reflects the less productive employment growth 
and it also indicates the presence of a strong high tradeoff between employment and 
productivity in these economies. 
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of per capita income, productivity and labor market indicators 
with US (=100) (1975 & 2005)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: GDP/P =per capita income, GDP/E= labor productivity, ER= Employment Rate and WAP/P = ratio 
of working age population to total population 
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  To analyze the impact of financial and economic crises (2007-09), the latest 
trends in growth in labor productivity, employment and output for the different regions of 
the world are presented in Table 4.4A in the appendix. The current global financial crisis, 
which started in 2007, has led to a decline in output growth in most of the economies 
around the world. Labor productivity growth reduced for all income groups in 2008, 
which resulted in a decline in output growth. The Conference Board (2009) shows that 
world productivity growth slowed sharply in 2008 and is set to decelerate further in 2009 
as the global recession deepen. However, this crisis is more severe for high income 
developed economies as compared to emerging economies. Generally, the pro-cyclical 
nature of productivity growth (higher in a boom and lower in a recession) can be 
observed from Table 4.4A in the appendix. 
  The regional level analysis suggests that the impact of the recent crisis differs 
widely across regions and depends upon various factors e.g. country reliance on 
international trade, dependence on natural resources, financial liberalization of banking 
system and fiscal resources at government disposal (The Conference Board, 2009). 
Although the productivity growth is affected in almost all regions, the adverse effects of 
the financial crisis are more visible in developed regions, i.e. North America, Western 
Europe and Japan. There is a significant decline in employment and productivity growth 
in these regions, for example, labor productivity growth in high income economies 
declined from 1.38 in 2006 to 0.57 in 2008. 
  In 2009, the global crisis resulted in a rapid decline in output, job losses and 
high unemployment rate in most economies but the productivity effect in developing and 
emerging economies is relatively low so far as compared to high income economies. 
However, for coming out of the recession and to achieve a sustainable productivity 
growth, there is a need for investment in tangible and intangible capital and for proper 
government responses around the world. 
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4.4 Empirical analyses 
The empirical strategy focuses on the relationship between productivity and participation. 
We follow the methodology adopted by McGuckin and Van Ark (2005), mainly because 
we are not only interested in the intensity of tradeoff between employment and 
productivity growth but also in the duration of this tradeoff. As discussed above for 
equation (4.1), we start with a simple accounting identity that includes per capita income. 
So we can rewrite the identity in equation (4.1) as 
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and equation (4.3) in terms of growth as  
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Since this is an identity, it cannot be estimated in order to assess the effect of a 
change in either right hand side variable to labor productivity growth. Since the 
dependent variable consists of Y/H and the first two terms on the right hand side of (4.4) 
might cause endogeneity problems since they also consist of Y and H, we move these two 
terms to the error term. So our equation for estimation in restricted form is: 
ε β β + ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ Δ + = ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ Δ
P
E
H
Y
log log 1 0                                                                                 (4.5) 
For estimating this model we use overlapping
7 panels of different time spans 
ranging from annual data to 10 years. Each equation is estimated without and with initial 
productivity levels (taken at the beginning of each time span) and country specific fixed 
effects. The initial labor productivity level is included as a control variable to capture the 
catching up phenomenon of developing economies. Our alternative equation (with 
controls) for estimation is 
                                                 
7 Overlapping time spans are e.g. years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, 4-6, to define growth periods for participation in the regression 
analysis. Tradeoff Between Productivity and Employment: An International Comparison 
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where j stands for the country and t stands for the period over which growth is measured. 
The measurement time span will consist of 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the employment to population ratio is used to measure labor force 
participation and will be referred to as the employment rate from here onward. GDP per 
employed person is our measure for labor productivity and as mentioned above our data 
is from The Conference Board and the Groningen Growth and Development Center. 
Econometric problem of analysis 
One potential problem is that of endogeneity of the employment rate (Becker and 
Gordon, 2008; Bourles et al. 2010). To test for that, we applied different estimation 
methods. Results are presented in Table 4.3. 
Column 1 in Table 4.3 presents the result of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
without country specific fixed effects and any control variable.  In column 2, we include 
country specific fixed effects and the initial level of labor productivity. The coefficient of 
the change in the employment rate is negative, significant and very close to the value that 
has been reported in column 1. 
The instrumental variable approach is applied in column 3 to correct for potential 
measurement error and simultaneity bias. We instrument the change in the employment 
rate by a first and second lag of the change in employment rate and a lagged value of 
GDP per capita. The Sargan test is used to evaluate the relevance and validity of these 
instruments. The test statistic and corresponding p-value is also presented. The test results 
point out that our instruments are valid and relevant. To test the hypothesis that the 
specified endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous, we ran the 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test of exogeneity for a regression equation with fixed 
effects. The null hypothesis states that an ordinary least squares estimator of the same 
equation will yield consistent estimates: that is, any endogeneity among the regressors 
would not have deleterious effects on OLS estimates. A rejection indicates that the 
instrumental variables fixed effects estimator should be employed. Since the five-percent 
critical value of this density function is 3.04, the null cannot be rejected, which implies Chapter 4 
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that the change in employment rate may be treated as an exogenous explanatory variable 
and that the OLS estimator produces unbiased results. 
 
Table 4.3: Effect of change in employment rate on value added per employed growth 
 
Dependent variable is growth in value added per person employed  
    
TSCS 
Ordinary Least 
Squares Fixed 
Effects Model 
Instrument al 
Variable 
Approach 
Generalized Method of 
Moments 
   I  II  III  IV 
Change in Employment to 
population ratio  -0.682*** -0.705***  -0.707***  -0.791*** 
 (12.062)  (12.631)  (3.102)  (15.447) 
Initial level of labor productivity   0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.578)  (1.473)  (0.699) 
Constant 1.661***  2.025***    1.623*** 
 (13.941)  (3.252)    (11.206) 
Number of observations  1170  1170  1080  1170 
Number of countries  45  45  45  45 
Sargan statistic      6.48   
P-value     0.096   
Davidson Mackinnon test of 
exogeneity                           0.146   
P-value     0.701   
Endogeneity test statistic      0.14   
P-value     0.70   
 *** significant at 1 percent,** significant at 5 percent,* significant at 10 percent 
In column 4, the employment rate is instrumented by the first and the second lag of change in employment to population ratio 
and the lagged value of GDP per capita 
 
The coefficient estimates in column 3 quite similar to those we obtained from the 
OLS method in column 1. This may be also due to the fact that we have large sample 
size.
8 (Bourles et al. 2010). Following Belorgey et al. (2006), we have also applied the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) as a robustness check, the estimation results are 
presented in column 4 of Table 4.3. The results remain very similar and reconfirm that 
OLS fixed effects model gives robust results. In following sections we will therefore use 
this estimator. The relationship between productivity and participation is evaluated in 
                                                 
8 Previous studies (Belorgey, 2006; Bourles and Cette, 2007; Becker and Gordon, 2008) are based on a 
small number of high income OECD countries and find that the coefficient estimates vary while using 
different estimation methods. 
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more extensive framework in Chapter 5 where we bring in additional explanatory 
variables. 
Panel estimation results 
We apply the panel approach to measure the relationship between the change in  the 
employment rate and productivity growth. The basic panel analysis results are presented 
in Table 4.4, in which growth in labor productivity is a dependent variable and the 
change in the employment rate is our independent variable. To evaluate the change in this 
tradeoff over the past decades we estimate the model for two time periods, 1980-2005 
and 1995-2005. We estimate the tradeoff between participation and productivity with and 
without control variables. The first and third columns in Table 4.4 show the results of 
simple regressions without any control variable. The second and fourth columns show the 
regression results with controls. We use the initial productivity level and country fixed 
effects as control variables. The top panel of the table provides the results for the impact 
of participation on labor productivity (GDP per employed growth). There is a strong 
tradeoff between participation and productivity and it remains significant even after 10 
years both in controlled and uncontrolled estimation results. During 1995-2005, the 
tradeoff between participation and employment is still significant statistically but its 
economic impact has decreased. 
    The bottom panel of Table 4.4 presents the result of the impact of increased 
participation on per capita income growth. The impact of the participation (employment 
to population ratio) is positive and significant for nearly all time spans (measurement 
intervals) in the uncontrolled regressions as well as the controlled regressions. The 
positive impact of participation on per capita income is higher in the recent time period of 
1995-2005 as compared to 1980-2005 (see column 4 in the bottom panel of Table 4.4). 
Regression results with controls (grey area in Table 4.4 are our main results as they 
include the country specific fixed effects which capture the impact of unobserved control 
variables in our model. 
Our finding of the existence of the tradeoff between labor productivity and 
participation growth rate is in consonance with previous studies (Beaudry and Collard, 
2002; Belorgey et al. 2006; Becker and Gordon, 2008). However, all these studies Chapter 4 
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focused on the tradeoff between employment and productivity among highly developed 
and industrialized economies only. In the case of developed economies, this tradeoff is 
short term and fades away in less than 5 years (McGuckin and van Ark, 2005; Broersma, 
2008). As in our sample of 45 countries, most economies are developing countries so the 
tradeoff persists even after 10 years for the period 1980-2005. Our sub period analysis of 
1995-2005 shows that this tradeoff becomes weaker as compared to coefficients of whole 
period analysis. The elasticity estimates for the employment rate to productivity tradeoff 
ranges from -0.32 to -0.78 in all cases. This means that the increase in productivity is not 
by definition translated in an increase in per capita income in case of developing and low 
income economies.  
To check the robustness of the relationship between participation and productivity 
growth, we evaluated the impact of various participation indicators (raw employment 
growth, employment/labor force, employment/working age population, labor 
force/working age population and labor force to total population ratios). Table 4.5A in 
the appendix shows the results, which reconfirm the existence of a strong tradeoff 
between participation and productivity. 
4.5 The impact of age and gender on the tradeoff 
To evaluate the tradeoff between productivity and participation, not only quantitative but 
also qualitative factors of labor force are important. In this section we test the hypothesis 
whether a disaggregation of the labor force participation rate into different gender, age 
groups and skill levels affects the determination of this tradeoff. Educational data of the 
employed labor force is not available for most developing economies, but we can 
evaluate the impact of gender and different age groups on the productivity-participation 
tradeoff. As data on the employment rate by gender and by different age groups is not 
available either, we will use information on female labor force participation and 
participation by different age groups provided by the ILO. Some cautions are needed 
when interpreting these results because the model estimates the impact of female 
participation and of different age groups on the overall labor productivity level, and not 
specifically on the productivity level of that particular group. 
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The impact of female participation on productivity growth is negative and 
significant for nearly all time spans during the 1980-2005. The estimation result for 
annual observation in column 1 implies that a one percent variation in the female 
participation rate changes labor productivity per worker by -0.31 percent. This tradeoff 
exists up to three years for the recent time period 1995-2005 (see first two columns in 
Table 4.5). After three years the tradeoff for females turns insignificant. The negative 
impact of female participation is probably due to a lack of education and skills, less 
experience (i.e., more entry and exit from labor market due to family responsibility) and 
an overrepresentation of jobs in low productivity sectors. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Effect of change in labor force participation on value added per employed 
growth 
  
Females  15-24 years old  55-64 years old 
1980-2005 1995-2005 1980-2005 1995-2005 1980-2005 1995-2005 
 
I  II III IV V VI 
 
Annual 
 
 
-0.31 
(4.82)*** 
 
-0.23 
(2.88)*** 
 
-0.27 
(5.65)*** 
 
-0.06 
(1.16) 
 
-0.13 
(3.11)*** 
 
-0.11 
(1.77)* 
 
2-year 
 
 
-0.33 
(4.04)*** 
 
 
-0.27 
(2.17)** 
 
 
-0.33 
(4.97)*** 
 
-0.10 
(1.17) 
 
-0.04 
(0.70) 
 
-0.11 
(1.17) 
 
 
3-year 
 
 
-0.36 
(3.64)*** 
 
 
-0.43 
(2.47)** 
 
 
-0.37 
(4.29)** 
 
-0.17 
(1.40) 
 
-0.04 
(0.69) 
 
-0.19 
(1.53) 
 
 
5-year 
 
 
 
-0.35 
(2.65)** 
 
 
-0.46 
(1.54) 
 
 
-0.43 
(3.57)*** 
 
-0.25 
(1.34) 
 
-0.05 
(0.53) 
 
-0.23 
(1.14) 
 
 
7-year 
 
 
-0.41 
(2.45)** 
 
-0.54 
(0.87) 
 
-0.43 
(2.76)*** 
 
-0.08 
(0.18) 
 
-0.05 
(0.53) 
 
-0.24 
(0.68) 
 
10-year 
 
 
 
-0.10 
(0.40) 
 
 
- 
 
 
-0.34 
(1.48) 
 
- 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
 
- 
 
Note: as mentioned in table 4.3. 
 ** significance at 1 % 
   * Significance at 5 %. . Tradeoff Between Productivity and Employment: An International Comparison 
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Similarly, the young and aged workers are considered as less productive on 
average than middle-aged workers. Younger workers are new entrants in the labor market 
and lack experience while aged workers may be characterized by lower ability to deal 
with new problems and age-related health issues. However, the argument can also be 
made that young workers come to the labor market with up-to-date knowledge, whereas 
skilled and aged workers are more productive because of on-the-job learning and 
experience over the years.  
The estimation results indicate that the impact of the young labor force (aged 15-
24 years) is negative and significant. After 1995, this tradeoff is no more significant (see 
column four in Table 4.4). Similarly, aged workers' participation impacts the productivity 
negatively for all time spans, although gradually there is decline in intensity of the 
tradeoff. For the period 1995-2005, the tradeoff between aged workers participation and 
productivity disappears even after one year (see last two columns of Table 4.5). 
Extending the analysis to examine the differences in the tradeoff for economies 
and regions belonging to different income ranges, we used the same specification as 
above. The estimation results by income ranges and for different regions are presented in 
Table 4.6. We make three observations on the basis of the results in Table 4.6. First, 
during 1980-2005 the tradeoff between productivity and participation remained 
significant for all time spans and all income categories, except for high income group 
economies. In the latter group, the tradeoff between participation and productivity fades 
away in less than five years. When we consider the sub period of 1995-2005, there is no 
tradeoff for high income economies and upper middle income economies during this 
period. For lower middle income economies and lower income economies, the tradeoff 
becomes insignificant after five years. Second, the value of the participation coefficient 
becomes higher as we move from high income economies towards low income 
economies. In other words, the negative impact of increased participation is high in low 
income economies compared to high income groups. Third, the negative and significant 
value of the participation coefficient is lower in the sub period 1995-2005 as compared to 
1980-2005, which indicates that the negative impact is declining over the time. The 
analysis above shows that the tradeoff between productivity and participation is large in 
low income economies as compared to advanced and developed economies. Chapter 4 
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Table 4.6: Effect of employment/population growth on labor productivity (GDP/employed) growth by 
income group 
 
High Income Economies  Upper Middle Income Economies  Lower Middle Income Economies  Low Income Economies   
  1980-2005 1995-2005  1980-2005  1995-2005 1980-2005  1995-2005  1980-2005  1995-2005 
Annual 
E/ P Growth 
 
 
-0.171 
(3.03)** 
 
0.035 
(0.40) 
 
-0.560 
(4.94)** 
 
-0.36 
(2.53)* 
 
-0.987 
(9.78)** 
 
-0.802 
(5.46)** 
 
-1.679 
(5.91)** 
 
-1.508 
(3.91)** 
2- years 
E/ P Growth 
 
 
-0.147 
(2.96)** 
 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
 
-0.367 
(3.01)** 
 
-0.21 
(1.25) 
 
-1.08 
(10.17)** 
 
-0.58 
(3.57)** 
 
-1.83 
(6.19)** 
 
-0.88 
(2.56)* 
3- years 
E/ P Growth 
 
 
-0.111 
(2.38)* 
 
-0.03 
(0.44) 
 
-0.33 
(2.57)* 
 
-0.21 
(1.06) 
 
-1.18 
(10.53)** 
 
-0.54 
(3.15)** 
 
-1.78 
(4.57)** 
 
-0.92 
(2.29)* 
5-years 
E/ P Growth 
 
 
-0.059 
(1.37) 
 
-0.09 
(1.15) 
 
-0.445 
(3.21)** 
 
-0.36 
(1.45) 
 
-1.22 
(10.77)** 
 
-0.48 
(2.45)* 
 
-2.16 
(4.33)** 
 
-1.78 
(2.36)* 
7-years 
E/ P Growth 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.06) 
 
-0.12 
(1.13) 
 
-0.46 
(3.26)** 
 
-0.28 
(1.24) 
 
-1.18 
(10.34)** 
 
-0.37 
(1.68) 
 
-1.76 
(3.62)** 
 
-1.14 
(1.20) 
10-years 
E/ P Growth 
 
 
-0.08 
(1.27) 
- 
 
 
-0.58 
(3.74)** 
 
- 
 
 
-0.916 
(10.41)*** 
- 
 
 
 
-1.74 
(3.27)** 
 
- 
 
Note: These regressions are based on overlapping panel and include initial level of labor productivity and country specific fixed effects.
High Income Economies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea ,Spain ,Hungary, UK and USA 
Upper Middle Economies: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Romania, South Africa and Turkey 
Lower middle Income Economies: Albania, China ,Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, India , Morocco, Peru , Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand and Tunisia 
Low Income Economies: Bangladesh, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zambia. Tradeoff Between Productivity and Employment: An International Comparison 
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A comparison of our results (for high income group economies) with the findings 
from Belorgey et al. (2006), shows that our estimated coefficient of participation on 
productivity is considerably smaller (-0.17) than their estimate of (-0.37). The 
comparison of our high income group results with the analysis by McGuckin and van Ark 
(2005) for 36 OECD countries shows similarity in terms of coefficient value (-0.21) as 
well as for the period of this tradeoff. Our analysis also suggests that this tradeoff 
disappears in less than five years for the high income economies. Broersma (2008) 
presents similar findings for Europe and for Anglo-Saxon countries. 
4.6 Summary and policy conclusions 
This chapter has analyzed the existence of a tradeoff between productivity and 
participation for the period 1980-2005 and the sub-period 1995-2005, across different 
regions of the world. We find the tradeoff to exist in most parts of world but its strength 
varies across countries and with different income ranges. Moreover, this tradeoff 
becomes insignificant or very low in 1995-2005 as compared to 1980-2005 in all 
economies, except for transition economies. In developed or high income economies the 
tradeoff is weak and low as compared to other income groups. This implies that in 
developing economies along with the emphasis on labor productivity growth there should 
be some short term and medium term arrangement for the productive absorption of the 
existing and new entrants of workers. Regional analysis shows that Africa is trapped in a 
low productivity trap because of unproductive employment growth whereas the Southeast 
Asian region performed well with positive employment and productivity growth during 
the period under analysis. 
Previous studies suggest that this diversity in the pattern of tradeoffs can be 
explained by differences in human capital investment, demographic dynamics, structural 
transformation phases and dissimilar labor market institutions between transition and 
developed countries (Bresnahan et al., 2002; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Cavelaars, 
2004; Cette, 2004 and Van Ark et al., 2008).  Extensive analysis of these variables will 
be considered in the next chapter. 
To reduce the productivity-participation trade-off in the short or medium run and 
to realize the long term growth potential, there is a need for the working of market forces Chapter 4 
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which allocate resources more productively and efficiently. While job growth may 
initially suffer, the productivity growth will bring prices down and create access to goods 
and services for a broader group of the population. As this creates new demand, the 
opportunities for creating productive jobs will ultimately increase, putting in motion a 
positive spiral of job and productivity growth. As this mechanism is not working 
automatically in transition and developing economies, there is a need of creating an 
environment which can alleviate/ reduce the negative short /medium term effects without 
affecting the long run growth potential. This can be done by facilitating the creation of 
jobs in infrastructure and other investment enriching sectors or by developing a national 
strategy for productivity growth. But focus should be on productivity enhancement along 
with employment growth as it will be the only way to achieve sustainable economic 
growth and better standard of living in long run. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Age Dependency and Labor Productivity Divergence
1  
 
                                         
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the relationship between the age composition of the population and 
labor productivity. This relationship is important, because countries are almost 
continuously passing through different demographic phases. While developed nations are 
characterized by a rapidly increasing aging population share, youth dependency in 
developing and emerging economies is still quite high, despite a declining trend. A better 
understanding of how these changes in age composition affect labor productivity growth 
is very important for a meaningful analysis of economic growth potential and realization. 
In this chapter, we use a panel of up to 110 countries
2 to examine the determinants 
of labor productivity (output per worker) growth over the period 1980-2005. Along with 
other socio-economic determinants of labor productivity growth, our main focus is on the 
role played by changes in the demographic structure of a country. There is a large body 
of literature on demographic transition and economic growth, suggesting that an increase 
of the working age population share or a decline of the dependent population can promote 
economic growth. Examples are Sarel (1995), Bloom and Williamson (1998), 
International Monetary Fund (2004), Kelley and Schmidt (2005) and Choudhry and 
Elhorst (2010). The effects of participation and of the age composition of the labor force 
                                                 
1 The author is thankful to Bart van Ark, Paul Elhorst, Dirk Bezemer and participants of the European 
Economic Association Conference, 2009, held in Barcelona, Spain for their valuable comments and 
suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 The sample of countries varies from 71 to 110 countries depending on data availability of the explanatory 
variables. Age Dependency and Labor Productivity Divergence 
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on labor productivity have also been analyzed, see Kogel (2005), Feyrer (2007) and 
Choudhry and Van Ark (2010). The hypothesis we test in this chapter is whether the age 
structure of the total population not only directly affects cross-country labor productivity 
growth differentials but also indirectly affects the effectiveness of other determinants of 
labor productivity growth. To our knowledge no other study has investigated this 
hypothesis before. Except for considering both advanced and developing economies, we 
also analyze whether the effects in high-income OECD
3 are different from those in other 
countries. 
We focus on labor productivity and factor inputs (other than labor) rather than 
total factor productivity (TFP). We decided to follow this approach rather than 
investigating the efficiency by which these inputs are being used, since TFP remains a 
residual factor in growth empirics. Nevertheless, it is recognized that TFP plays an 
important role in explaining cross-country differences in output per capita (see e.g. King 
and Levine, 1994; Prescott, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999; Kogel, 2005; Islam, 2008).   
Kogel (2005) find that high youth dependency affects the total factor productivity 
through the channel of lower savings and consequently lower spending on research and 
development.  
Our results show that child dependency has a stronger adverse effect on labor 
productivity than old age dependency. In addition, higher age dependency impacts labor 
productivity growth negatively not only directly but also indirectly by modifying the 
impact of other social, economic and infrastructural determinants. More specifically, we 
find that the marginal effects of gross capital formation, labor market reforms, and 
information and communication technology investment are statistically significant and 
higher at lower levels of age dependency. These findings hold for both developed and 
developing economies. Conversely, the marginal effect of financial development 
increases at higher levels of age dependency but is statistically insignificant. On the other 
hand the marginal effect of financial development at higher levels of age dependency in 
high income countries appears to be greater than in other countries.  
                                                 
3 For the sake of brevity, we will refer to high-income OECD countries as developed economies in the rest 
of the chapter, while other economies will be referred to as developing economies. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses labor 
productivity growth trends across countries and regions during 1980-2005. It also 
presents a brief literature review of labor productivity determinants to provide a rationale 
for the selection of the explanatory variables in our empirical analysis. Section 5.3 
presents the empirical framework and provides an overview of the data. Section 5.4 
presents the empirical results and their implications. Section 5.5 offers various sensitivity 
analyses and robustness checks. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Labor productivity trends across regions 
In this section, we present labor productivity growth trends across different regions 
during 1980-2005. As productivity growth not only varies across regions, but also within 
regions, there is a reasonable diversity with respect to productivity performance. To 
examine the performance of labor productivity across regions and income groups, we use 
the Labor Productivity Index (LPI) which is graphed in Figure 5.1.
4  The figure shows 
that Africa‘s productivity growth performance is the worst of all regions. It is the only 
region in which labor productivity fell since 1990. The best performing regions are the 
Southeast and East Asia. In these regions all economies registered an increase in 
productivity during the 1990s. In East Asia, all economies were more or less on the same 
growth path until 1993, but since then China’s productivity growth increased more 
rapidly. The South Asian region has also seen improvements in terms of productivity 
growth, especially since 1990, because of the impressive labor productivity growth 
figures in India. India’s output per person employed increased by more than 75 percent 
during 1990-2005, which was faster and far better than in its neighboring countries.  
Determinants of labor productivity 
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of labor 
productivity. In this section we review a selection of these studies, especially those 
focusing on the variables considered in the empirical part of this chapter. The literature 
has mainly used two methods of analysis. The first one is a short term business cycle 
approach. In this approach, productivity growth is mostly related to employment growth 
(Beaudry and Collard, 2002; Becker and Gordon, 2008 and Choudhry and Van Ark, 
                                                 
4 We set labor productivity to 100 in year 1980. Age Dependency and Labor Productivity Divergence 
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2010). The second one can be described as the long term growth approach. Starting from 
Solow’s neoclassical growth model, these studies focus on the main determinants of labor 
productivity growth (or per capita income growth, as a proxy) both in the steady state as 
well in the transition state. In conditional convergence versions of the Solow model, other 
exogenous variables have also been considered in this literature (Barro, 1991).  
Figure 5.1: Labor productivity index (1980-2005), output per person employed (1980=100) 
Labor productivity index by region, 1980-2005 where 1980=100
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Note: ESEASIA= East and Southeast Asia, MENA = Middle East & North Africa, NAMER= North America, SAMER= South 
America and SASIA= South Asia 
The number of studies investigating the effect of the age structure on aggregate 
productivity growth is limited. Some studies focus on the impact of the age structure on 
economic growth (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Choudhry and Elhorst, 2010), or on 
firm (plant) productivity (Skirbekk, 2003; IImakunnas and Maliranta, 2005). Others 
examine the effect of the age structure of the labor force on labor productivity (Feyrer, 
2007; Choudhry and Van Ark, 2010). In addition, Kogel (2005) finds that a negative 
relationship between youth dependency and total factor productivity. Finally, some Chapter 5 
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studies find that the age structure of the entire population affects output (Sarel, 1995; 
Persson, 2002). 
This chapter differs from the studies mentioned above in that it focuses on the 
impact of the age composition of the entire population on labor productivity (while other 
studies mainly evaluate the impact of the age composition of the working population on 
labor productivity), and because it considers an interactive model of age composition 
with other determinants (explanatory variables) of labor productivity. We will show that 
these determinants not only have a direct effect on labor productivity but due to these 
interactions also indirect effects conditional on the age composition of the total 
population.  
In this study
5, we evaluate the impact of gross capital formation, financial 
development, ICT development and labor market reforms on labor productivity growth. 
However, since other socioeconomic indicators have also played an important role in 
recent growth studies (Barro, 1995; Bourlès and Cette, 2007; Islam, 2008; Marelli and 
Signorelli, 2010), we also consider several additional control variables, such as labor 
force participation rate, human capital, infrastructure development, openness and 
inflation. 
The most discussed variable in recent studies as a potential determinant of labor 
productivity is ICT investment (Van Ark et al., 2003; Belorgey et al., 2006; Jorgenson, 
2007). These studies find that ICT investment and diffusion can explain part of 
productivity differential between Europe and the U.S. We therefore incorporate ICT 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP as an explanatory variable. The positive impact of 
new technologies for developing economies also depends on the availability of skilled 
labor (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). It has been argued that many technologies adopted 
by developing economies, which are developed in the OECD economies, are 
complementary to the skill set of these richer countries’ workforces. Low income 
developing economies often lack these skilled workers for an efficient utilization of these 
                                                 
5 Our dependent variable is labor productivity (output per worker) growth, our independent variables are 
age dependency, gross capital formation, financial development (domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector as percentage of GDP), ICT development (ICT expenditure as percentage of GDP), labor market 
reforms (labor market reforms index), participation rate (total employment/total population) and inflation 
rate. Age Dependency and Labor Productivity Divergence 
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technologies, which reduces the positive impact these countries might obtain of a 
relatively young labor force. The technology-skill mismatch could account for a large 
part of observed output-per-worker differences around the world. 
 Labor Market Reforms (LMR) is another determinant that might improve the 
performance of labor markets. We are evaluating LMR’s role at different levels of age 
dependency. Our hypothesis is that labor market reforms can promote labor productivity 
in countries where the working age population share in total population is relatively high. 
In addition, financial sector development may promote economic growth and labor 
productivity by providing better access to funding opportunities for highly productive and 
efficient projects.  Our hypothesis is that financial services can be better utilized if the 
share of productive population in total population is higher.  
5.3 Model specification 
The dependent variable in our model is labor productivity growth, measured as the 
change in output per employed person. Alternatively, as a part of the sensitivity analysis, 
we consider output per hour as the dependent variable. In our baseline model, we assume 
that labor productivity is dependent on several economic indicators, labor market 
institutions, age composition of population, financial development and the growth in 
information and communication technology (ICT) in an economy. We test whether these 
determinants have a direct impact on labor productivity as well as an indirect impact 
conditional on the age composition of the total population. So our baseline model is 
it t i it it it it it AD AD INF IPEY ER ε τ β β β β β β α + + ∂ + Ψ + + + + + Δ + Δ 6
2
5 4 3 2 1 i it   =   LP                        
(5.1) 
where i represents a country and t a time period. LP denotes labor productivity growth
6; 
ΔER is the change in the broad participation rate measured as total employment divided 
by total population, IPEY is the initial level of labor productivity in an economy, INF is 
the inflation rate and AD is the ratio of the dependent population to the working age 
population.Ψ  represents one of the variables of our interest
7 which includes gross capital 
                                                 
6 LP is measured by taking the log difference of labor productivity at t and t-1. 
7 For these variables we want to check their effect on labor productivity at different levels of age 
dependency. Chapter 5 
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formation, ICT expenditure, labor market regulations and financial development. β6  
represents the corresponding coefficient of  the variable of interest.  i ∂  is a country fixed 
effect,  t τ is a period fixed effect and εit is an independently and identically normally 
distributed error term with zero mean and variance σ
2. Country fixed effects control for 
all country-specific, time-invariant variables whose omission could bias the estimates in a 
typical cross-sectional study. For example, these country specific fixed effects allow for 
different labor market institutions and cultural and social norms across countries. The 
justification for adding time-period fixed effects notes that they control for all time-
specific, country-invariant variables whose omission could bias the estimation in a typical 
time-series study (see Baltagi, 2005).  
To check whether the impacts of other productivity determinants are conditional 
on the age structure of the population, we introduce an interaction term between age 
dependency and one of the variables of our interest.  Consequently, our model extends to 
2
it i1 2 3 4 5 6 7  =  * LP it it it it it it it it i t it ER IPEY INF AD AD AD α ββ ββ ββ β τ ε +Δ + + + + +Ψ +Ψ + ∂ ++ Δ  
(5.2) 
where  Ψ *AD is the interaction term of one of our variables of interest with age 
dependency. Since we are primarily interested in evaluating the effect of four explanatory 
variables and their interaction with age dependency, we will estimate four separate
8 
models extended to include: 1) age dependency * gross capital formation; 2) age 
dependency * ICT expenditure; 3) age dependency * labor market reforms and 4) age 
dependency * financial development. For example, to determine the effect of ICT 
expenditure on labor productivity at different levels of age dependency we estimate the 
model 
2
it i1 2 3 4 5 6 7  =  * LP it it it it it it it it i t it ER IPEY INF AD AD ICT ICT AD α ββ ββ βββ τ ε +Δ + + + + + + + ∂ ++ Δ                                
(5.3)   
                                                 
8 We estimate four separate models for the following reasons: 1) to have a sufficient number of 
observations. For example, we have only 416 observations for ICT expenditure while we have more than 
2000 observations for gross capital formation and financial development; 2) we have also carried out a 
regression analysis  including all linear and interaction terms in one single equation. Although the number 
of observations declined significantly (361), the results were comparable. The estimation results are 
presented in Table 5.3A in the appendix. Age Dependency and Labor Productivity Divergence 
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As a next step we calculate the marginal effect of each variable of interest at 
different levels of age dependency. For this purpose we differentiate equation (5.2) with 
respect to that particular variable. Thus for the calculation of the marginal effect of ICT 
expenditure conditional on age dependency, we take the derivative of equation (5.3) with 
respect to the ICT variable to get 
AD ICT
LP
7 6 β β + = ∂
∂                                                                                        (5.4)  
The marginal effect of other variables of interest can be calculated accordingly.   
Data description and analysis  
We use data on labor productivity (output per worker, measured as GDP per person 
employed) taken from The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre.
9 Labor productivity levels vary significantly across countries. The average labor 
productivity level of high income economies was 11 times higher than that of low income 
economies in 1980. This difference in labor productivity increased further to 12.1 in 
2005. We use the employment to population ratio as a measure of the labor force 
participation rate. This variable is taken from the TCB/GGDC database. In chapter 4 it 
was found that the relationship between labor productivity and the labor force 
participation rate is negative in the short term.  
Age dependency is measured as the ratio of dependent population to working age 
population, which is obtained from the World Development Indicators. The dependent 
population is defined as the sum of the young population (0-14 years) and the aged 
population (65+ years). The working age population is measured by the population aged 
15-64 years. To evaluate the relationship between labor productivity and age dependency, 
a scatter plot is presented in Figure 5.2 which suggests a negative and non-linear 
relationship between these two variables. We therefore included a square term of age 
dependency as an additional explanatory variable in our empirical model.  
A comparison of age dependency and labor productivity performance for different 
income groups is presented in Figure 5.3. Age dependency in low income economies is 
nearly twice as high than that in high income economies. At the same time, labor 
                                                 
9 Version June, 2009 Chapter 5 
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productivity is relatively low compared to high income and upper middle income 
economies. Age dependency seems to have come down most rapidly in the upper and 
lower middle income countries.  
 
Figure 5.2: Relationship (scatter plot) between labor productivity and age dependency 
(1980 & 2005)  
 
As discussed above other potential determinants of labor productivity are 
macroeconomic indicators like labor market institutions, ICT development and financial 
development. Two macroeconomic variables will be included: (i) adjusted inflation as a 
proxy for changes in the price level and macro economic instability of a country;
10 and 
(ii) gross capital formation
11 growth to capture macroeconomic developments. Data on 
                                                 
10 To adjust for extreme movements, we modify the inflation rate (P) as
/100
1(/ 1 0 0 )
P
P +
.  
11 Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed 
assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories.  
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inflation and gross capital formation is taken from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI).  
To evaluate the role of labor market institutions and regulations, we incorporate 
the Labor Market Regulations (LMR) index as an explanatory variable. LMR is a 
composite index based on six measures of labor market institutions (minimum wage, 
hiring and firing regulations, centralized collective bargaining, mandated cost of hiring, 
mandated cost of worker dismissal and conscription). The LMR index is an unweighted 
average of these six measures and its value varies from 1-10. Data on LMR index is taken 
from the Fraser Institute.
12 
Additionally, we use ICT expenditure as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for ICT 
development, and domestic credit by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP as a 
proxy for financial development. Both are taken from WDI. 
Figure 5.3: Labor productivity and age dependency by country groups ranked according to 
average income 
Note: LP is labor productivity measured as output per employed worker and AD is age dependency measured as ratio of 
dependent population to working age population. 
HYE= High Income Economies, UMYE = Upper Middle Income Economies, LMYE= Lower Middle Income Economies 
and LYE= Lower Income Economies 
 
                                                 
12 http://www.freetheworld.com 
Labor Productivity and age Dependency by Income Group (1980-2005)
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We also use a set of control variables suggested in previous studies on the 
determinants of labor productivity to check the robustness of our empirical model. We 
include the initial level of GDP per person employed to reflect the different levels of 
development that characterize each of the countries. Other control variables include 
employment in the agricultural sector, openness, foreign direct investment and 
infrastructure development. Data on these control variables is taken from the historical 
database of World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). We also used the corruption 
indicator to evaluate its importance for labor productivity growth.  
The precise definitions and data sources of all variables used are given in Table 
5.1A in the appendix. Summary statistics of the dependent variable and the independent 
variables are presented in Table 5.2A in the appendix. Table 5.1 reports the correlation 
matrix of our variables. The low correlation coefficients indicate that multicollinearity 
will not be a problem in our estimations. 
Table 5.1: Correlation matrix between dependent variable and explanatory variables 
 
   LP  PART  ILP  INF  GCF  ICT  LMR  FDEPTH  AD 
Labor Productivity 
Growth  (LP)  1.00            
Participation Growth 
(PART)  0.07  1.00          
Initial Labor Productivity 
Level  (ILP)  -0.16  0.33  1.00         
Inflation (INF)  -0.12  -0.14  -0.29  1.00        
Gross Capital Formation 
Growth (GCF)  0.28  0.29  -0.05  -0.21  1.00       
ICT Expenditure  -0.04  0.13 0.24  -0.06 0.01 1.00       
Labor Market 
Regulations  (LMR)  0.04  0.09  -0.04  -0.11 0.02 0.15 1.00     
Financial Depth 
(FDEPTH)  -0.10  0.24 0.43  -0.29 0.12 0.26 0.23  1.00   
Age Dependency (AD)  -0.18  -0.30 -0.45  0.22 -0.34 -0.03  0.05  -0.32  1.00 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
The estimation results are reported in Table 5.2. The results are based on annual data over 
the period 1980-2005 for a large number of countries at different stages of economic 
development. The number of countries in different specifications varies from 71 to 110 
depending on data availability of the explanatory variables. The fixed effects model has Age Dependency and Labor Productivity Divergence 
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been selected on the basis of the Hausman specification test (Baltagi, 2005).  The 
Hausman test statistic points out that the fixed effects model should be used rather than 
the random effects model (see Table 5.2). To account for time specific effects, we 
introduced time dummies for five year periods.
13 To investigate the hypothesis that the 
country fixed effects are not jointly significant, we performed an F-test. The low p-value 
of F-test statistic in Table 5.2 suggests that we must reject this hypothesis.  
First we carried out a regression analysis with age dependency, its quadratic term 
and other control variables without any interactive term (see columns 1 - 4 of Table 5.2). 
The F-statistics indicate an overall significance level of the models at 1 percent.  
We find that the initial labor productivity level is significant and negative which 
reflects the conditional convergence in per capita productivity growth in our sample of 
countries. The impact of age dependency is negative and significant which implies that a 
higher dependency rate leads to a decline in labor productivity growth. The coefficient of 
the quadratic age dependency term is positive and statistically significant in two 
specifications (Model 1 & Model 4). Based on the marginal effect of age dependency, we 
see that a lower level of age dependency leads to a higher level of labor productivity.
14 
The control variables have their expected signs. The impact of labor force participation 
(employment/ population ratio) growth on labor productivity is negative and significant.
15 
This finding is consistent with the literature that evaluated the role of increasing rates 
participation on labor productivity (see e.g. Beaudry and Collard, 2003; Choudhry and 
Van Ark, 2010). As expected, higher inflation is negatively related to labor productivity 
growth, while higher gross capital formation and ICT development promote labor 
productivity. The impact of LMR is not significant (see column 3 of Table 5.2).
16  
                                                 
13 Time dummy D1 takes the value 1 for 1981-1985 and otherwise is 0. 
14 Calculations were made by taking the derivative of equation (5.1) with respect to age dependency. 
15 To ensure that the effect of changes in age dependency on labor productivity growth is not simple due to 
labor force participation growth, we also excluded the labor force participation rate variable from the 
specification, and found that the impact of age dependency remained negative and significant. This is 
because the correlation between age dependency and labor participation rate is in fact quite low (-0.30). 
16 Before we turn to the results regarding the impact of various indicators conditional on age dependency, it 
is important to note that inference cannot be based on simple t-statistics because the model parameters do 
not provide substantial information in case of models with multiplicative terms (Brambor et al., 2006 and 
Shehzad and De Haan 2009). As Aiken and West (1991) point out, in interactive models we need to take 
the derivative of the model with respect to the variable of interest and evaluate its effect conditional on the 
means of other constituent terms part of the derivative. Chapter 5 
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Table 5.2: Impact of demographics on  labor  productivity 
 
  Direct Model  Interactive model 
    1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Age Dependency  -0.414***  -0.937*  -0.08  -0.619***  -0.392***  -0.667  -0.004  -0.627*** 
    0.129  0.5  0.248 0.185 0.131 0.541 0.220 0.179 
Age Dependency*Age Dependency  0.226***  0.416 -0.029  0.347***  0.213***  0.292  0.044  0.346*** 
  0.080  0.337 0.187 0.115 0.080 0.345 0.159 0.115 
Change in Participation  -0.702***  -0.492***  -0.612***  -0.555***  -0.731***  -0.493***  -0.614***  -0.555*** 
    0.057  0.149 0.144 0.077 0.056 0.148 0.144 0.076 
Initial level of labor productivity  -0.030*** -0.155***  -0.051***  -0.065***  -0.030*** -0.159***  -0.055*** -0.065*** 
    0.008  0.041 0.017 0.014 0.008 0.041 0.018 0.014 
Inflation  -0.103***  -0.174**  -0.117*** -0.124*** -0.100***  -0.175**  -0.122*** -0.124*** 
    0.024  0.071 0.035 0.021 0.024 0.071 0.034 0.021 
Change in Gross Capital Formation  0.001***         0.002***        
   0.000         0.000        
Gross capital Formation*Age Dependency            -0.001***                
             0.000                 
ICT Expenditure     0.010**          0.026**              
      0.004          0.011              
ICT expenditure*Age Dependency               -0.026              
                0.016              
Labor Market Reforms       0.002          0.018***             
        0.003          0.005            
Labor Market Reforms*Age Dependency                 -0.028***            
                  0.009            
Financial Depth         -0.008         -0.02 
          0.009         0.02 
Financial Depth*Age Dependency                   0.019 
                    0.041 
Constant  0.474***  1.872*** 0.582*** 0.886*** 0.463*** 1.800*** 0.554*** 0.890*** 
    0.111  0.528 0.202 0.178 0.109 0.522 0.203 0.176 
Significance of Fixed Effects                     
P-value of F-statistics  0.001  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.001 
                     
Hausman Test  46.67 57.10  11.95  144.34  43.63  64.9  17.29  141.19 
  0.000  0.000 0.051 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.000 
                     
Joint significance of Interaction and Constituent Term            29.6  4.57  4.03  4.27 
            0.001  0.003  0.005  0.002 
                     
Number of observations  2111  419  621  2381  2111  419  621  2381 
Number of Countries  110  71  106  115  110  71  106  115 
R
2  0.402  0.257 0.253 0.261 0.410 0.263 0.261 0.260 
F Statistic  59.779***  11.780*** 6.832***  20.376***  51.938***  11.974***  6.473***  17.647*** 
Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. 
Coefficient of financial depth is multiplied with 100 to make results presentable. 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent and * indicates a significance at 1 percent level Age Dependency and Labor Productivity Divergence 
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The coefficient of financial development (measured by domestic credit provided 
by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP) is negative but statistically insignificant. It 
may be due to the fact that a large number of countries in our sample are developing and 
emerging economies, where the financial sector is not yet fully developed and financial 
services’ outreach is still limited. Time specific effects, although not shown in Table 5.2, 
are statistically significant in model 4 (with financial development included) both in the 
linear and interactive specifications of the model. 
 One potential problem of the estimation results reported in Table 5.2 is that of 
reverse causality between age dependency and labor productivity. To test for this 
potential problem, we apply an instrumental variable approach. For this purpose, age 
dependency is instrumented by child dependency lagged two years in time and population 
growth lagged five years in time. The validity of these instruments is tested by applying 
statistical tests. The corresponding estimation results are presented in Table 5.4A in the 
appendix. The Davidson test computes a statistic for the exogeniety of one or more 
regressors in a fixed-effect regression estimated via instrumental variables, the null 
hypothesis of which states that an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of the same 
equation would yield consistent estimates: that is, any endogeneity among the regressors 
would not have deleterious effects on OLS estimates. The high p-value that has been 
found indicates that there is no endogeneity problem in our model. The coefficient of age 
dependency remains negative and significant which is in line with our previous empirical 
findings.  
    To investigate the other productivity determinants are also conditional on the age 
structure of the population, we introduced the interaction term of age dependency with 
gross capital formation, ICT development, labor market reforms and financial 
development. The estimation results are presented in columns 5-8 of Table 5.2. Our key 
hypotheses relate to the significance of the marginal effect of our variables of interest 
represented by Ψ  on our dependent variable. By taking the first-order derivative of the 
dependent variable with respect to the variable of interest as mentioned in equation (5.4), 
we will get our hypothesis to test 
 Chapter 5 
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H0:β6+ β7*AD = 0 
H1: β6+ β7*AD ≠ 0 
 
Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the impact of our variable of interest on 
labor productivity is significant and conditional on the size of age dependency. In order 
to assess the significance of these variables, we need to draw confidence intervals, for 
which standard errors can be calculated following the methodology of Aiken and West 
(1991).
17 
Figure 5.4: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms 
and  financial development on labor productivity at different levels of age dependency - complete 
sample  
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of age dependency. These figures 
correspond to our main results as given in columns 5-8 of Table 5.2.  The upper panels show the marginal 
effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the lower panels show the 
marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and Financial development (fdepth) at different levels of 
age dependency.  
 
                                                 
17 Technical details on calculating marginal effects and confidence intervals can be found in Brambor et al 
(2006). 
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On the basis of the results presented in columns 5-8 of Table 5.2, we consider the 
marginal impact of the multiplicative term. Figure 5.4 presents the marginal effect of 
various explanatory variables on labor productivity, conditional on different levels of age 
dependency. The solid line in each panel of Figure 5.4 shows the marginal impact of one 
variable of interest on labor productivity at different levels of age dependency. The 95 % 
confidence intervals around the solid line allow us to determine the conditions under 
which that variable has a statistically significant effect on labor productivity – that is, its 
effect is statistically significant positive (or negative) whenever the upper and lower 
bounds of the confidence interval are both above (or below) the zero line.  
For example, the upper left panel in Figure 5.4 shows the marginal effect of 
growth in gross capital formation (GFC) on labor productivity at different levels of age 
dependency. This figure corresponds to the main result in the fifth column of Table 5.1. 
Downward sloping, statistically significant marginal effects of GCF reflect that as the age 
dependency level in an economy increases, the positive impact of investment on labor 
productivity growth will be lowered. A possible explanation for this significant 
downward sloping marginal effect is that a higher working age share offers the 
opportunity to utilize gross capital formation more efficiently, which in turns promotes 
labor productivity growth. 
The marginal effect of ICT on labor productivity at different levels of age 
dependency is presented in the upper right panel of Figure 5.4 (corresponding to the 
results in column 6 of Table 5.2). The downward sloping marginal impact line suggests 
that ICT helps to promote labor productivity growth at lower levels of age dependency. If 
the dependency burden in an economy falls, it raises the positive role of ICT for 
productivity growth. Empirical results imply that a 1 % increase in ICT expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP at the average level of age dependency (0.66) raises labor 
productivity by 0.88 %. If age dependency is greater than 0.80, the ICT role towards 
labor productivity growth declines to 0.58 %. To absorb and utilize ICT development 
properly, an abundant skilled active labor force is apparently a basic requirement. 
However, this is difficult to fulfill in the presence of a large dependent population as 
many people are still in school or already retired so that skill demands do not match 
supply. Chapter 5 
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The effect of labor market regulations on labor productivity also changes at 
different levels of age dependency. Contrary to the results in the model without 
interaction term (column 3 of Table 5.2), we find that labor market regulations promote 
labor productivity in countries with a relatively large working age population, as well as 
that it increases its impact (see lower right panel of Figure 5.4). In countries with high 
dependency rates, the role of labor market regulations is relatively small in promoting 
labor productivity. 
The role of financial development in promoting economic growth is greatly 
acknowledged in the literature (King and Levine, 1993; Nourzad, 2002; and Arizala et 
al., 2009). However, there are some studies that have found a negative effect 
(Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000; Borio and Lowe, 2002). We use domestic credit by the 
banking sector as percentage of GDP as a proxy for financial depth (fdepth). Our results 
show that its marginal effect is slightly positive at high levels of age dependency. It 
reflects the fact that an increase in financial depth increases labor productivity if age 
dependency rises, although its coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Overall, our empirical analyses provide empirical evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that the age composition of the population matters. Our results indicate that 
higher age dependency impacts labor productivity growth negatively not only directly but 
also indirectly. More specifically, we find that the marginal effects of gross capital 
formation, labor market reforms and information and communication technology 
investment on labor productivity growth are significantly higher at lower levels of age 
dependency. Furthermore, although the marginal effect of financial development on labor 
productivity is slightly higher at higher levels of age dependency, it is not statistically 
significant. Size and nature of age dependency vary across different income groups. For 
example, age dependency in low income economies is 1.9 times higher than in high 
income economies.  The diversity in size and nature of age dependency across regions 
and different income levels thus helps to explain labor productivity differentials among 
them. 
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5.5 Robustness and extensions 
We carried out a number of robustness checks to examine whether our results hold when 
we restrict our sample to only developed or only developing economies. The results are 
presented in the appendix in Tables 5.5A and 5.6A, respectively, while the marginal 
effects corresponding to these empirical results are presented in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, 
respectively. Our findings remain almost the same for both groups of economies with the 
exception of the marginal effect of financial development. 
Figure 5.5: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms 
and  financial development on labor productivity at different levels of age dependency – 
developed countries  
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of age dependency. These figures 
correspond to our main results as given in columns 5-8 of Table 5.4A.  The upper panels show the marginal 
effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the lower panels show the 
marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and financial development (fdepth) at different levels of 
age dependency. 
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We find that the marginal effect of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure and 
labor market reforms declines at higher levels of age dependency. Separate analyses for 
developed and for developing economies also provide very similar marginal effects of 
GCF on labor productivity conditional on age dependency. However, in the case of 
developed countries, the slope is somewhat flatter indicating a slower decline in labor 
productivity as compared to developing countries (see upper left graphs of Figures 5.5 
and 5.6, respectively). The same is true for ICT expenditure and LMR (see upper right 
and lower left graphs in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, respectively).  
Figure 5.6: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms 
and financial development on labor productivity at different levels of age dependency – 
developing countries 
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of age dependency. These figures 
correspond to our main results as given in columns 5-8 of Table 5.5A.  The upper panels show the marginal 
effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the lower panels show the 
marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and financial development (fdepth) at different levels of 
age dependency. 
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Table 5. 3: Demographics and determinants of labor  productivity – sensitivity analysis 
 
   Interactive model 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Age Dependency  -0.356***  -0.264***  -0.403***  -0.538*** -0.415***  -0.362***  -0.268  -0.086 
   0.081  0.079  0.085  0.156  0.083  0.132  0.202  0.101 
Age Dependency*Age Dependency  0.201***  0.137*** 0.212***  0.300*** 0.228***  0.190*  0.124  0.041 
 0.052  0.051  0.055  0.105  0.054  0.1  0.129  0.066 
Change in Participation  -0.738***  -0.791***  -0.750***  -0.739*** -0.727***  -0.704***  -0.810***  -0.755*** 
   0.036  0.036  0.036  0.048  0.037  0.036  0.106  0.041 
Initial level of labor productivity -0.037***  -0.021***  -0.027***  -0.061*** -0.030*** -0.020***  0.011 -0.031*** 
   0.006  0.006  0.006  0.011  0.006  0.008  0.015  0.007 
Inflation -0.106***  -0.067***  -0.080***  -0.142*** -0.101***  -0.107***  -0.043***  -0.074*** 
   0.006  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.006  0.008  0.014  0.007 
Change in Gross Capital Formation  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.004***  0.002*** 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
Gross capital Formation*Age Dependency  -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.002*** -0.001***  -0.001*  -0.003***  -0.001*** 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000 
Openness  0.000***                         
   0.000                         
Remittances    0.174***                       
     0.043                       
Foreign direct Investment      0.001                     
       0.000                     
Infrastructure (roads )         0.000**                   
         0.000                   
Telephone lines per 1000          0.001                 
           0.000                 
Employment in Agriculture            0.001***               
             0.000               
 Education              0.000             
              0.001             
 Corruption                -0.001 
                 0.001 
Constant 0.493***  0.325***  0.440***  0.807***  0.471***  0.344***  0.037  0.349*** 
 0.072  0.073  0.079  0.131  0.073  0.1  0.182  0.089 
Number of observations  2103  1798  1978  1113  2097  1298  290  1403 
Number of Countries  110  103  109  107  110  97  82  81 
R
2 0.418  0.4  0.404  0.462  0.41  0.461  0.435  0.43 
F Statistic  178.415***  140.710*** 157.545*** 107.266*** 172.153***  127.572***  19.265*** 123.806***
Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent and * indicates a significance at 1 percent level Chapter 5 
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 The marginal effect of financial development on labor productivity growth at old 
age dependency is larger in high income OECD countries, but it is only statistically 
significant at low levels of age dependency (see bottom left panel in Figure 5.4). For 
developing economies, the financial development marginal impact curve is flatter and 
insignificant for labor productivity at different levels of age dependency.  
These differences in marginal impact of financial development may be due to the 
different nature of age dependency in developed and developing countries. Developed 
countries are characterized by high old age dependency contrary to developing countries 
where high child dependency mainly represents age dependency (see Figure 5.1A in the 
appendix). It may be because of the fact that older people make good use of their savings, 
as a result of which financial deepening is more effective than for younger people. 
We have also splitted up age dependency in child dependency and old age 
dependency. The marginal effects of the various determinants of labor productivity at 
different levels of child dependency and old age dependency are presented in Figures 
5.2A to 5.2.2A and 5.4A to 5.4.2A in the appendix.
18 The results show that child 
dependency affects labor productivity adversely both in the complete sample and in the 
sub-samples of developed and developing countries.  
However, in the case of high income developed economies, the impact of gross 
capital formation remains positive and significant at higher levels of child dependency. 
The marginal effects curves for developing countries are slightly steeper than those for 
the high income economies. The impact of old age dependency is not negative in the 
complete sample and in the sample of developing countries. This can be explained by the 
low level of old age dependency in developing countries (in low income developing 
economies, the higher share of age dependency is due to child dependency; moreover, 
due to poor health conditions, life expectancy is also lower in comparison to developed 
economies). It is only the marginal effect curve of financial development that becomes 
downward sloping, though not significant.  
                                                 
18 The corresponding tables of results are not presented but are available on request. Age Dependency and Labor Productivity Divergence 
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In the sample of developed countries, the marginal effect of GCF is slightly lower 
at different levels of old age dependency, while the ICT impact on labor productivity 
remains almost the same at different levels of age dependency. The impact of labor 
market reforms is positive in presence of old age dependency. Altogether, the analysis by 
child and old age dependency burdens reflect that child dependency has a stronger 
adverse effect on labor productivity than old age dependency. However, the long run 
effects of children might still be positive since they receive schooling and develop skills 
for higher productivity in the future. 
19 
We have also determined the impact of other control variables that have been 
suggested by previous studies in the literature along with our preferred interactive model. 
The empirical results are presented in Table 5.3. In columns 1-8 we add several 
economic, human capital and infrastructural variables. We find that openness, 
remittances and infrastructure development are significantly related to labor productivity. 
But the sign and significance of the variables of interest remain unchanged. 
As a sensitivity analysis we also changed our period of analysis to 1995-2005. 
The results, which are presented in Figure 5.4A in the appendix, show that the marginal 
effects of various determinants, conditional on age dependency, hardly change and thus 
may said to be robust to the period of analysis. Finally, we changed our dependent 
variable from output per worker to output per hour. This led to a significant decline in the 
number of observations, as data on hours per worker is not available for a large number 
of countries. However, the findings are very similar to the results obtained for developed 
countries. This is because data on output per worker is mostly only available for 
developed economies. 
On the basis of these sensitivity analyses, we may conclude that our main finding that age 
dependency has a negative effect on labor productivity growth and lowers the impact of 
other determinants of labor productivity growth holds. 
 
 
                                                 
19 But after gaining proper education and required skills they can be more productive in the long term. 
There is need to explore this effect, but comparable time series data are missing. Chapter 5 
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5.6 Conclusion 
We examine the effect of gross capital formation, labor market institution, ICT 
expenditure and financial development on labor productivity (measured by output per 
worker) conditional on different levels of age dependency for up to 110 countries over 
the period 1980-2005. We find that age dependency matters for labor productivity 
growth. This finding is in line with the conclusion of Kogel’s (2005) study that youth 
dependency may be harmful for labor productivity. Our results show that higher age 
dependency impacts labor productivity growth negatively not only directly but also 
indirectly by modifying the impact of other social, economic and infrastructural 
determinants.  
  In our sensitivity tests, we use a number of variations in the definitions of the 
variables used, in the sample of countries and the period of analysis. It turns out that our 
results are generally very robust and hold for both sub samples of developed and 
developing countries. We also find that child dependency has a stronger adverse impact 
on labor productivity than old age dependency. Age dependency in low income 
economies is 1.8 times higher than in high income developed economies. This implies 
that our finding that age dependency affects labor productivity negatively helps to explain 
productivity growth differentials across country groups at different income levels. 
Furthermore, our finding suggests that in the future when child dependency in developing 
and emerging economies declines, there may be an expected increase in labor 
productivity not only directly but also through improved performance of other 
determinants of labor productivity. In developing and emerging economies, foremost 
priority should therefore be given to an increase in the education and skill training of the 
working age population, so that these economies can properly utilize the favorable 
demographic changes to increase labor productivity and economic growth. 
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Appendix: 
 
 
 
Table 2.1A: List of sample countries by continent 
 
Europe Asia  Africa  South  America 
North/Central 
America  Oceania 
Austria Bangladesh Chad  Argentina  Barbados  Australia 
Belgium China  Egypt  Bolivia  Canada  New  Zealand 
Cyprus  Hong Kong  Ghana  Brazil  Costa Rica  Papua New Guinea 
Denmark India  Madagascar Chile  El  Salvador   
Finland Indonesia  Mali  Colombia Guatemala   
France Japan  Nigeria  Ecuador Jamaica   
Germany Kenya  South  Africa  Paraguay  Mexico   
Greece  South Korea  Swaziland  Peru  United States   
Hungary Malaysia  Togo  Uruguay     
Iceland Pakistan  Tunisia  Venezuela     
Ireland Philippines Zambia       
Italy Singapore  Zimbabwe       
Luxembourg Sri  Lanka         
Malta Syria         
Netherlands Thailand         
Norway Turkey         
Portugal          
Spain          
Sweden          
Switzerland          
United Kingdom                Appendices 
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Table 2.2A: Contribution of demographic transition process to past economic growth: results per decade  
 
  
  China  India    Pakistan 
 
  1963-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000  1963-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000    1963-70 1971-80  1981-90 1991-2000 
Average annual growth 
rate of real GDP per 
capita  7.169 4.373 7.768  9.279 
 
1.867 0.760 3.589  3.649 
 
4.798 1.515 3.495  1.430 
                        
Average growth rate 
child dependency ratio  -0.019  3.080  6.199  2.361 
 
-0.405 1.296 1.431  1.764 
 
-0.660 -0.156 -0.601  1.610 
Average growth rate old-
age dependency ratio  0.507  -0.146  -0.232  -0.864 
 
-0.358 -0.361 -0.170  -0.446 
 
0.954 0.199 0.026  -0.298 
Average growth 
differential between 
working-age population 
and total population  0.026  0.368  0.622  0.134 
 
-0.067 0.148 0.164  0.175 
 
-0.043 -0.013 -0.082  0.210 Appendices 
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               Table 3.1A: List of sample countries by income group 
 
 
Table 2.3A: Projected changes in dependency ratios in China, India and 
Pakistan 
 
   China India  Pakistan 
Year Total  Child  Old-age  Total Child Old-age Total  Child Old-age 
2000 48  38  10  65  58  7  82  75  7 
2005 42  31  11  60  53  7  73  67  7 
2010 39  28  11  56  48  8  69  62  7 
2015 40  27  13  52  44  8  65  58  7 
2020 44  27  17  49  40  9  62  54  8 
2025 46  26  19  47  36  11  58  50  8 
2030 49  25  24  45  33  12  54  45  9 
2035 54  24  30  44  30  14  51  41  10 
2040 59  24  35  44  28  15  50  39  11 
2045 61  24  36  45  27  18  49  36  13 
2050 63  25  38  47  27  20  50  35  15 
Source: United Nations (2008) 
Low  
income 
economies 
Lower  
middle  
income 
economies 
Upper  
middle  
income 
economies 
High  
income 
economies 
Bangladesh China  Argentina  Australia 
India Colombia  Brazil  Belgium 
Kenya Ecuador Chile  Canada 
Madagascar Egypt  Malaysia  France   
Nigeria Indonesia Mexico  Italy 
Pakistan Morocco  South  Africa  Japan 
Tanzania Peru  Turkey  Netherlands 
Zambia Philippines    New  Zealand 
Zimbabwe  Sri Lanka    South Korea 
 Syria    Spain 
 Thailand    UK 
   Tunisia     USA Appendices 
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Table 3.2A:  Summary Statistics by Income Group  
 
Low Income Economies 
Lower Middle Income 
Economies 
Upper Middle Income 
Economies  High Income Economies  
Variable Name  Mean Min  Max  Mean Min Max  Mean  Min  Max Mean  Min  Max 
Female Participation Age 15-19  50.31  17.00  85.35  31.14  3.90  82.70  34.89  7.70  69.55  39.81  4.40  84.60 
Female Participation Age 20-24  60.55  24.29  99.80  44.82  5.01  91.70  49.46  20.03  72.40  62.85  19.68  80.30 
Female Participation Age 24-29  65.02  28.57  99.65  46.06  3.79  93.00  49.35  16.32  79.80  58.56  19.78  85.30 
Female Participation Age 30-34  69.55  29.55  100.00  46.35  5.77  91.40  47.85  13.86  81.90  55.13  16.03  82.20 
Female Participation Age 35-39  71.01  29.34  100.00  46.18  7.35  91.50  49.05  13.89  82.50  57.38  16.85  82.10 
Female Participation Age 40-44  70.38  27.09  100.00  46.53  8.03  90.11  47.97  13.86  82.90  58.33  16.78  83.40 
Female Participation Age 45-49  70.18  25.33  100.00  44.19  9.16  86.67  45.81  14.62  80.70  55.99  17.31  83.30 
Female Participation Age 50-54  68.71  24.70  97.90  39.34  8.51  82.78  41.46  13.98  72.00  48.98  18.17  78.90 
Female Participation Age 55-59  64.85  23.85  94.15  33.31  9.79  77.19  31.72  13.59  67.30  37.60  14.20  70.50 
Female Participation Age 60-64  56.37  18.29  83.30  23.26  4.60  54.10  21.63  5.00  65.30  22.21  4.00  50.80 
Total Fertility Rate  6.03  2.84  8.12  4.47 1.81 7.60  3.93  1.97  6.88 2.14  1.08  5.67 
Average years of schooling  
(females,  age>15)  2.15  0.11 5.04  3.99  0.25  8.18 4.65 1.15  8.90  8.13  3.02  12.02 
Capital stock per worker (000)  4.95  0.06  21.34  15.20  1.46  37.55  29.18  3.36  68.05  90.30  5.24  175.89 
Employment in agriculture (%)  73.56  43.00  92.60  47.55  6.20  83.20  30.49  7.71  78.70  11.04  1.40  61.30 
Lagged  Birth  Rate/1000  42.63  16.98 51.59  36.44  15.98  50.79 29.67 12.17  47.97  20.06  9.22  49.34 
Infant Mortality Rate/1000  102.45  53.00  165.00  66.61 12.00  186.00  55.62 8.00 163.00 14.19 3.00  90.00 
Under 5 Mortality Rate/1000  167.15  73.00  290.00  96.84  14.00  278.00  73.36  10.00  219.00  16.75  4.00  127.00 
Notes: Based on sample of 326 observations. 
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Table 3.3A: Alternative instrumental variables sets 
  
Davidson-MacKinnon Test of 
Exogeneity  Over identification test   Under identification test  Weak identification test  First Stage F-stat* 
   F statistic  p-value  Sargan-Hansen test  p-value  Chi-sq(2)  p-value 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
Statistic    
LBR-5, IMR, MR  11.5  <0.01  0.73  0.39  27.81  0.00  10.10  28.2 / 27.3 
URB, CD, UN  0.72  0.48  2.01  0.15  4.28  0.12  1.31  3.8 / 15.7 
AD, LEB, PCY  15.14  0.05  0.53  0.41  1.38  0.49  0.42  77.4 /  40.6 
TMP, URB, AYSM  2.10  0.12  0.00  0.91  0.64  0.72  0.19  2.4 /  0.2 
POP-1, TMP, AYSM  7.88  0.04  0.05  0.82  6.56  0.04  2.28  5.6 / 25.1 
UN, PCY, CD  22.38  0.01  0.25  0.61  5.76  0.07  1.90  6.8 / 16.0 
AYSM, TMP,  PCY  8.60  0.02  0.00  0.92  2.92  0.23  0.88  2.5 / 0.9 
MR-1, AYSF-1, URB  2.03  0.13  0.01  0.91  0.04  0.98  0.01  11.7 / 4.5 
LBR-5, LEB, URB  18.33  0.00  0.00  0.97  0.38  0.82  0.13  19.4 / 16.5 
TFR-1, LEB-1, PCY  13.20  0.00  0.29  0.55  1.10  0.57  0.33  91 /  35 
Note: LBR-5=lagged crude birth rate; IMR=infant mortality rate; MR=mortality rate under 5 years of age; URB=urbanization; CD= child dependency; UN=unemployment rate; AD=age 
dependency; LEB= life expectancy at birth for women; PCY= per capita income; TMP= labor force participation for men; AYSM= average years of schooling for men; POP= total 
population size; TFR-1=lagged total fertility rate 
* First value is for first stage regression for total fertility rate and second value is for interaction term (total fertility rate*capital stock per worker) Appendices 
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Table 4.1A: List of Countries in sample by region  
  
East and Southeast Asia  South America  Middle East and North Africa  Africa    Europe 
China   Brazil    Egypt    Nigeria    France 
Indonesia   Colombia   Turkey     
South 
Africa   UK 
Japan   Argentina    Syria    Tanzania    Italy 
Philippines   Peru    Morocco    Kenya    Spain 
Thailand   Chile    Tunisia    Madagascar    Netherlands 
S.  Korea   Ecuador        Zimbabwe    Belgium 
Malaysia          Zambia     
           
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
South Asia    North America  Oceania       Albania 
Pakistan   USA    Australia       Hungary 
India   Canada    New  Zealand       Bulgaria 
Sri  Lanka   Mexico           Poland 
Bangladesh             Romania 
List of Countries in sample by income Groups  Development 
High 
Income 
Economies 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
Economies 
lower 
middle 
income 
economies 
lower 
income 
Economies     Developed Economies  Developing Economies 
Australia Bulgaria  China  Bangladesh    Australia   Albania  China  Bangladesh 
Belgium Argentina  Colombia  India    Belgium   Argentina  Colombia  India 
Canada Brazil Ecuador  Kenya    Canada   Brazil  Ecuador  Kenya 
France   Chile  Egypt  Madagascar    France     Chile  Egypt  Madagascar 
Italy Malaysia  Indonesia  Nigeria    Hungary   Malaysia  Indonesia  Bulgaria 
Hungary Mexico Morocco  Pakistan    Italy   Mexico  Morocco  Poland 
Japan S  Africa  Peru  Tanzania    Japan   South  Africa  Peru  Romania 
Netherlands Turkey  Philippines  Zambia    Netherlands   Turkey  Nigeria   
New Zealand  Poland  Sri Lanka  Zimbabwe    New Zealand    Philippines  Pakistan   
South Korea  Romania  Syria      South Korea    Sri Lanka  Tanzania   
Spain   Thailand      Spain    Syria  Zambia   
UK     Tunisia        UK    Thailand  Zimbabwe    
USA   Albania      USA    Tunisia     
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Table 4.2A: Output decomposition by employment and productivity 1960-2005 by region 
   Output Growth  Employment  Growth  Productivity  Growth 
Africa 2.93  2.68  0.25 
East and Southeast Asia  5.61  2.21  3.40 
Europe 3.01  0.73  2.27 
Eastern Europe  2.88  -0.05  2.93 
Middle East and North Africa  4.64  2.58  2.06 
North America  3.65  2.37  1.28 
Oceania 3.19  1.79  1.40 
South America  3.56  2.39  1.17 
South Asia  4.51  2.25  2.26 
 
By Income Group 
 
   Output Growth  Employment  Growth  Productivity  Growth 
High income economies  3.43  1.13  2.30 
Upper middle income economies  3.60  1.48  2.12 
Lower Middle income 
economies  4.66 2.46  2.21 
Low income economies  3.30  2.68  0.62 
 
By Development Level 
 
   Output Growth  Employment  Growth  Productivity  Growth 
Developed 3.48  1.24  2.23 
Developing 3.99  2.19  1.80 
Source : TCB\GGDC, Total Economy Database, 2008 
 
 
Table 4.3A: Output decomposition by employment and productivity 1960-2005 by income 
groups 
 
   High Income Economies  Upper Middle Income Economies 
   Output growth  Emp growth  Produc growth  Output growth  Emp growth  Produc growth 
1960-70  5.48 1.50 3.99  5.26 1.70 3.56 
1970-80  3.65 1.15 2.50  4.71 2.03 2.68 
1980-90  2.91 0.97 1.93  1.55 1.94 -0.40 
1990-00  2.65 0.79 1.86  2.96 0.81 2.16 
2000-05  2.47 1.24 1.22  3.54 0.94 2.59 
   Lower middle Income Economies  Lower Income Economies 
   Output growth  Emp growth  Produc growth  Output growth  Emp growth  Produc growth 
1960-70  4.85 2.15 2.70  4.94 2.43 2.52 
1970-80  5.70 2.87 2.83  3.04 2.81 0.22 
1980-90  3.73 3.12 0.60  2.91 3.19 -0.28 
1990-00  4.04 1.87 2.17  2.20 2.61 -0.41 
2000-05  5.01 2.27 2.73  3.40 2.36 1.05 
Note: Emp= Employment, Produc= Productivity 
Source: TCB\GGDC, Total Economy Database, 2008 
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Table 4.4A: Growth of labor productivity, GDP and employment by region (2006-08) 
 
   2006  2007  2008  Avg 2006-08 
Labor Productivity Growth (GDP per persons Employed, annual average, percent) 
South Asia  5.59  5.83  4.85  5.42 
South  America  1.83  2.51  1.95  2.10 
Oceania 0.34  1.01  -0.95  0.13 
North America  1.11  0.93  0.57  0.87 
Middle East and North Africa  3.72  2.25  1.87  2.61 
Central  & Eastern Europe  4.26  3.77  3.72  3.92 
Europe 1.09  0.98  0.77  0.95 
Southeast Asia  4.52  4.75  2.66  3.97 
Africa 2.05  2.27  0.91  1.74 
Real GDP Growth (annual average, percent) 
South Asia  7.63  7.27  6.27  7.06 
South  America  5.83  6.41  5.90  6.05 
Oceania 2.43  3.32 0.19  1.98 
North America  3.56  2.64  0.97  2.39 
Middle East and North Africa  6.42  4.95  4.65  5.34 
Central & Eastern Europe  5.98  5.31  5.02  5.44 
Europe 2.89  2.76  0.82  2.16 
Southeast Asia  5.79  6.42  4.07  5.43 
Africa 4.36  4.59  3.20  4.05 
Growth in Persons Employed (annual average, percent) 
South Asia  2.23  1.37  1.37  1.66 
South  America  4.09  3.83  3.87  3.93 
Oceania 2.08  2.29 1.14  1.84 
North America  2.42  1.70  0.42  1.52 
Middle East and North Africa  2.63  2.66  2.73  2.67 
Central & Eastern Europe  1.67  1.50  1.28  1.48 
Europe 1.79  1.77  0.82  1.46 
Southeast Asia  1.23  1.61  1.37  1.40 
Africa 2.27  2.27  2.27  2.27 
Source: The Conference Board, Total Economy Database, June 2009 
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Table 4.5A: Effect of participation on labor productivity growth  
Employment   Employment/Labor force  Employment/Working Age  Employment/Population  Labor force/Working age  Labor force / Population   
  uncontrolled Controlled uncontrolled Controlled uncontrolled Controlled uncontrolled Controlled uncontrolled Controlled uncontrolled Controlled 
Annual 
 
Labor 
Productivity 
Growth 
 
Constant 
 
Observation 
 
 
-0.699 
(12.49)** 
 
2. 80 
(16.56)** 
 
1000 
 
 
-0.683 
(11.84) 
 
4.63 
(6.99) 
 
1000 
 
 
 
 
-0.439 
(6.10)** 
 
1. 23 
(9.95)** 
 
1000 
 
 
-0.498 
(7.36)** 
 
2.89 
(4.20)** 
 
1000 
 
 
-0.690 
(10.76)** 
 
1. 37 
(11.54)** 
 
1000 
 
 
-0.675 
(11.23)** 
 
2.63 
(3.97)** 
 
1000 
 
 
 
-0.663 
(10.28)** 
 
1. 67 
(13.16)** 
 
975 
 
 
 
-0.670 
(11.09)** 
 
3.32 
(4.89)** 
 
975 
 
 
-0.930 
(8.22)** 
 
1.509 
(12.08)** 
 
1000 
 
 
-0.823 
(7.31)** 
 
3.47 
(5.09)** 
 
1000 
 
 
-0.803 
(7.29)** 
 
1.83 
(12.08)** 
 
975 
 
 
-0.777 
(6.99)** 
 
4.29 
(6.02) 
 
975 
5-years 
 
Labor 
Productivity 
Growth 
 
Constant 
 
Observation 
 
 
-0.712 
(12.19)** 
 
2.85 
(19.10)** 
 
840 
 
 
-0.668 
(11.27)** 
 
5.37 
(13.19)** 
 
840 
 
 
 
-0.291 
(3.12)** 
 
1.27 
(15.04)** 
 
840 
 
 
-0.599 
(7.75)** 
 
3.37 
(8.27)** 
 
840 
 
 
-0.666 
(7.95)** 
 
1.39 
(16.97)** 
 
840 
 
 
-0.714 
(10.75)** 
 
3.46 
(8.84)** 
 
840 
 
 
-0.598 
(7.23)** 
 
1.65 
(17.47)** 
 
819 
 
 
-0.685 
(10.35)** 
 
4.16 
(10.47)** 
 
819 
 
 
-0.964 
(7.52)** 
 
1.54 
(17.56)** 
 
840 
 
 
-0.791 
(6.26)** 
 
4.14 
(10.15)** 
 
840 
 
 
-0.711 
(6.10)** 
 
1.79 
(15.76)** 
 
819 
 
 
-0.621 
(5.26)** 
 
4.74 
(10.79)** 
 
819 
10-years 
 
Labor 
Productivity 
Growth 
 
Constant 
 
Observation 
 
 
-0.69 
(10.68)** 
 
2.88 
(18.32)** 
 
640 
 
 
-0.888 
(5.92) 
 
4.60 
(3.97) 
 
640 
 
 
0.104 
(0.81) 
 
1.40 
(17.5)** 
 
640 
 
 
-0.70 
(7.25)** 
 
3.81 
(11.67)** 
 
640 
 
 
-0.566 
(4.79)** 
 
1.46 
(18.57)** 
 
640 
 
 
-0.79 
(9.94)** 
 
3.94 
(12.76)** 
 
640 
 
 
-0.474 
(4.27)** 
 
1.67 
(17.11)** 
 
624 
 
 
-0.710 
(9.31)** 
 
4.72 
(15.17)** 
 
624 
 
 
-1.01 
(7.03)** 
 
1.64** 
(19.60) 
 
640 
 
 
-0.777 
(5.47)** 
 
4.65 
(14.41)** 
 
640 
 
 
-0.754 
(5.99)** 
 
1.91 
(16.98)** 
 
624 
 
 
 
-0.60 
(4.74)** 
 
5.26 
(14.62)** 
 
624 
All independent variables are specified as growth rates. 
** significance at 1 percent 
* significance at 5 percent Appendices 
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Table 5.1A:  Description of data and its sources 
 
Variable Variable  description  Source 
LP  GDP per employed person 
Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre 
PART  Employed to total population ratio 
Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre 
AD  (0-14  years)+ (65+ years) / 15-64 years  World Development Indicators 
GCF  Gross capital formation is the sum of fixed 
gross capital formation, changes in 
inventories and acquisition less disposables 
of valuables  World Development Indicators 
INF   Consumer prices % annual  World Development Indicators 
ICT  Information and communication technology 
expenditure (% of GDP)   World Development Indicators 
LMR  Un-weighted average of six measures 
(Minimum wage, hiring and firing 
regulations, centralized collective 
bargaining, Mandated cost of hiring, 
Mandated cost of worker dismissal and 
Conscription) and its value varies from 1-10. 
Economic Freedom Index of Fraser 
Institute 
FIND Financial  Development  measured  as 
domestic credit provided by banking sector 
(% of GDP)  World Development Indicators 
 
Table 5.2A: Summary statistics  
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Labor Productivity Growth  0.01  0.05  -0.35  0.30 
Age Dependency  0.66  0.19  0.30  1.16 
Change in Participation  0.00  0.02  -0.15  0.27 
Initial level of Labor Productivity (US $ 000)  18.03  14.35 0.53 64.15 
Inflation 0.12  0.17  -0.11  1.00 
Change in Gross Capital Formation  4.47  14.46  -50.26  111.40 
ICT Expenditure  5.78  2.31  1.03  15.06 
Financial Development  63.57  47.94  -28.22  318.67 
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Table 5.3A: Impact of demographics on  labor  productivity 
Dependent variable is labor productivity growth 
   1 
Age Dependency  -0.746* 
   0.452 
Age Dependency*Age Dependency  0.409 
   0.345 
Change in Participation  -0.792*** 
   0.057 
Initial level of labor productivity  -0.105*** 
   0.02 
Inflation -0.105*** 
   0.02 
Change in Gross Capital Formation  0.004*** 
   0 
Gross capital Formation*Age Dependency  -0.003*** 
   0 
ICT Expenditure  0.024 
   0.007 
ICT expenditure*Age Dependency  -0.0269 
   0.011 
Labor Market Reforms  0.002 
   0.008 
Labor Market Reforms*Age Dependency  0.0003 
   0.014 
Financial Depth  -0.001** 
   0 
Financial Depth*Age Dependency  0.003** 
   0 
Constant 1.278*** 
   0.279 
Significance of Fixed Effects    
P-value of F-statistics  0.001 
     
Number of observations  361 
Number of Countries  67 
R
2  0.68 
F Statistic  43.22*** 
Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent and 
* indicates a significance at 1 percent level Appendices 
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Table 5.4A: 2SLS Estimations Second Stage 
 
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Growth 
 1  2 
Age Dependency  -0.083***  -0.088** 
 0.017  0.043 
Change in Participation  -0.687***  -0.720*** 
 0.038  0.044 
Initial Level of Labor Productivity -0.022***  -0.029*** 
 0.006  0.007 
Inflation -0.111***  -0.081*** 
 0.007  0.009 
Change in Gross Capital Formation  0.001***  0.001*** 
 0  0 
Gross capital Formation*Age Dependency    0.001 
     0.002 
Number of observations  1895  1465 
Number of Countries  107  75 
R
2 0.396  0.383 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Statistics  96.21  18.24 
Stock-Yogo Critical Value  11.98  8.11 
Hensen J statistic (p-value)  0.67  0.22 
Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity (p-value)  0.218  0.482 
*significant at 10%,**significant at 5%,*** significant at 1 percent. Age dependency in model 1 is 
instrumented by second lag of child dependency and 5th lag of population growth. In model 2, age 
dependency and its interaction term are instrumented by 5th lag value of capital stock per worker, 
population growth and child dependency. Henson J statistic test for instrument validity, high p value 
reflects that instruments are valid (uncorrelated with error term and correctly excluded from second 
stage regression). Davidson test computes a test of exogeneity for a fixed-effect regression estimated 
via instrumental variables, the null hypothesis for which states that any endogeneity among the 
regressors would not have deleterious effects on OLS estimates. High p value suggests that there is no 
endogeneity problem in model. 
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Table 5.5A: Impact of demographics on labor  productivity for  high income OECD countries 
 
   Direct Model  Interactive model 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Age Dependency  -0.018  -0.856  1.003**  0.282  0.044  -1.399  1.125**  0.044 
   0.296  1.907  0.46  0.32  0.318  1.887  0.448  0.335 
Age Dependency*Age Dependency  -0.002  0.724 -0.973** -0.309  -0.059  1.835  -0.819* -0.158 
  0.274 1.957 0.412  0.28  0.287 1.989 0.405 0.282 
Change in Participation  -0.490***  -0.330*** -0.294***  -0.199***  -0.491***  -0.326***  -0.293***  -0.194*** 
    0.058 0.106 0.084 0.064  0.06  0.109 0.083 0.064 
Initial Level of Labor Productivity  -0.024*** -0.024 -0.037***  -0.034***  -0.024*** -0.029 -0.039***  -0.035*** 
    0.006  0.032 0.01 0.009 0.006  0.033 0.01 0.009 
Inflation -0.094***  -0.220*  -0.183***  -0.159***  -0.095***  -0.216*  -0.199***  -0.155*** 
    0.033 0.112 0.054 0.035 0.033  0.11  0.059 0.037 
Change in Gross Capital Formation  0.001***        0.002**       
    0      0.001     
Gross Capital Formation*Age Dependency          -0.002       
         0.003     
ICT Expenditure    0.009**        0.048*     
     0.004      0.026    
ICT Expenditure*Age Dependency            -0.081     
             0.05     
Labor Market Reforms      0.002        0.025   
       0.002        0.018   
Labor Market Reforms*Age Dependency              -0.048   
               0.037   
Financial Depth        -0.005        -0.038 
         0.006        0.028 
Financial Depth*Age Dependency          0.061 
            0.054 
            
Constant 0.284**  0.461  0.15  0.320**  0.265**  0.517  0.071  0.412*** 
    0.116 0.538 0.167 0.145 0.125 0.573 0.184 0.147 
            
Number of observations  607  150  229  608  607  150  229  608 
Number of Countries  27  25  27  27  27  25  27  27 
R
2  0.366 0.154 0.162 0.153 0.367 0.171 0.174 0.158 
F Statistic  39.380*** 9.589***  14.768*** 14.565*** 37.575***  10.805*** 12.535*** 13.111***
Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. 
Coefficient of financial depth is multiplied with 100 to make results presentable. 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent and * indicates a significance at 1 percent level 
 
 
 
 
 Appendices 
 
 
 
149
 
 
 
Table 5.6A: Impact of demographics on labor  productivity for developing countries 
 
   Direct Model  Interactive model 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Age  Dependency  -0.530*** -1.074  -0.539 -0.709***  -0.507*** -0.678  -0.47 -0.717*** 
   0.157  0.655  0.468  0.23  0.16  0.688  0.44  0.224 
Age Dependency*Age Dependency  0.295***  0.503 0.263  0.402***  0.282***  0.32  0.376  0.401*** 
  0.095 0.421 0.325 0.142 0.097 0.422 0.289 0.142 
Change in Participation  -0.757***  -0.497***  -0.659*** -0.621***  -0.777***  -0.496***  -0.665*** -0.621*** 
    0.062 0.166 0.179 0.089 0.059 0.164 0.178 0.089 
Initial level of Labor  Productivity  -0.032***  -0.180*** -0.077** -0.070*** -0.032*** -0.191*** -0.085** -0.070*** 
    0.01  0.048 0.033 0.016 0.009 0.047 0.035 0.016 
Inflation  -0.102*** -0.180** -0.109*** -0.121*** -0.099*** -0.184** -0.113*** -0.121*** 
    0.024 0.078 0.036 0.021 0.025 0.078 0.036 0.021 
Change in Gross Capital Formation  0.001***        0.002**       
   0.00        0.001       
Gross Capital Formation*Age Dependency          -0.001*       
           0.001       
ICT Expenditure    0.011*        0.034**     
     0.005      0.015    
ICT Expenditure*Age Dependency            -0.035*     
             0.019     
Labor Market Reforms      0.002        0.026**   
       0.004       0.01   
Labor Market Reforms*Age Dependency              -0.038***  
           0.012   
Financial  Depth      -0.007      -0.011 
        0.014      0.034 
Financial Depth*Age Dependency          0.006 
            0.048 
            
Constant  0.527*** 2.109*** 0.970** 0.950*** 0.515*** 2.040*** 0.957** 0.955*** 
    0.133 0.623 0.414 0.198 0.132 0.594 0.419 0.194 
            
Number of observations  1504  269  392  1773  1504  269  392  1773 
Number of Countries  83  46  79  88  83  46  79  88 
R
2  0.41  0.277 0.276 0.275 0.417 0.288 0.288 0.275 
F Statistic  61.066*** 11.132*** 8.429***  19.906*** 51.889***  12.850*** 7.542***  17.148***
Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. 
Coefficient of financial depth is multiplied with 100 to make results presentable. 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent and * indicates a significance at 1 percent level 
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Figure 5.1A: Child dependency and old age dependency by income group 
Child Dependency and Oldage Dependency 
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Figure 5.2A: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market 
reforms and  financial development on labor productivity at different levels of child 
dependency-complete sample 
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of child dependency. The upper 
panels show the marginal effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the 
lower panels show the marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and Financial Development 
(fdepth) at different levels of child dependency. 
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Figure 5.2.1A: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market 
reforms and  financial development on labor productivity at different levels of child 
dependency- developed countries 
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of child dependency. The upper 
panels show the marginal effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the 
lower panels show the marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and Financial Development 
(fdepth) at different levels of child dependency. 
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Figure 5.2.2A: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market 
reforms and  financial development on labor productivity at different levels of child 
dependency – developing countries 
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of child dependency. The upper 
panels show the marginal effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the 
lower panels show the marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and Financial Development 
(fdepth) at different levels of child dependency. 
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Figure 5.3A: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market 
reforms and  financial development on labor productivity at different levels of old age 
dependency -complete sample 
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of child dependency. The upper 
panels show the marginal effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the 
lower panels show the marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and Financial Development 
(fdepth) at different levels of child dependency. 
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Figure 5.3.1A: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market 
reforms and  financial development on labor productivity at different levels of old age 
dependency- developed countries 
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of child dependency. The upper 
panels show the marginal effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the 
lower panel show the marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and Financial Development 
(fdepth) at different levels of child dependency. 
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Figure 5.3.2A: Marginal impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market 
reforms and  financial development on labor productivity at different levels of old age 
dependency – developing  countries 
 
This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of child dependency. The upper 
panels show the marginal effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the 
lower panels show the marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and Financial Development 
(fdepth) at different levels of child dependency. 
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Figure 5.4A : Impact of demographics  on labor  productivity 1995-2005 -sensitivity analysis 
 
 This figure examines the impact of gross capital formation, ICT expenditure, labor market reforms and 
financial development on labor productivity growth at different levels of child dependency. The upper 
panels show the marginal effect of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and ICT expenditure (ICT) and the 
lower panels show the marginal effect of Labor Market Reforms (LMR) and Financial Development 
(fdepth) at different levels of child dependency. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Dit proefschrift levert empirisch bewijs voor de stelling dat de verdeling van de 
bevolking over verschillende leeftijdsgroepen van invloed is op economische groei, de 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen en de groei van de arbeidsproductiviteit. Tevens levert 
het empirisch bewijs voor de stelling dat de relatie tussen de arbeidsparticipatiegraad van 
vrouwen en de economische groei een U-vorm vertoont, alsook dat een toename van de 
arbeidsparticipatiegraad op de korte termijn gepaard gaat met een afname van de 
arbeidsproductiviteit. 
  Na motivering van dit proefschrift in hoofdstuk 1, wordt in hoofdstuk 2 een 
aangepast Solow-Swan neoklassiek groeimodel geïntroduceerd, uitgebreid met 
demografische variabelen. De parameters van dit model worden geschat gebruikmakend 
van data uit zeventig landen over de periode 1961-2003. De resultaten tonen aan dat het 
bruto nationaal product per hoofd van de bevolking positief samenhangt met het 
groeiverschil tussen de beroepsbevolking en de totale bevolking en negatief samenhangt 
met de aandelen jongeren en ouderen. Uitgaande van deze modelresultaten kan voorts 
worden vastgesteld dat 46 procent van de economische groei per hoofd van de bevolking 
in China over de periode 1961-2003 wordt verklaard door demografische veranderingen 
in de bevolkingsopbouw, 39 procent in India en 25 procent in Pakistan. Naar verwachting 
hebben demografische veranderingen in de bevolkingsopbouw eveneens een positief 
effect op de economische groei in India en Pakistan over de periode 2005-2050, maar een 
negatief effect in China. Samenvatting 
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Hoofdstuk 3 levert empirisch bewijs voor de stelling dat de relatie tussen de 
arbeidsparticipatiegraad van vrouwen en de economische groei een U-vorm vertoont. De 
aggregatie van een micro-economisch model van de arbeidsparticipatiebeslissing over 
individuen toont aan dat vruchtbaarheid, het aandeel van de werkgelegenheid in de 
landbouw, het opleidings- en het inkomensniveau van een land de belangrijkste 
verklarende variabelen vormen van de arbeidsparticipatiegraad in dat land over de 
economische ontwikkelingscyclus. Een kwadratisch functioneel verband met interactie-
effecten tussen de kapitaal-arbeid ratio als proxy voor het inkomensniveau en ieder ander 
van de genoemde verklarende variabelen wordt geschat voor vrouwen in tien 
verschillende leeftijdsklassen, gebruikmakend van data van 40 landen in verschillende 
inkomensklassen over de periode 1960-2000. Voor elke leeftijdsgroep en voor elke 
verklarende variabele in het model kan een punt worden vastgesteld waarop een regime 
van een dalende participatiegraad omslaat in een regime van een toenemende 
participatiegraad. De daaraan verbonden beleidsconclusie is dat het verschil in de mate 
van arbeidsparticipatie van mannen en vrouwen in elk land uiteindelijk kan worden 
weggewerkt als het inkomensniveau maar voldoende stijgt. 
  Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert de invloed van een toename in de arbeidsparticipatiegraad 
op de arbeidsproductiviteit, met specifieke aandacht voor transitie- en ontwikkelende 
economieën. De analyse is gebaseerd op data van 45 landen uit verschillende delen van 
de wereld over de periode 1980-2005. De resultaten tonen aan dat er een afruil bestaat 
tussen productiviteit en arbeidsmarktparticipatie op de korte termijn. Omdat deze afruil 
echter na enkele jaren verdwijnt, heeft een toename van de arbeidsmarktparticipatiegraad 
op de middellange tot lange termijn uiteindelijk een positief effect op economische groei. 
Voorts tonen de resultaten aan dat de intensiteit van de afruil verschilt tussen landen en is 
gerelateerd aan het inkomensniveau. De afruil is het zwakst in ontwikkelde, rijke landen, 
waar deze binnen een periode van vijf jaar verdwijnt. In ontwikkelende en opkomende 
landen daarentegen is de afruil het sterkst, en verzwakt deze slechts geleidelijk over een 
langere tijdsduur.  
  Hoofdstuk 5 verschaft meer inzicht in het uiteenlopen van de arbeidsproductiviteit 
tussen regio’s en verschillende inkomensklassen in de wereld en levert empirisch bewijs 
voor de stelling dat de leeftijdsopbouw van de bevolking bepalend is voor Samenvatting 
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arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei. De resultaten wijzen uit dat een groter aandeel van 
leeftijdsafhankelijke bevolkingsgroepen negatief uitwerkt op de economische groei, niet 
alleen direct maar ook doordat de impact van andere sociale, economische en 
infrastructurele determinanten van economische groei hierdoor indirect wordt beïnvloed. 
Voorts blijkt dat een bevolkingsopbouw met een groter aandeel jongeren een sterker 
nadelig effect heeft op de groei van de arbeidsproductiviteit dan dat van ouderen. Deze 
diversiteit in grootte en aard van de leeftijdsafhankelijke bevolking tussen regio’s en 
tussen verschillende inkomensgroepen dragen aldus bij aan een betere verklaring van de 
verschillen in waargenomen arbeidsproductiviteit.  
  De behoefte om de snelheid en timing van demografische veranderingen vanuit 
beleidsperspectief beter te begrijpen wordt door de resultaten van dit proefschrift 
benadrukt, alsook de behoefte om het “demografische dividend” te kunnen vertalen in 
termen van economische groei. Het merendeel van de ontwikkelende en opkomende 
markteconomieën ondergaan nu of in de nabije toekomst een fase waarin ze de voordelen 
van demografische transitie kunnen benutten. Er is echter geen garantie dat het volledige 
kwantum van deze voordelen ook daadwerkelijk gerealiseerd zal worden. Belangrijke 
redenen hiervoor zijn het ontbreken van een adequaat beleidsraamwerk en onvoldoende 
voorbereiding. 
 
 